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Announcement

To Members of the Academy:

In accordance with provisions of the bylaws, notice is hereby given that the Board of Directors has fixed Monday, January 29, 1968, as the date for the Annual Corporate Meeting of The Academy of Political Science. The meeting will be held in the office of The Academy of Political Science, Room 411, Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York City, at 4:00 p.m.

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Urban Problems and the Federal Government: A Historical Inquiry*

DANIEL J. ELAZAR
Temple University

In recent years there has been a growing concern among political scientists and political practitioners alike with the evolution of the relationships between the federal government and the cities. This concern is variously directed toward federal relations with the nation's largest cities in particular toward federal relations with urban concentrations generally, or toward the need for developing a coherent pattern of relationships between the federal government and the nation's burgeoning metropolitan areas. Regardless of its immediate focus, it is based on public recognition of an obviously great increase in the dollar amounts of federal aid to the cities and a proliferation of federal programs specifically directed toward contemporary urban problems.

It is generally assumed that the federal-city relationship that is

* The bulk of the research for this article was made possible through a grant of funds from the University Research Board of the University of Illinois and of time from the Institute of Government and Public Affairs of that university. The initial hypotheses were developed and preliminary data gathered in the course of the author's other studies of nineteenth-century American federalism. See his *The American Partnership* (Chicago, 1962). Aside from the materials cited below, the author has made extensive use of documents in the State Historical Society and State Archives of Colorado, the Burton Historical Collection of the Detroit Public Library, the Barlow Collections in the Henry E. Huntington Library, the Minnesota Historical Society and State Archives of Minnesota, the Virginia State Archives, and the National Archives.

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evolving is radically new in several respects: in its very concern with urban problems as such; in the fact that much of it appears to be a direct relationship, for all intents and purposes, bypassing the states insofar as active implementation of the programs is concerned; and, finally, in its overall impact on American federalism. These assumptions are based on several premises, among them that the federal government ignored the cities until recently, and that meaningful (usually taken to mean direct) federal-city relationships date back no further than the beginning of the New Deal, prior to which time the cities received such minor federal benefits as were available via the states and then only as political subdivisions of the states. As an outgrowth of these two assumptions, there is a third: that the new federal-city relationship represents a new departure for American federalism by changing the basis of the federal system from a two-level (federal-state) to a three-level (federal-state-city) relationship.[1]

In at least one sense, the foregoing assumptions are well grounded in fact. The cities (and other urban entities) in this country are indeed carving a place for themselves in the scheme of American federalism not quite like any they had before, if only because they bulk so much larger on the American scene than ever before. At the same time, to the extent that the assumptions rest on the idea that the federal-local (substituting the word "local" for "city" so as to encompass urban counties, towns, boroughs, and the like) relationship of today is a radically new one, it is necessary to examine the historical record to see if such is the case before drawing any conclusions about the course of American federalism. Only if the federal-local relationship before 1933 is properly explored and examined in light of our knowledge of the nature of American federalism as it has evolved since the adoption of the Constitution is it

[1] This viewpoint is expressed either explicitly or implicitly in recent works on federal-city relations. See, for example, *The Federal Government and the Cities* (Washington, 1962), a collection of lectures delivered at The George Washington University in 1961, of which Roscoe C. Martin's excellent "Washington and the Cities: An Introduction" is most enlightening. Two other important sources of material on the evolving federal-city relationship are Robert H. Connery and Richard H. Leach, *The Federal Government and Metropolitan Areas* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) and "City-Federal Relations," *Proceedings of the American Municipal Congress, 1958* (Washington, 1958).

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possible to build an understanding of the evolution of the federal system in light of recent urbanizing trends.

This article will (1) raise some basic questions as to the character of federal-city relations in the period prior to 1933, (2) make a preliminary examination of those relations in light of the historical evidence in an effort to (3) bring the inquiry into the problem of federal-city relations today into proper historical focus and (4) to suggest some lines of further inquiry.

The Evolution of De Facto Arrangements

It would appear that the first step in an inquiry into the evolution of city-federal relationships in the United States is to determine at what point cities, as such, began to make specialized demands on the state and federal governments (past those related to simple incorporation) that differed from the demands of other local governments.

(1) Much is made of the change in city-federal relations since 1933. However, much of the supposed lack of sophisticated relations in the nineteenth century was simply due to a lack of large cities. The dates of the incorporation of today's largest cities provide one indicator of this. Table 1 (all tables follow text) reveals that prior to 1815 only seven of the nation's fifty largest cities of today were incorporated. In point of fact, they represented a majority of the incorporated cities of their time. In 1810, the nation had only forty-six urban places of more than 2,500 population, only eleven of which had more than 10,000 people and none of which reached 100,000.[2]

(2) Even when cities were established, they did not immediately develop specialized governmental needs that could not be handled to their general satisfaction within the existing structure of government. Boston, for example, the country's third largest city in the early nineteenth century, did not even see fit to incorporate until 1822, when its population was already 47,000. Until then it was governed by the same town system used in the most rural areas of New England. Admittedly, Boston was an exception. However, even after the development of incorporated municipalities, the size factor (that is, the smallness of the "cities") placed limits on the need for

[2] All statistical data are taken from U. S. Census Bureau, *Historical Statistics of the United States* (Washington, 1957) unless otherwise indicated.

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specialized urban services. As indicated in Tables 2 and 3, before 1840 there were no large cities in the United States and it was not until after 1900 that the medium size and large cities came to contain as much as twenty-five per cent of the nation's total population.

(3) In this regard it is also important to note that the total number of urban places (population 2,500 or more) in the United States did not exceed 1,000 for the first time until 1890 and only in that year did the urban share of the total population reach one third of the national total (Table 4). Not until 1920 did the total population of places over 2,500 exceed the total rural population. That same year the total population in cities of 100,000 and over exceeded the total population in all smaller urban places for the first time (significantly, this was reversed in 1950 as part of the suburbanizing trend).

(4) There is considerable evidence to the effect that even today virtually all cities below 50,000 in population, excepting only a few older suburban cities which face "central city"-type problems, really do not develop a "city" outlook in the political arena. As a rule, they align themselves with the so-called "rural" areas (really a misnomer in the demographic sense today) against the "big city" in urban-rural conflict situations. Indeed, it is likely that most cities below 150,000 population (again excepting certain older suburban and industrial cities) also reject "city" ideas and align themselves in opposition to the big-city bloc on most issues. Certainly these smaller cities have not been the source of specialized city pressures on the states and demands on Washington because they have not had such demands. If the situation that prevails today can be projected backward to the period between 1790 and 1930, it is probable that widespread specialized "city" demands sufficiently differentiated from those of other local governments to create substantial intrastate urban-rural conflict did not develop until the period of the First World War, except in the cases of the very largest cities, those with present (1960) populations of over 750,000 and which then exceeded 250,000 in population. In 1910, the nineteen cities of 250,000 or more had hardly more than fifteen per cent of the nation's population. Even as late as 1930, they did not encompass a quarter of the nation's people. The big cities' desire to turn to the federal government instead of the states could not have become a national issue until then, if only because there were not enough big cities with specialized demands.

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(5) This is not to imply that there were no conflicts between the states and their big cities prior to 1913, but that they were few, not uniquely urban, and not particularly unmanageable within the states until then. In Illinois, for example, the origins of the Chicago-downstate cleavage date back to the post-Civil War period and no further. Before the Civil War, the basic intrastate conflict was a sectional one between Yankee-settled northern Illinois, including Chicago, and Southern-dominated southern Illinois. The first overt conflict between the mayor of Chicago and the governor of Illinois developed in 1871 in the aftermath of the Chicago Fire, when Mayor Mason turned directly to the federal government for troops to maintain order in the gutted city even though Governor Palmer was prepared to send state militia to Chicago to do the job.[3] Still, until World War I the conflicts were few and minor and were generally resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both sides. In 1904 Chicago even obtained a limited amount of "home rule" through a constitutional amendment ratified state-wide, and in 1912 Edward Dunn, a former mayor of Chicago, was elected governor (the only time this has happened). Though his victory came in a three-way race, it and his very nomination are at least testimony to the fact that it was still considered politically feasible to nominate a Democratic mayor of Chicago for the office of governor, something which would be most unexpected today. Actually, until well after World War I, the partisan cleavage between "Democratic" Chicago and "Republican" downstate did not exist, Chicago being as Republican as the rest of northern and central Illinois.

Similar embryonic big city-outstate conflicts existed in Massachusetts, New York, Maryland, and Missouri, and perhaps elsewhere as well. But, just as in the Chicago-downstate Illinois conflict, most of those states took some steps to alleviate the situation through amendment of their constitutions to grant to their largest cities some measure of home rule of a kind not given to other cities in the same states even today. The metropolitan problems of New York City, for example, were substantially ameliorated through state assistance in the consolidation of the five boroughs in 1898. The creation of city-counties in Baltimore, Denver, Philadelphia, St.

[3] The correspondence from that exchange was published by the State of Illinois as *Letters From Governor Palmer Concerning the Chicago Fire* (Chicago, 1873).

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Louis, San Francisco, and other large cities at the turn of the century was also indicative of the then still existing ability and willingness of the states to assist the few large cities in meeting their relatively few specialized demands.[4] However, by 1910 or thereabouts, this option appears to have been closed off.

(6) At this point it is wise to add one caveat. Despite relative smallness in *size*, the larger pre-twentieth-century cities functioned in a more complex manner than cities of similar size today because of the magnitude of the social and economic as well as political functions that accrued to them as the largest cities of their time. Insofar as this was the case, there were "big-city" attributes present even in what today would be considered small and medium size cities. This certainly affected the major nineteenth-century cities' needs for outside aid and to some extent influenced their specific demands.

(7) One of these demands, and indeed a basic one, related to the physical growth of the cities themselves. Dynamic small and medium size cities grew to become today's large cities through annexation of adjacent lands to provide a basis for population growth. Until the late nineteenth century, annexation was, under state law and in fact, a commonly used—and an easily used—device which contributed to the internal growth of cities and met such problems of suburbanization as affected them. Annexation was often used unilaterally by the cities to meet, directly or indirectly, problems of suburbanization and metropolitanization that today lead cities to turn to the federal and state governments for more active assistance.[5] Examples of the problems attacked by the then relatively simple device of annexation include: (a) the need for a single municipal government to serve all urban residents in a given area; (b) the

[4] See Frank J. Goodenow, *Municipal Problems* (New York, 1897).

[5] Annexation as a device declined when a sufficient number of suburban communities (including those created as suburbs or, more likely, those previously-settled towns suburbanized in the course of the expansion of the central city) began to desire to retain their "independence" and identities. They became a countervailing power within the state and were generally able to create a stalemate which served their interests. Significantly, most major annexations in recent years have taken place in the South and Southwest (Atlanta, Dallas, Houston, Nashville, Phoenix, San Antonio, Oklahoma City, to mention a few) in areas without established suburban communities to fight them. City-county consolidation and separation cases had similar histories before 1913. The *Municipal Year Book* publishes annexation data for the nation's cities annually.

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provision of reasonably uniform area-wide services, few as they may have been; (c) the establishment of such area-wide regulatory standards and codes as were considered appropriate at the time; and (d) the establishment of uniform, if minimal, area-wide tax levies and revenue collections. Given the low level demands for local services in even the larger cities until relatively late in the nineteenth century, simple extension of ordinary municipal powers was usually sufficient to relax all but the most eager municipal reformers.

(8) The rise of the big city as a national entity coincides with the actual (as opposed to the chronological) end of the nineteenth century, which can be placed somewhere between 1913 and 1917. Several landmark events occurred to mark its passing: (a) Woodrow Wilson inaugurated the twentieth-century versions of "big government" and cooperative federalism, though still endowing them with a rural bias; (b) the land frontier, as expressed, for example, in the opportunity for homesteading new lands, which actually increased after 1890 for a brief period, finally ceased to exist; and (c) the United States became involved in World War I and its accompanying international entanglements. Consequently, the real line of demarcation in the history of cities' demands on the federal government—if one exists—is perhaps better drawn at 1913 than at 1933. In the Wilson administration, however, the rural biases of the Southern- and Western-dominated Congress strictly limited the aids available to cities under the new programs.[6] Consequently, the latter year is especially significant, because it was only then that the federal government began to respond to the cities' new specialized demands.

Local Demands and Federal Responses

What was the nature of the general demands of localities that did exist and were relevant to the cities prior to 1913? What was the nature of the responses of the federal and state governments to those demands and to such specialized demands as were then generated by the major cities? In other words, how did the federal system respond to urban needs before 1913?

[6] The effects of the rural biases of the Wilson administration on the new federal grant programs are discussed in Austin F. Macdonald, *Federal Aid* (New York, 1928).

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The major government-oriented demands of localities prior to 1913 centered around:

(1) the development and maintenance of lines of communication with the rest of the country—particularly through the postal service;

(2) the development and maintenance of facilities for commercial intercourse locally and with the rest of the country—particularly through waterways, roads, and railroads;

(3) the development and maintenance of a limited number of local services—particularly schools, rudimentary police and fire services, rudimentary street and sanitation services, and limited welfare services (such as poor relief);

(4) contributions by extra-local governments to the local economic base to ensure prosperity and growth in a variety of specific ways, depending on the particular situation of each locality—these included items as diverse as the maintenance of federal and state institutions (and payrolls) in the locality; benefits from the federal tariff for local manufacturing establishments; state and federal contracts for locally-based businesses and various other governmental services that aided the development of local economies;

(5) outside financial assistance in some form for the support of all the above demands—particularly through grants-in-land, reimbursements of local expenditures, and distributions of the earnings of permanently endowed and earmarked funds.

Despite the considerably lower "velocity of government" (amount of government activity at all levels in relation to the total activity of society) prior to 1913, these demands were not inconsiderable. What is more, they were probably met with nearly as much relative success as the more exacting and varied demands of the twentieth century are met today.

Central to understanding the responses of the federal and state governments is an understanding of the functioning of the federal system prior to 1913. As this writer has demonstrated in *The American Partnership*, what we today call "cooperative federalism" was the dominant form of federalism even prior to the New Deal. The differences in American federalism then and now are primarily differences arising from the increased velocity of government in the twentieth century. Consequently, one may look for an absolute in-

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crease in direct federal-city relations since 1913 or 1933, but this does not necessarily imply radically new departures in federal-city relations (though this indeed may be the case in the relations between the great metropolitan centers and the federal government). It may even be that the percentage of formal federal-*local* programs in relation to the overall number of formal intergovernmental programs has not changed appreciably even as it is likely that the percentage of federal-city programs has increased as urbanization has increased. Two illustrations: (1) The direct federal-city relations created by the river and harbor improvement programs in the nineteenth century were possibly as extensive in proportion to the total amount of intergovernmental activity of the time as are direct federal-city relations in contemporary redevelopment programs. These were and are direct relations of the kinds that were later to burgeon in other fields. (2) Quasi-formal federal-county relations were developed in the post-Civil War period to conduct federal surveys of various kinds. These were federal-local relations that were not urban in character because the programs were not urban ones. Non-urban-related federal-local relations are certainly not unexpected in a generally non-urban society.

The federal response before 1913 led to city-federal relations in the following fields:

(1) Postal service was often the first governmental service of any sort demanded by residents of newly-settled local communities. Today, the extension of postal service is often overlooked as an important aspect of federal-city relations because it is taken for granted. In the days of the land frontier, it was often a crucial factor influencing the possibilities for local commerce to develop and even the probability of a community's survival by providing it with: (a) a drawing card as a potential center of commerce with which to attract neighboring settlers; (b) a means of communication with the outside world that made commerce possible and lessened isolation in an age when travel was difficult and expensive; (c) cash in the form of postal receipts—often the only more or less steady flow of cash available in a frontier community; and (d) freight and passenger service, which developed from stagecoach and railroad lines established as a result of obtaining mail contracts.

Nor did communities acquire postal service without exerting effort. Their leaders used pressure, political influence, and sheer

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public relations to gain the services of the post office, the construction of post office buildings, and the expansion of both. Among the best received new programs of Lincoln's administration were the initiation of parcel post, railway mail cars, and free delivery in cities of over fifty thousand population, all vital measures for the growth of American cities. The impact of the post office did not pass with the passing of the community's frontier stage. As the community grew, so did the post office—as a center of communication, as a business attraction, as a source of payrolls, and, most important, as a center of local politics—both as a source of political patronage and as a base of operations for local political leaders.[7]

(2) Since the close of the War of 1812, the U.S. Corps of Engineers has been involved in a federal-city partnership in waterway improvement and, later, flood control. Cities actively sought federal aid in this field and were usually responsible for securing federal waterway improvements not only for themselves but for the regions (and states) they served. This was not only a matter of lobbying for federal aid, but often involved joint day-to-day efforts, after the congressional appropriations were made, in carrying out projects. These efforts were usually the product of negotiations between local officials and federal administrative personnel, frequently with the assistance of the local representative in Congress. They ranged from the construction of a dredge by the City of Richmond, with federal funds, to be leased to the Army Engineers while the latter were engaged in local projects and then used by the city to maintain the improvements, to the inclusion of federal harbor services personnel on a quasi-formal Board of Harbor Improvement for the City of Boston to advise the city fathers on needed improvements so the latter could lobby for federal funds to pay for them.[8]

[7] An abundance of documents on the role of the post office in the nineteenth century can be found in U. S. Congress, *American State Papers*. The political role of the department is discussed in Dorothy G. Fowler, *The Cabinet Politician: The Postmasters General, 1829-1909* (New York, 1943). The economic impact of postal services in cities has not been adequately treated, but Wayne E. Fuller's *RFD: The Changing Face of Rural America* (Bloomington, Ind., 1964) does much to indicate the possibilities even while focusing on rural post offices. Political studies of the extension of postal services can be found in Clyde Kelly, *United States Postal Policy* (New York, 1931) and Daniel C. Roper, *The United States Post Office* (New York, 1917).

[8] *American State Papers* contains much documentary material on river and harbor improvements. Though there has been no comprehensive study of the

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Cities also lobbied for and contributed toward (until forbidden to do so in most state constitutions) the construction of roads and railroads to serve their needs. Roads were either constructed by federal agencies directly or through federal land grants to the states. Railroads were constructed through federal land grants to the states or directly to federal-chartered companies. In either case, those cities competed for location of road and railroad routes and often those that lost withered away or ceased to grow. The struggle for transportation facilities involved considerable federal-city contact, collaboration, and conflict.[9]

(3) Normally there was little direct federal aid to local governmental agencies except in the earlier stages of the development of cities west of the Appalachians before the territories in which they were established achieved statehood. In those early stages, however, direct federal aid was often very significant, involving, as it did, direct grants of land for townsites and local institutions, as well as the federal land survey which, as the nation's foremost effort

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economic impact of river and harbor improvements, there are numerous contemporary and historical studies of specific waterways and ports which deal with the question. See such standard works as E. W. Gould, *Fifty Years on the Mississippi or Gould's History of River Navigation* (St. Louis, 1889); Mildred L. Hartsough, *From Canoe to Steel Barge on the Upper Mississippi* (Minneapolis, 1934); and William E. Lass, *A History of Steamboating on the Upper Missouri River* (Lincoln, Neb., 1962). Lucille M. Kane, *The Waterfall that Built a City* (St. Paul, Minn., 1966), shows the impact of federal improvements on one major city, Minneapolis. For a brief overview of the pre-Civil War period, see Forest G. Hill, *Roads, Rails, and Waterways: The Army Engineers and Early Transportation* (Norman, Okla., 1957). For data on the appropriations and activities in every city in the United States, see U. S. House of Representatives, *Index to the Reports of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, 1866-1912*, I (Rivers and Harbors) Doc. 740, 63rd Congress, 2d Session, 1914. The Richmond case is discussed in Elazar, *The American Partnership*, Chap. 16.

[9] For exemplary studies of the local impact of federal aid to roads, see Philip D. Jordan, *The National Road* (Indianapolis, 1948). W. Turrentine Jackson, *Wagon Roads West* (Berkeley, 1952), Hill, Paul W. Gates, *The Illinois Central Railroad and its Colonization Work* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), and Richard C. Overton, *Burlington West: A Colonizing History of the Burlington Railroad* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941) are undoubtedly the best studies of cities and railroad development. This writer drew extensively on the sources listed in the bibliographies of both. For overviews of federal activity, see Lewis H. Haney, *A Congressional History of Railroads in the United States, 1850-1887* (Madison, 1908, 1910), 2 Vols., and John B. Sanborn, *Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways* (Madison, 1899).

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at national planning, provided a basis for all local development in the public land states.[10] After statehood, federal aid for local services was important, but was almost invariably channeled through the states.

After the middle of the nineteenth century a new form of federal-local relations began to develop in the form of contacts between professionals in such diverse fields as education, library science, agriculture, and public welfare. These contacts were made privately and through the professional associations that began to emerge in the eighteen-forties. Over time, they grew to be a significant means of improving government services at both levels and of forging strong, if informal, cooperative lines between Washington and the localities.[11]

(4) Federal contributions to the local economic base through federal institutions, payrolls, tariffs, contracts, and the like have always been an important factor in American history. Again, their relative impact in the years before 1913 was no less than it has been since the great increase in the velocity of government in the twentieth century and may even have been greater. Though they have virtually disappeared from view today as historians have concentrated on more dramatic events of the past, the community leaders of that day were fully aware of their importance.[12] Federal military installations almost invariably were sought as contributors to local prosperity. Marine hospitals, post offices, customs offices, sub-treasuries, mints, and the like were equally sought. Military and civil construction and mail contracts were prized. Tariff concessions on particular items could make or break particular cities which survived because of particular industries. Nineteenth-century Americans were quite conscious of this, too.

[10] The laws and statistics of direct federal grants to localities are presented in Thomas C. Donaldson, *The Public Domain* (Washington, 1884), and R. M. Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage, The Public Domain, 1776-1936* (Princeton, 1942). See, also, George M. Stephenson, *The Political History of the Public Lands* (Boston, 1917).

[11] Elazar, *The American Partnership*, Chap. 15.

[12] The documentary evidence of federal-city relations contains many acknowledgments of the importance of these federal aids. Among the easily accessible published materials, see, for example, Thomas Hart Benton, *Thirty Years View* (New York, 1854-56). John G. Van Deusen discusses local reactions to federal expenditures and assembles excellent fiscal data on these expenditures before the Civil War in *Economic Bases of Disunion in South Carolina* (New York, 1928).

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Despite the fact that the cities' demands were not much different from the demands of smaller localities, the larger cities as a general rule almost certainly benefited more than the smaller towns from the aforementioned programs. The exceptions were important because they almost invariably meant that the fortunate town would grow beyond reasonable objective expectations. Thus, in the years between 1827 and 1857 Chicago received more benefits from the federal government than St. Louis, its larger sister to the south. Most of this aid came in the form of land grants earmarked for it though channeled through the State of Illinois or directly transferred to the new city, but mail subsidies and new federal installations were also important, particularly in making the new city a center for federal activities in the Northwest. By 1860 Chicago had surpassed St. Louis in growth, no doubt aided by the extra measure of federal assistance available to the entrepreneurs who used that city as their base.[13] Almost all of these "benefits" contributed greatly to the urbanization of the United States in the long run.

Between 1913 and 1933 all of these responses were extended or modified and some new ones introduced in response to new needs.

(1) Post offices declined in importance as active elements in federal-city relations; their political importance declined, other federal agencies came into the local community, and cities grew less clearly dependent on the postal service as the primary means of communication with the outside world. However, the establishment of postal savings banks that served the new immigrants who had flocked to the big cities of the Northeast temporarily added a new dimension to the role of the post office in urban affairs.

(2) Waterway improvements continued to be an important source of direct federal-city collaboration. Highway construction was added to the list, though as a federal-state-local program, not as a direct federal-city effort.

(3) The federal government first became involved—though only marginally—with urban housing in the eighteen-nineties when Congress became concerned with slum conditions in the great Eastern cities. Direct federal activity in the field of urban housing developed briefly during World War I, in response to the wartime situation. It lapsed after the end of hostilities.

[13] Bessie L. Pierce, *A History of Chicago* (New York, 1937), 2 Vols., and James W. Putnam, *The Illinois and Michigan Canal* (Chicago, 1918).

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(4) World War I also had an extraordinary though brief effect on the level of federal contributions to the local economies, urban and rural. While the cities benefited greatly from wartime industrial expansion, the agricultural areas also benefited from wartime agricultural expansion. Before and after the war, a state of "normalcy" may be said to have prevailed in the localities' search for government contributions to their economies and in the federal response, but this was not a "normalcy" of inaction.

The Emergence of Specialized Demands

In light of all this, what were the new specialized big city demands that developed between 1913 and 1933, and how did they relate to the earlier demands of the cities?

It was in the field of local services that specialized urban demands really developed in the twentieth century. These demands originated in the late nineteenth century. They continued to develop at an accelerated rate after 1913, so that the explosion in federal-city relations that occurred during the New Deal actually did not spring full-blown from Depression-created needs but was the culmination of demands generated fifteen to thirty years earlier. These demands did not lead the cities to bypass the states for the first time. The cities had been seeking aid from the federal government in fields where pioneering programs were required for generations. Even though new urban needs were leading to new demands, few of the newly created federal programs were designed to favor urban areas over others.

The general categories we have already listed continued to be basic in the demands of both the localities generally and the new big cities after 1913, with some modifications which grew out of the changing needs of a dynamic society.

(1) Promotion of new communications facilities generally ceased to be a direct governmental concern, since post offices were already established in all but the very smallest hamlets, and telephone (like telegraph) services were developed through private enterprise. Government now became concerned with *regulation* of privately-owned communications facilities and *improvement* of postal services. Here big city needs did not appreciably differ from the general needs of all localities even after 1913, until the post-World War II years.

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(2) Promotion of inter-city commercial facilities continued to involve river and harbor improvements but was also expanded into a concern for airports and highways. Needs for the former were primarily big city-oriented before World War II (since 1945 even the smaller urban places have been actively competing for navigable channels and harbor facilities) and did contribute to the cities' turning to the federal government, much in the same way that river and harbor improvements have since the War of 1812. The need for highways was more general, but, though big cities sought more federal assistance for intra-city highway connections because of the greater costs of urban highway construction, the states' primary concern with farm-to-market highways in a still half-rural nation led to congressional restrictions on the amount of federal aid which could be used for urban areas. These restrictions were not fully removed until the nineteen-forties.

(3) The need for local services increased generally, but the cities' search for federal assistance in every field (except welfare at the very end of the period under discussion) did not depart from the limited claims of localities generally. Here and there requests for assistance in urban redevelopment were heard.

(4) The demands for contributions to the local economic base were in no way diminished, nor were they specific to the big cities any more than they had been prior to 1913. If anything, the biggest cities ceased to be as dependent upon such contributions as smaller localities because of their more diverse economic bases.

Outside financial assistance, then, was sought in new ways primarily for highways and welfare, both to a limited degree. Otherwise, the previous patterns were maintained with slight modifications.

New and specialized big city demands were generated after 1913 in the fields of metropolitanization and the physical improvement of the urban environment. Both were new fields of interest that first emerged in the eighteen-nineties and were not publicly acknowledged until after 1910, and they were the demands which later evoked a response from the New Deal. Prior to 1933 little was done to meet them other than to make provision for the cities' unilateral action through permissive state legislation. This was primarily because they were expensive demands and, historically, the federal government has had to take the lead in expending large sums

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for the introduction of new programs managed by any level of government in the United States.

All of this points to the hardly radical conclusion that what really was occurring in the period between 1913 and 1933 was a subtle reshaping of the greater part of the range of government activities to the demands of an increasing urbanized society.

As a consequence of this reshaping of the activities of the federal-state-local partnership, virtually all cities except the largest metropolitan centers received sufficient federal and state assistance and benefits to satisfy most of their demands without leading them to take steps to alter the established patterns of federalism.

This was not the case after 1913 (and particularly after World War I) for the great metropolitan centers. They had grown so big that their needs and problems no longer fit into the same categories as those of their smaller urban sisters or of the nation's local communities, rural or urban. This change was multifaceted: On one hand, the large metropolitan centers had developed unique problems of urbanization and metropolitanization; on the other hand, the great metropolitan centers had grown so large and socio-economically complex that they had become as self-contained and self-sufficient within the national framework (and as diverse internally) as the states of which they were parts.

Turned inward and possessing their own problems, the residents and leaders of the big metropolitan centers fell out of harmony with their states and the other urban centers within them. This estrangement led cities like New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Los Angeles, and others slightly smaller in population to turn to the federal government, not as constituent elements of their states advocating programs of interest to all localities (or even all cities), but as self-contained civil societies in their own right, seeking aid for their own specialized problems. At the close of the period discussed here, at least one well-known Chicagoan, Charles E. Merriam, was calling for the transformation of the large metropolitan centers into city-states. That this did not come to pass is a tribute to the stability and the flexibility of the federal system. It is also evidence that the basic cleavage in interest was not between urban and non-urban America, but between the great metropolitan centers and the rest of rapidly urbanizing America. The latter continued to appeal directly and indirectly to the federal government for aid and assis-

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tance just as they had been doing since the establishment of the Republic, but as constituent elements of their respective states, not as competing civil societies.

Some Unanswered Questions

If this brief discussion has raised some of the salient questions concerning the development of city-federal relations and has presented some of the evidence and possible conclusions which may be drawn from it, it is obviously far from exhaustive. Among the important questions not discussed or only briefly mentioned are several other points of concern:

(1) *The role of the cities as participants in the political processes of federalism.* Federal aid came to the localities partly because of national necessity and partly as a result of local pressures. The latter were made manifest by the political role of the localities within the non-centralized federal system whereby their leaders and representatives could agitate for aid, mobilize support for their efforts on all levels, adapt acquired aid to local conditions, and even play the state and federal governments off against one another to their advantage.[14]

(2) *Sectional differences in federal-city relations, which seem to be quite significant.* Hints of these differences can be found in the foregoing pages—for example, in the way in which Western cities benefited primarily from federal expenditures locally. The extent of these differences appears to be more widespread, subtle, and important than such hints can indicate, reflecting, as they do, basic differences in the character of cities in the North, South, and West.

(3) *The differences in city-state relations in the several states.* The kinds of demands different cities made of the federal government and the way in which those demands were made depended, even before 1933, on the responses of their states to their special needs.

Nobody can deny that recent federal responses to urban problems have been of unprecedented scope and magnitude. At the same time, there is considerable evidence that they are not unprecedented in

[14] See the writer's "Local Government in Intergovernmental Perspective," in *Illinois Government* (Urbana, 1961) for a brief delineation of the various roles of the localities in the federal system today, which are reasonably applicable to the period before 1933 as well.

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their roots and may not even be unprecedented in their impact. The evidence is not all in, but it should be clear that failure to understand the federal-city relationship before 1933 may lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the impact—or the proper management—of the federal-city relationship today. Such conclusions could, in turn, drastically affect the future of the American system as we know it.

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TABLE 1
Incorporation Dates of Fifty Largest U.S. Cities by Historical Period*

I. Pre-1776 (2)	*II. 1776-1815 (5)*	*III. 1816-1848 (22)*	*IV. 1849-1876 (17)*	*V. 1877-1912 (5)*
New York (1685)	Baltimore (1797)	Atlanta (1847)	Akron (1865)	Honolulu (1909)
Philadelphia (1701)	Dayton (1805)	Boston (1822)	Birmingham (1871)	Long Beach, California (1888)
	New Orleans (1805)	Buffalo (1832)	Dallas (1856)	Miami (1896)
	Richmond (1782)	Chicago (1837)	Denver (1861)	Oklahoma City (1890)
	San Antonio (1809)	Cincinnati (1819)	Fort Worth (1873)	
		Cleveland (1836)	Indianapolis (1874)	
		Columbus (1834)	Jersey City (1855)	
		Detroit (1824)	Kansas City (1850)	
		Houston (1837)	Los Angeles (1850)	
		Jacksonville (1832)	Minneapolis (1867)	
		Louisville (1828)	Oakland (1854)	
		Memphis (1826)	Omaha (1857)	
		Milwaukee (1846)	Portland (1851)	
		Newark (1836)	St. Paul (1853)	
		Norfolk (1845)	San Diego (1850)	
		Pittsburgh (1816)	San Francisco (1850)	
		Providence (1832)	Seattle (1869)	
		Rochester (1834)		
		St. Louis (1822)		
		Syracuse (1848)		
		Toledo (1837)		
		Worcester (1848)		

* Dates are those in which cities were incorporated as cities.

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TABLE 2
Number and Population of U.S. Cities by Category: 1790-1930

Year	Towns (2,500-10,000) No.	Towns (2,500-10,000) Total Pop. (000s)	Small Cities (10,000-50,000) No.	Small Cities (10,000-50,000) Total Pop. (000s)	Med.-Size Cities (50,000-250,000) No.	Med.-Size Cities (50,000-250,000) Total Pop. (000s)	Large Cities (250,000-1,000,000) No.	Large Cities (250,000-1,000,000) Total Pop. (000s)	Great Cities (1,000,000+) No.	Great Cities (1,000,000+) Total Pop. (000s)
1790	19	92	5	110						
1800	27	140	5	122	1	61				
1810	35	186	9	189	2	150				
1820	48	251	10	192	3	250				
1830	67	357	19	346	4	405				
1840	94	500	32	640	4	392	1	313		
1850	174	913	52	1,172	9	943	1	516		
1860	299	1,541	77	1,555	13	1,445	3	1,646		
1870	495	2,364	143	2,640	18	1,758	7	3,140		
1880	716	3,335	188	3,636	27	2,735	7	3,218	1	1,206
1890	994	4,661	296	5,720	47	4,809	8	3,254	3	4,468
1910	1,665	7,946	488	9,572	90	9,019	16	6,961	3	8,501
1920	1,970	9,354	608	12,110	119	11,785	22	10,764	3	10,146
1930	2,183	10,615	791	15,523	154	14,032	32	13,720	5	15,065

Source: *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1957.*

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TABLE 3
Cities' Cumulative Per Cent of Total Population by Size of Place: 1790-1930

Size of Place	*1790*	*1850*	*1900*	*1930*
1,000,000 plus			8.5	12.3
250,000 plus		2.2	14.4	23.4
50,000 plus		6.3	22.3	34.9
10,000 plus	2.8	11.3	31.7	47.5
2,500 plus	5.1	15.3	39.7	56.2

Source: 1950 Census of Population, Vol. II, Characteristics of Population, Part 1.

TABLE 4
Distribution of U.S. Population According to Size of Place: 1790-1930

	Population Distribution Per Cent					*Number of Urban Places by Size*		
Year	*Total Urban*	*One Million Plus*	*100,000 to One Million*	*Under 100,000*	*Total Rural*	*One Million Plus*	*100,000 to One Million*	*Under 100,000*
1790	5.1	—	—	5.1	94.9	—	—	24
1800	6.1	—	—	6.1	93.9	—	—	33
1810	7.3	—	—	7.3	92.7	—	—	46
1820	7.2	—	1.3	5.9	92.8	—	1	60
1830	8.8	—	1.6	7.2	91.2	—	1	89
1840	10.8	—	3.0	7.8	89.2	—	3	128
1850	15.3	—	5.1	10.2	84.7	—	6	230
1860	19.8	—	8.4	11.4	80.2	—	9	383
1870	25.7	—	10.7	15.0	74.3	—	14	649
1880	28.2	2.4	10.0	15.8	71.8	1	19	919
1890	35.1	5.8	9.6	19.7	64.9	3	25	1,320
1900	39.7	8.5	10.2	21.0	60.3	3	35	1,699
1910	45.7	9.2	12.9	23.6	54.3	3	47	2,212
1920	51.2	9.6	16.3	25.3	48.8	3	65	2,654
1930	56.2	12.3	17.3	26.6	43.8	5	88	3,072

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Early Experiences of Manpower Problems in an Industrial Society at War: Great Britain, 1854-56

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It is now a platitude that comprehensive manpower budgeting plays a vital role in the total war effort of any industrial society. Yet it was not until the Second World War that this was fully appreciated, even in Britain, the nation with by far the longest experience of the problems of an industrial economy geared to international trade. In the First World War bitter experience did indeed slowly compel its rudimentary enforcement, first with badges and leaving certificates for munitions workers, and finally with the prevention of those in essential occupations from enlisting for military service. Yet British ideas about the best way to meet the calls of war upon a country's manpower remained obstinately naïve. Three or four generations earlier, however, in the 1854-56 war with Russia, the only European war Britain engaged in between 1815 and 1914, mid-Victorian Englishmen had already had their eyes forcibly opened to some of the novel problems which confront an industrial society at war, and a few had dimly begun to perceive their implications. In manpower, as in many other wartime concerns, the problems and expedients of twentieth-century Englishmen at war had mid-nineteenth-century antecedents of which they knew nothing and whose very existence they did not suspect. For British experiences during the Crimean War were not simply forgotten; they were grotesquely distorted exceptionally quickly and thoroughly, and necessarily remained so as long

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as the Crimean War itself continued to be dismissed as the classic example of military inefficiency and futility.

In reality, unexpectedly brief and limited though it was, the Crimean War was no mere barren anti-climax. In the matter of manpower, in particular, it demonstrated to many reflective men that the policies employed in earlier struggles had ceased to be either workable or desirable, partly because of the changing nature of war itself, but even more because of the demographic and economic changes which were so obviously transforming Britain in those years. Yet even the most open-minded could not agree upon the solutions to be put in their place. Moreover, the sanctity the mid-Victorian generation accorded to economic processes meant that many of their successors' most useful devices necessarily remained a closed book to them. In the event, manpower policies in the Crimean War remained an obstinate mélange of old and new, with the old heavily predominating; some of the old policies were retained for novel reasons, and many of the new policies which were adopted were intended to solve old problems. The sudden advent of peace in the beginning of 1856 abruptly cut short the evolution of policies and comment alike. Nevertheless, even in official circles, the logic of changing circumstances had compelled decisions and discussions which deserve attention, and outside the limiting confines of the official mind, some strikingly perceptive evaluations of the new situation had been made.

Even to the most hidebound, the Crimean War very soon made it clear that the perennial problem of recruiting the army in time of war had taken not simply a more acute, but a genuinely novel form. Throughout the war a large gap yawned between the number of regular troops for which ministers had secured parliamentary sanction and the army's actual strength, while the militia was even more seriously below its full establishment.[1] Some such situ-

[1] Throughout the war the army was short of around twenty-five per cent of its establishment, as against a peacetime deficiency of about two per cent. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867, XV (*Reports, I*), [C. 3752], "Reports of the Commissioners appointed to enquire into the recruiting for the Army," Appendix E, p. 221. At one point (March 1855), the militia shrank to less than one-third of its establishment. Great Britain, 3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXVII (1855), 554. At the beginning of that inauspicious month, the army needed around ninety thousand men; by the end it had got 4,514. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1854-55, IX, Part 3 (*Reports*, III, Part 3), [247], "Fourth Report

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ation, however, had long been a familiar ingredient in British wartime experience. It was not this shortfall itself which was alarming, but its new demographic background. Since 1814 the number of British males at military age had approximately doubled. Nevertheless, in 1854 it was with difficulty that Britain maintained a force in the Crimea whose numbers amounted to barely half the number of British troops Wellington had under his command in 1814.[2] Why did a so much larger population prove incapable of readily furnishing a substantially smaller number of men for active service? This was the humiliating and disturbing paradox for which the Crimean generation was obliged to seek an explanation. Many of them, it goes without saying, found the solution simply in mistaken official policies. Their charges of government blunders and delays are all too familiar, and although some of them would never have been made if the government's objectives had been fully understood, many were entirely justified and indeed hardly severe enough. But the root of the manpower problems exposed in the Crimean War lay elsewhere—in the economic transformation of Britain—and it is striking how often and how thoughtfully this was recognized by contemporaries. All too often official policy lagged behind informed contemporary opinion in drawing out the consequences of economic change. Yet it hardly follows that the ministers of the day deserve to be singled out for condemnation, despite the fact that for England the Crimean War was decidedly a politicians' and not a generals' war. Few governments walk forward on their own initiative, and fewer still of those bold enough to disregard military advice and precedent in the midst of war are in any position to impose a policy distinguished for logic and coherence. Certainly the two British governments in office during the Crimean War were not. Thus, although educated English opinion was often remarkably perceptive and alert in those years, it need not provoke great surprise that official manpower policies reveal a series of compromises scarcely less erratic than those of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.

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from the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol," Appendix 14, p. 351.

[2] This paradox is expounded in R. H. Patterson, "Our Rural Population and the War," *Blackwood's Magazine*, LXXVIII (1855), 734.

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In the Crimean as in these earlier wars there were two possible internal sources of recruits for the army,[3] the militia and the civilian population as a whole, and three possible methods of tapping them: force, persuasion, and a mixture of the two verging upon sharp practice. In addition, extraneous sources might be drawn upon through the enlistment of friendly aliens, allied nationals, and renegade prisoners of war. Finally, the combatant strength of the army could be increased by the transfer of non-combatant duties to special corps or to civilians. Each of these four perennial resources was open to controversy. Historic precedent, even more than contemporary politics, however, focused official attention during the Crimean War chiefly upon the first two. Which was to be preferred, direct recruiting from the civilian population, or indirect recruiting from the militia? What were the best methods to employ in doing either? It is this debate upon the proper use of the militia which furnishes the key to the vagaries of recruiting policies under Palmerston and Panmure, as much as to those in the days of Windham and Castlereagh fifty years before.[4] Should it be a local force used exclusively for local defense, or an auxiliary force available for garrison duty and even active service abroad? Or should it be regarded primarily as a reserve of more or less trained and disciplined men which could be readily incorporated into the army in time of need? The first was the view that inspired the act passed by the Tories in 1852 (15 and 16 Vict. cap. 50) which created the force in existence at the beginning of the Crimean War—

[3] The navy is here ignored, since a very high proportion of the extra men it needed in time of war had to be highly trained seamen, and thus it could not to any large extent draw upon the general manpower resources of the country. The problems raised by the reform of the naval recruiting system at this time, however, provide many interesting parallels with mlitary problems in the same period. In particular it is worth noting that for the navy as well as for the army and militia this was the first war in which compulsion was not used. The subject is thoroughly discussed in R. Taylor, "Manning the Royal Navy: The reform of the recruiting system, 1852-62," *Mariner's Mirror*, XLIV (1958), 302-12, XLV (1959), 46-58.

[4] The eighteenth-century debate upon the militia has recently been comprehensively discussed in J. R. Western, *The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1965). Its sequel after 1802 is described by R. Glover, *Peninsular Preparation* (Cambridge, 1963), 215-52, as well as in Sir J. Fortescue, *The County Lieutenancies and the Army, 1803-1814* (London, 1909).

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a force raised by voluntary enlistment and subject to not more than twenty-one days' training each year for not more than five years. But when Britain's enemy was Russia and France was her ally, the military value of such a force was obviously minimal, since invasion was clearly out of the question. In such a war, if the militia was not to be completely discounted it must clearly be used either as an auxiliary force, or as a recruiting net for the army. But which? Were not these two functions to some extent incompatible? Could either of them, moreover, be efficiently performed without sacrificing the voluntary and strongly territorial basis upon which the existing force relied? In the event, these fundamental questions remained unsettled, and the militia was called upon to perform a variety of functions in so inconsistent a way that it was at least debatable whether its contribution to the war effort was of any value at all.

The energetic secretary at war in office at the beginning of the war, Sidney Herbert, was a firm believer in using the militia as the chief source of recruits for the army.[5] So, too, were the commander-in-chief, Lord Hardinge, the commander in the Crimea, Lord Raglan, and, for example, Lord John Russell, Sir Charles Wood, Prince Albert, and the Queen herself.[6] They argued that a man was much more likely to volunteer for the army at the end of a few weeks' service in the militia, because the plunge out of his familiar surroundings had already been taken; if his militia regiment was embodied, moreover, he had no prospect of a quick return home anyway, and so might very well settle for a double bounty by volunteering for short service in the Line instead. When he was urged to take this step not by a recruiting party but by his own colonel

[5] This appears particularly clearly in his vigorous memorandum on recruiting of Nov. 20, 1854, Royal Archives (hereafter, RA), Windsor Castle, E4/54. (I have to acknowledge the gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen to make use of material in the Royal Archives).

[6] Hardinge to Palmerston, Nov. 3, 1855, Broadlands Archives (my thanks are due to the Trustees of the Broadlands Estates for permission to make use of material in the Broadlands Archives); Raglan to Panmure, *The Panmure Papers*, ed. Sir G. Douglas and Sir G. D. Ramsay (London, 1908), I, 251; Lord John Russell to Panmure, Feb. 13, 1855, Dalhousie Muniments, H. M. Scottish Register House, Edinburgh; Sir Charles Wood to Grey, Dec. 1, 1854, Mss. of third Earl Grey, Prior's Kitchen, Durham; Prince Albert to Aberdeen, Nov. 1, 1854, Aberdeen Papers, British Museum, Add. Mss. 43, 319, fol. 4; the Queen to Aberdeen, Jan. 22, 1855, *ibid.*, fol. 109.

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(invariably a well-known local landowner), it was strange indeed if he often refused. A smaller band, however, were convinced that these men would have enlisted anyhow, at least if the Line bounty were high enough, and that the embodiment of the militia merely meant that the army got their services much later and at very much greater cost than it would have done had it recruited them directly. The first secretary of state for war, the fifth Duke of Newcastle, inclined to this view,[7] and it was strongly held by the Duke of Cambridge (who did not, however, become commander-in-chief until 1856) and, for example, by Prince Albert's private secretary, Major-General Grey, and his brother, that highly articulate Whig, the third Earl Grey.[8] In the recruiting drive after the battles of Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman, the pro-militia school of thought not surprisingly triumphed, as it had done in the crises of the Revolutionary and Peninsular Wars. In November 1854 the number of militia regiments embodied was hastily doubled, and all embodied regiments were asked to furnish twenty-five per cent of their numbers to the army. Militia colonels were offered an ensigncy for every seventy-five such recruits, and so on pro rata (a latter-day example of the notorious device of raising men for rank), and their men an extra one pound in addition to the ordinary Line bounty.[9] At the same time the Coalition Cabinet made a second and somewhat inconsistent call upon the militia, by deciding to ask certain militia regiments to volunteer for Mediterranean garrison duties in order to release the regular garrisons for the Crimea.[10]

Together these calls put a premium upon keeping the ranks of the militia well filled. Yet two other decisions made ministers seem

[7] See his evidence before the Sebastopol Committee in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1854-55, IX, Part 2 (*Reports*, III, Part 2), [218], "Third Report from the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol," Minutes of Evidence, Question 15331, p. 203.

[8] The Duke of Cambridge to Major-General Grey, June 17, 1855, RA E37/5; Major-General Grey to Colonel Phipps, July 11, 1855, RA E 6/29. Grey believed that to get one volunteer from the militia cost the country two hundred pounds (*ibid.*).

[9] See, for example, Sidney Herbert's Memorandum of Nov. 20, 1854, already cited (RA E 4/54), and his letter to Palmerston, Nov. 30, 1854, Broadlands Archives.

[10] This was one of the "vigorous measures" urged upon the cabinet by the Prince on Nov. 1, 1854 (Add. 43,319, fol. 4). The act authorizing such service (18 and 19 Vict. c.1) was passed as an emergency measure in December 1854.

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determined to achieve the opposite. To the indignation of the Queen and many of her subjects, her ministers refused to order the resumption either of balloting for the militia, or of fines for the non-fulfillment of militia quotas. For this stand upon the voluntary principle, Palmerston was chiefly responsible, both in 1854 as home secretary and, therefore, the minister responsible for the militia, and in 1855 as prime minister. He alone of those in office in the Crimean War knew from personal experience that the ballot as formerly practiced in England simply led to increased desertion and spiraling bounties. When he became secretary at war in 1811, one of his first official acts had been to suspend the militia ballot,[11] and he remained faithful to this policy nearly half a century later.[12] Thus it came about that in the Crimean War, the British for the first time fought a European war without any resort to compulsion whatsoever.[13] But not only was no form of compulsion ever used; far more surprisingly, in November 1854 and again in February 1855 the War Office itself gave a great many seasoned militiamen their *congé*. Any man who had joined before May 1854, so commanding officers were then instructed, and had served for fifty-nine days, should be discharged upon request, since such men had been attested for short service only.[14] This apparently quixotic order (the law officers considered these men legally obliged to serve)[15] rapidly reduced many militia regiments to a mere cadre of officers.[16] Such extreme sensitivity, even in the midst of the recruiting crisis, to parliamentary charges of "breaking faith with the men," reflects primarily the Palmerston government's need to placate some at least of its numerous early critics,[17] but also the continual need to foster good relationships between the landowning classes and the administration on the one hand, and those same classes and the

[11] Sir John Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, VIII (London, 1917), 4.

[12] His secretary of state for war, Panmure, was clearly more ready to contemplate compulsion. Great Britain, 3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXVI (1854-55), 1614, 1734.

[13] Until 1780 it had been usual to impress rogues and vagabonds for the army; and of course the ballot was used to fill the post-Restoration militia until 1828 and press-gangs to fill the navy until 1815.

[14] 3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXVII (1855), 546, 1173.

[15] *Ibid.*, 949, 978.

[16] 3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXVIII (1855), 117, 130.

[17] See Sir George Grey to Lord John Russell, April 5, 1855, Russell Papers, Public Record Office, PRO 30/22/11.

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people of their own localities on the other, if a voluntary, territorial militia was to survive at all.[18] It was no doubt considerations like these, as well as his own scrupulousness, which led Newcastle in May 1854 to give the original verbal assurance[19] which his successor felt obliged to honor in the far more difficult political situation of February 1855. Nevertheless, when respect for the principle of voluntary service was carried to such extreme lengths in the midst of a national emergency, it is hardly surprising that although much was asked of the militia in the Crimean War, comparatively little was given.

II

To some extent, however, this failure fully to exploit the militia reflected the impact of the rival policy of direct recruitment of the army from the whole civilian population. In the three months after Inkerman, popular enthusiasm brought in an encouraging flood of infantry recruits[20]—but they were mostly mere boys. Patriotism alone was clearly not enough. Nevertheless, it could plausibly be argued that in a "people's war" (as contemporary journalists liked to call the Crimean War) even mature men with family responsibilities and settled prospects might be willing to enlist, provided they were offered a really short term of enlistment, high pay, perhaps with dependents' allowances, and (urged the thoroughgoing at least), real prospects of promotion from the ranks. Those who were attuned to the outlook inspired by the fashionable simplifications of political economy argued explicitly that the more full employment and labor mobility prevailed in civilian life, the more would the army need to improve its conditions of service, if it was to get the type of volunteer it needed. This was the approach which attracted the Peelite Duke of Newcastle as secretary of state for war in 1854. From the beginning Newcastle was anxious to overcome the Horse Guards' preference for indirect recruiting through the pressures brought to bear in the militia. He proposed to begin by

[18] Palmerston always insisted that "it would not be politic to attempt administrative coercion on a Force the vital principle of which is voluntary service" (Palmerston to Hardinge, April 19, 1854, Broadlands Mss.).

[19] 3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXIII (1854), 313.

[20] Monthly recruiting figures are given in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1854-55, IX, Part 3 (*Reports*, III, Part 3), [247], "Fourth Report from the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol," Appendix 14, p. 351.

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raising the Line bounty.[21] To the traditionalists, however, this could only encourage desertion, and it was not until the need for massive reinforcements became desperate in the autumn of 1854 that Newcastle began to get his way.[22] In the still graver situation in February 1855 his Whig successor, Lord Panmure, carried as an emergency measure a drastic short enlistment act,[23] and when the recruiting situation continued to deteriorate, dramatically announced in June that the pay of men serving in the Crimea would be doubled.[24] But with this, Panmure had overreached himself. He had acted without the sanction of his prime minister or his cabinet colleagues, and Palmerston quickly called him to book.[25] Moreover he had appreciated the financial and political implications of his move as little as its constitutional ones.[26] Panmure was obliged to compromise with a fifty per cent increase in pay, given as a field allowance to men in active service.[27] Nevertheless, the upshot was still a victory for the school of thought which urged increased pay rather than the traditional raising of the bounty, which in fact Palmerston himself would have preferred.[28] In practice, however, this extra sixpence a day was small stuff—the great contractor, Sir Joseph Paxton, urged that an extra three or four shillings a day was

[21] See his evidence before the Sebastopol Committee, in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1854-55, IX, Part 2 (*Reports*, III, Part 2), [218], "Third Report from the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol," Minutes of Evidence, Questions 15328-329, p. 203, and Lord Hardinge's, in *ibid.*, Part 3 (*Reports*, III, Part 3), [247], "Fourth Report from the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol," Minutes of Evidence, Question 20791, p. 236.

[22] The bounty was raised and the standard of height lowered on Oct. 30, 1854, and once again, respectively, on Jan. 22, 1855, and Dec. 19, 1854. *Ibid.*, Appendix 14, pp. 352-53.

[23] 18 and 19 Vict. cap. 4. This act was intended to induce men between twenty-four and thirty-two years of age to enlist for one, two, or three years. Opposition protests limited the duration of this "very strong measure" to three years. 3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXVI (1854-55), 1408, 1599.

[24] 3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXIX (1855), 272.

[25] Palmerston to Panmure, June 29, 1855, Broadlands Archives; Palmerston to the Queen, same day, RA A 24/85.

[26] The *Daily News* (a radical middle-class journal) tried to raise the cry that the crown was trying to curry favor with the troops by usurping the Commons' right to decide what their pay should be (June 30, 1855).

[27] 3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXIX (1855), 438. This was the decision reached by an *ad hoc* Committee of the Cabinet (Palmerston to the Queen, June 30, 1855, RA A 24/91).

[28] Palmerston to Panmure, June 10, 1855, *Panmure Papers*, I, 232.

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needed if the army was to compete with civilian employers[29]—and it is doubtful whether it ever became sufficiently widely known to have the intended effect of bringing in more and better men.[30] To the end of the war an inconclusive debate continued between those who saw the army as part of the labor market, and urged it to pay the market price for a good article (in the fashionable contemporary jargon), and the traditionalists who tirelessly repeated, with abundant illustrations, that higher pay would only lead to drunkenness. Promotion from the ranks had an even slimmer chance of success, despite the vogue for French military practices which the Crimean campaign inspired and radical cries that British soldiers, too, should be given the encouragement of feeling that they had a marshal's baton in their knapsacks. Such a change was all too obviously incompatible with the entrenched British system of the purchase of commissions; even more fatally, perhaps, it became inextricably linked with that alarming anti-aristocratic movement which demanded that merit alone should be made the password to success in every walk of life, and culminated in the mass demonstrations organized by the Administrative Reform Association in the late spring of 1855. Despite the efforts of a moderate and well-liked spokesman in the House of Commons, changes substantial enough to affect recruiting were out of the question.[31] The high-water mark in this respect remained Sidney Herbert's gesture in 1854 of requiring one sergeant to be recommended for promotion to commissioned rank from each regiment in the Crimea.[32]

[29] Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 22, 1855, Granville Papers, Public Record Office, PRO 30/29/18. The skilled navvies in Paxton's Army Works Corps in the Crimea were getting forty shillings a week. G. F. Chadwick, "The Army Works Corps in the Crimea," *Journal of Transport History*, VI (1964), 131.

[30] J. R. Godley, on June 23, 1859, when assistant undersecretary for war, asserted categorically that it did not. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1861, XV (*Reports*, I), [2762], "Report of the Commissioners appointed to enquire into the present system of recruiting for the Army," Minutes of Evidence, Question 1857, pp. 110-11).

[31] See the debate on Lord Goderich's motion, March 1, 1855, 3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXVI (1854-55), 2094-2165. The usual radical point of view is expressed, for example, by the *Morning Advertiser*, Dec. 16, 1854, and more moderately by *The Times*, Dec. 15, 1854.

[32] In the five years ending February 1855, 129 non-commissioned officers had been promoted, apart from these ninety in the Crimea. 3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXVI (1854-55), 2110.

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III

Thus if the army had fallen between the two stools of direct and indirect recruiting, both sides could claim that their policies had not been given a fair trial. All that was certain was that neither offering inducements to superior workers, nor influencing and inveigling yokels and "the scum of the earth," had actually brought in enough men. There remained two last expedients. The first was to tap foreign sources of military manpower. In principle, this had a very ancient ancestry indeed; Wellington's assertion in 1852 that only a third of the men in British armies were English was not altogether remote from the truth. But in the Crimean War, the British government raised a type of foreign corps for which there was no exact precedent—namely, corps created from aliens who volunteered as private individuals, as opposed to corps which came readymade into British service as a result of a financial transaction with the government which they served.[33] It was not that the governments of the Crimean period were averse to traditional methods; they would have preferred the Piedmontese troops, for example, to have been simply subsidized auxiliaries to the British army. But Cavour insisted that the Piedmontese should be "des alliés, non des serviteurs";[34] and the German states (Britain's traditional foreign recruiting ground) obstinately refused to sanction British recruiting in their territories.[35] Thus, in the Crimean War Britain's only subsidized corps was a contingent of twenty thousand Ottoman Cossacks (which included many renegade Polish prisoners of war);[36] her "foreign corps" was necessarily composed of aliens (mostly Germans and Swiss and never more than ten thousand strong) privately enlisted in a wide variety of places at the cost of much petty friction with the neutral powers whose subjects

[33] Granville explained this distinction to Lord John Russell when the cabinet first took up the idea (Oct. 10, 1854, PRO 30/29/23).

[34] *Cavour e l'Inghilterra*, Carteggio con V.D. D'Azeglio a cura della commissione reale editrice (Bologna, 1933), I, 92. The British attitude toward subsidies is discussed in my *A Liberal State at War: English Politics and Economics during the Crimean War* (London, 1967), 216-22.

[35] For example, Clarendon to Lord John Russell, Jan. 12, 1855, PRO 30/22/11.

[36] Treasury Minute of May 1, 1855, Public Record Office, Treasury 29/559. This corps was officered as well as paid by Great Britain (Aberdeen to the Queen, June 17, 1854, RA G 13/112).

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they were.[37] Only from a domestic point of view did this novel method of foreign recruitment have anything to recommend it, since it did allow a shadowy claim to be made that such volunteers felt real sympathy for British war aims. Even so, the enlistment of these men provoked an immense uproar of indignation at home,[38] chiefly from those who delighted in stressing the lofty nature of the struggle and the national mission to fight, and were prepared to echo the changing attitude toward the army represented by journalistic catch-phrases about "our brave boys." In reality, no continental war had ever previously been carried on by Britain with so small a number of foreign troops; moreover, these raw volunteers took so long to train that in the event they never saw action at all. As a solution to English manpower problems, these ten thousand aliens were of no practical value whatsoever.

One final expedient remains to be noticed: that of increasing the number of men available for active service by creating non-combatant corps for the performance of non-military duties usually undertaken by troops. Here official policy—driven on by outspoken public faith in the superior efficiency of private enterprise as well as by sheer necessity—was comparatively adventurous during the Crimean War. The civilian engineering firm of Brassey & Co. was employed to build the world's first military railway at Balaklava, and a contract signed with another businessman, Sir Joseph Paxton, to provide a large corps of experienced navvies (at a high rate of pay) to undertake road building and trench work instead of the troops.[39] A non-combatant Land Transport Corps was created, and its men paid more than twice as much as privates of the Line, though considerably less than Paxton's navvies, and promised the option of their discharge at the end of the war.[40] This, however,

[37] An enormous mass of evidence survives about these corps, which proved immensely troublesome from beginning to end.

[38] The bill authorizing their enlistment was very violently attacked in both Houses (3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXVI [1854-55], 251-91, 344-72, 429-60, 507-618, 629-82, 746-898), partly as a threat to English liberties, but chiefly as a morally offensive resort to mercenaries. Outside Parliament it was widely denounced as "a Bill for insulting the people and army, and for exciting public discontents" (*Morning Advertiser*, Dec. 19, 1854).

[39] See M. Robbins, "The Balaklava Railway," *Journal of Transport History*, I (1953), 28-43, and G. F. Chadwick.

[40] Sir John Fortescue, *The Royal Army Service Corps* (Cambridge, 1930), I, 155-57.

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was the furthest ministers were prepared to go. When the Opposition's leading military spokesman, Lord Ellenborough, protested that far too many soldiers were spending their time on duties which could be better performed by clerks, he drew no official response.[41] Nor did they feel able to respond to repeated suggestions that a forced labor corps should be organized from the numerous ticket-of-leave men who in the eighteen-fifties existed in a limbo between ordinary life and penal servitude. In earlier wars the criminal population had regularly been drawn upon to augment the army; but in the Crimean War public enthusiasm and romanticization of the war and the army made it impossible even for these good conduct prisoners awaiting their discharge to be sent to join "the people's army." The only acceptable plan was to form them into a labor corps quite distinct from the army; this, although contemplated, raised too many problems of law, discipline, and security ever to be put into practice.[42]

By the end of the war the substantial failure of all these various policies could hardly be disguised; nor could it be denied that by adopting so heterogeneous a bunch of expedients ministers had laid themselves wide open to charges of inconsistency and irresolution. All too often, moreover, they had been slow and inefficient in executing these miscellaneous decisions. Nevertheless, official failings, however serious, were not the real source of the intractable problems of manpower which bedeviled the British in the Crimean War. That source lay far deeper, as many thoughtful contemporaries were prepared to admit. For the first time a wartime army raised from criminals, paupers, and ne'er-do-wells, with a leaven of gullible or easily intoxicated youths, had become widely unacceptable thanks to idealized and heroic conceptions of what the war was about and unparalleled public identification with the troops and their experiences. More decisive still, such an army had ceased to be practicable. For although the population of the United Kingdom had indeed increased dramatically since 1815, in the eighteen-fifties the play of economic forces decisively prevented the nation from enjoying an

[41] 3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXVII (1855), 1285.

[42] *Ibid.*, CXXXVIII, (1855), 132-34, 138; Sir George Grey to Panmure, Aug. 10, 1855, Dalhousie Muniments; Sir George Grey to Palmerston, Aug. 17, 1855, Broadlands Archives.

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increased supply of military manpower, and this was so (though for different reasons) in England, Scotland, and Ireland alike.

IV

It was upon England that contemporary concern centered, and there a single phenomenon seemed striking enough to bear the whole burden of blame—the predominance of high wages and a heavy demand for labor. Unemployment, high prices, scarcity, and hardships were what that generation expected war to bring, but to their bewilderment, throughout 1854 and 1855, the army had to be expanded without the aid of the economic pressures they confidently anticipated. "Our prosperity is our undoing," exclaimed Prince Albert in 1855; and few contemporaries attempted to amplify this general explanation.

In fact, the shortage of young male labor during the Crimean War had several causes. From the point of view of the army, the situation in the rural areas was perhaps the most ominous, for these were the areas which in the past had yielded, if not always the most, certainly the best recruits. The basic cause of the rise in agricultural wages in the eighteen-fifties is revealed by the census returns of 1861—namely, rural depopulation. Absolute declines of rural population were common for the first time in that decade; and the majority of those who left the rural areas, whether to emigrate or not, were males under the age of 35, and most commonly between the ages of 17 and 25, the peak recruiting age.[43] The gold rushes had done much to stimulate rural emigration, especially in East Anglia and the Fens, Devon, and Cornwall,[44] and during the first part of the war the stream of emigrants did not lessen.[45] But rural depopulation was not, of course, a uniform phenomenon, and two other fac-

[43] W. Hasbach, *A History of the English Agricultural Labourer* (London, 1908), 252; J. Saville, *Rural Depopulation in England and Wales* (London, 1957), 9, 89, 106.

[44] C. T. Smith, "The Movement of Population in England and Wales in 1851 and 1861," *Geographical Journal*, CXVI (1951), 205.

[45] In 1855, however, the total number of emigrants was only 150,023, as against 267,047 in 1854. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1868-69, L (*Accounts and Papers*, XVII), [397], "Return of the number of emigrants, natives of Great Britain or Ireland, who have left the United Kingdom for the British Colonies or the United States of America, during the ten years ending December 1857," p. 2.

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tors in particular were at work in boosting agricultural wages: the spread of high farming, which required more labor;[46] and the growth of alternative employment opportunities, above all as navvies, for the itinerant haymakers and harvesters upon whom farmers had been accustomed to rely. Thus in the period of the Crimean War there was less floating rural labor than ever before, and agricultural prosperity made it possible for farmers to offer high wages to retain what there was. This was the situation which emptied the militia when the War Office circular of February 1855 conceded that men attested before May 1854 had a legal right to their discharge. With assured work at high wages waiting for them, it was not to be expected that men who had agreed to undergo a brief annual training under pressure from some local landowner would voluntarily endure embodied service in the militia for thirteen pence a day, with none of the compensations of military life to offset the loss of wages which might be as high as two shillings and sixpence or five shillings a day, at least in the north.[47]

In the industrial areas, prosperity was by no means uniform throughout the war. But in the areas hardest hit by the interruption of the boom in trade with Australia and the United States (which was the major cause of industrial dislocation during the war), namely the West Riding of Yorkshire and to a lesser extent Nottinghamshire and Lancashire, it was female employment which suffered most,[48] and recruiting accordingly gained nothing thereby. Railway builders consistently complained of a shortage of labor; shipbuilding wages reached a peak in 1855, and so, too, did wages in the Welsh and Cornish mining districts and in the London building trades.[49] The great industrial towns themselves were never the recruiting ser-

[46] E. L. Jones, "The Agricultural Labour Market in England, 1793-1872," *Economic History Review*, second series, XVII (1964), 328.

[47] 3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXVI (1854-55), 715. Agricultural wages in the north were on average thirty-seven per cent higher than in the south in the eighteen-fifties (Hasbach, 247).

[48] The increase in the numbers receiving poor relief between Jan. 1, 1854, and Jan. 1, 1855, was concentrated in this area, and was largely an increase of females (*The Economist*, March 3, 1855). See, also, *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1855, on the importance of the American and Australian trades.

[49] J. R. T. Hughes, *Fluctuations in Trade, Industry and Finance* (Oxford, 1960), 198; G. H. Wood, "Real Wages and the Standard of Comfort since 1850," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, LXXII (1909), 93; 3 *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, CXXXIX (1855), 856.

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geant's most valued catchment area; indeed the rate of rejection of such recruits on medical grounds was sufficiently high during the Crimean War to furnish the sanitary campaigners with a fresh argument for sweeping action to improve the health of towns.[50] But during the Crimean War the army found the supply very scanty indeed of its three best kinds of recruits, young artisans, casual workmen on the tramp, and young farm workers looking for adventure or evading an affiliation order. To some small extent this dearth was the result of changes in the poor law;[51] to a far greater extent it was the result of lurid and widely circulated press reports of the suffering and neglect endured by the troops besieging Sebastopol;[52] but most of all it was the result of the fact that the Crimean War coincided with a secular peak in work and wages[53] which affected most the very classes of Englishmen from which in time of war recruits were customarily drawn.

Traditionally, however, the British Army had always found fertile recruiting grounds in time of war in Ireland and the Scottish Highlands, and to neither could the Prince's lament of a fatal prosperity conceivably apply in those years. Yet the economic difficulties of Ireland and the Highlands diminished the flow of recruits quite as much as English prosperity. In Ireland the great famine had drastically reduced the population by some one and a half million, and since then emigration had, as *The Economist* put it, "carried off annually 200,000 men in their prime."[54] No doubt *The Tablet* was merely indulging in its customary polemics when it discovered the explanation of English recruiting difficulties *tout court* in what it chose to call "the deliberate depopulation of Ireland."[55] Nevertheless, the dramatic alteration in the size and composition of Ireland's population was undoubtedly a serious blow to the army, especially

[50] A. H. Elton, *How to Raise Able-Bodied Recruits*, Tract No. 15 of his *Tracts for the Present Crisis* (Bristol, 1855-56).

[51] After 1844 affiliation orders were probably less frequently made, since the initiative had to be taken by the mother instead of the parish. T. Mackay, *History of the English Poor Law* (London, 1899), III, 316; Anon., "The Recruiting of the Army," *United Service Journal*, III (1837), 433.

[52] Note the experiences of Sir J. D. Astley of the Grenadier Guards described in his *Fifty Years of My Life* (London, 1894), 238.

[53] Thomas, 1st Earl of Brassey, *Work and Wages* (London, 1916 ed.), 28.

[54] *The Economist*, Dec. 30, 1854.

[55] *The Tablet*, Dec. 23, 1854.

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since it was accompanied by an all too similar situation in the Highlands. There, too, rural depopulation, though less drastic, had taken its toll. The census returns of 1851 show that all over the Highlands there had been significant net emigration in the eighteen-forties; in Argyll, as many as thirty-seven per cent of the people born in that county were resident outside it in 1851.[56] The reasons for and distribution of this net depopulation have been shown to be more complex than contemporaries imagined; neither the notorious landlords' clearances nor the spread of sheep-farming played the decisive role with which they have been credited. The Highlands had their calamitous potato famines in the eighteen-forties, as well as their evicted cottars and crofters; but more important than either was the pull of the demand for labor in the expanding centers of the Lowlands, at least in those parts of the Highlands where propinquity allowed this pull to make itself felt.[57] In any case the decay and disruption of traditional tenant-landlord relationships were almost as significant in this context as net depopulation. It was factors like these which together affected the recruiting of the Highland Regiments and caused the concern felt, for example, over the difficulties experienced by Sir Colin Campbell in recruiting his brigade in the autumn of 1855.[58]

V

Thus in the years of the Crimean War a persistent demand for labor caused by rapid agricultural and industrial development in England, a demographic emergency in Ireland, and changing land use in Scotland, together created an economic situation in which the old methods of expanding the army had no chance of success at all. The only two devices logically worth a trial—compulsion always apart—were neither of them remotely practicable within the framework of contemporary political and social assumptions. Any attempt by the state to outbid civilian employers of labor by giving a pay rise of the order of four hundred per cent to the troops would run completely counter to the rigorous contemporary cult of economy in public spending. Similarly, any real effort to set the army's recruiting

[56] Malcolm Gray, *The Highland Economy, 1750-1850* (Edinburgh, 1957), 65.
[57] *Ibid.*, 99.
[58] A thoughtful contemporary discussion is to be found in Patterson, "Our Rural Population and the War."

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sights at a target somewhat higher in the social scale and systematically to exploit patriotic sentiments and social pressures to induce enlistment, was bound to be defeated by the impossibility of changing the army's image of callousness and brutality (much aggravated by the publicity given to the Crimean chaos), at least without reforms apparently too socially subversive to contemplate. With a governing class which was not prepared to pay the market rate nor to provide conditions of service roughly comparable with those of civilian life, it inevitably followed that an expanding economy made wartime military expansion much more difficult, not easier, despite a rapidly growing population. This was the truism made plain in the Crimean War, and in official circles the practical conclusion drawn was neither novel nor difficult to apprehend—that what the country needed was a permanent trained reserve under legal compulsion to serve in an emergency.

However, to some of the many mid-Victorians who delighted in applying their reading of political economy to the facts of contemporary life, the manpower situation in the Crimean War suggested reflections a good deal more original and forward-looking than this. In the mid-twentieth century, with the experience of two world wars as well as much sophisticated theoretical work on the utilization of labor to draw upon, it has become a commonplace that mass enlistment is emphatically not one of the paths to military victory in a modern industrial state. It was in the Crimean War that this corollary of industrialization began to be dimly appreciated and the question to be seen to be not simply how to get large numbers of Englishmen into the armed forces, but whether they would serve the country's war effort better by remaining in civil life. This did not come about in the manner of the First World War, through concern over the output of munitions workers or the need to increase agricultural production. It was the result of a particular vision of the foundations of British power common among men of affairs in that generation—a vision of a power impressive, indeed, but all too precariously based upon a narrow lead against many competitors in the field of international trade and manufacturing industry. This was the line of thought which made business circles and the amateur political economists who wrote for the press such enthusiastic defenders of the Aberdeen Coalition's otherwise highly unpopular foreign enlistment bill in December 1854. To these men, the en-

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listment of foreigners was obviously desirable, to "prevent sudden damage to productive industry."[59] Sudden heavy recruiting of the English working classes would throw into jeopardy the country's strength and wealth, and put too much strain on the sinews of war. Men who argued thus had no sympathy with the displays of affronted patriotism given by such widely read journals as *The Times*[60] and the *Morning Advertiser*, or with the moralizing denunciations of "alien hirelings" voiced by a whole gamut of politicians from Gladstone to David Urquhart. On the contrary, they were prepared to go even further and to urge subsidy negotiations upon the government as a more substantial method still of conserving native manpower for British industry.[61] Inevitably these calls were denounced as yet one more proof of the willingness of a nation of shopkeepers to fight with their money, but not with their blood. Nevertheless, in some influential quarters at least this attitude was for the first time genuinely based upon a coherent appreciation of the non-military factors involved in victory in war, and of the part the proper use of manpower could play in allowing some of these factors to operate. The traditional deterrents to indiscriminate mass recruiting continued to make themselves felt in the Crimean War (for example, in the reluctance to recruit married men, lest the burden of supporting their dependents on the rates should make the propertied classes withdraw their support for recruiting altogether, and in virtual suspension of recruiting at harvest times), but side by side with such time-honored bogeys as rural anti-militia riots, irate ratepayers, and unharvested crops, appeared the new bugbear of dislocation of production. For the first time it was explicitly argued that in the long run victory would depend not only on the armed forces, but also on the maintenance of the country's competitive position as a manufacturing nation and a great center of world trade;[62] and in unofficial circles at least some of the impli-

[59] *Daily News*, Dec. 14, 1854; *The Economist*, Dec. 30, 1854; "The Ten Days' Session," *Fraser's Magazine*, Jan. 1855, p. 122.

[60] By the autumn of 1855, however, *The Times* was changing its tone about the desirability of tapping foreign sources of manpower, as A. H. Elton complained in *Rubble Wanted Here*, No. 17 of his *Tracts for the Present Crisis*.

[61] See the full report upon the views of Glasgow business circles in R. Menteith to Lord John Russell, Dec. 16, 1854, PRO 30/22/11.

[62] This same belief underlay the novel policies with regard to trade adopted in the Crimean War, as is argued by the present writer in "Economic Warfare

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cations of this with regard to the proper use of British manpower in time of war began to be pondered.

In this, as in so many other matters, the lessons offered by the Crimean War were unexpectedly cut short and their moral never fully drawn out. It was clear that in an expanding industrial and commercial economy the old system was not only inappropriate, but even less workable than it had been before. But what should—or could—be put in its place? Heavy reliance upon extraneous sources of manpower? Hardly, for the diplomatic repercussions of the Crimean foreign legions were awkward enough to ensure that England would have no more foreign mercenaries. Competition by the army with civilian wage-rates? Too drastic a reassessment of the spending role of the state was involved for this to be practicable. Could patriotism, then, be enough in a national emergency, or must personal ambition be called upon to supplement it, by allowing the army to become a career wide open to talent? Or (and in official eyes this was the most realistic policy) should the main effort be to keep in being in time of peace an organized and trained reserve, based either upon some form of militia or upon discharged long-service regulars? For the next fifty years this question of how the British Army could best be recruited in peace and expanded in war was one of the most constant, and soon one of the stalest, administrative problems in British public life. It is hardly surprising that in the course of that long and wearisome debate the participants forgot how variously this same problem had been explored under the pressure of the strains, actual and anticipated, of that great war which never materialized and was remembered only in caricature, the war against Russia of 1854-56.

in the Crimean War," *Economic History Review*, second series, XIV (1961), 36.

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The Wilhelmstrasse in the Nazi Era

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After the defeat of Germany in 1945 officials of the German Foreign Office asserted at Nuremberg and in their memoirs that their office had lost its traditional powers over the formulation of foreign policy in the Nazi era. They insisted that proliferating para-diplomatic agencies had eroded their position, that Hitler made all crucial decisions without consulting them and then kept them ignorant, and that as a consequence the Foreign Office had been little more than a "technical apparatus."[1] Many scholars have accepted their arguments,[2] have even seen in the histories of other foreign offices of the major European and North American nations a similar loss of prerogatives, influence, and prestige. The evidence might almost be construed to justify a general rule covering the disparate but related phenomena of weakened foreign offices.[3] The historian must, however, be very wary. The German officials misread the history of their own office, partly by predicating

[1] The phrase is from Ernst von Weizsäcker, *The Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsäcker*, trans. John Andrews (London, 1951), 106.

[2] G. Craig and F. Gilbert (eds.), *The Diplomats, 1919-1939* (Princeton, 1953), 409, where Craig quotes Weizsäcker's phrase; P. Seabury, *The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats Under the Nazi Regime* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954); W. H. C. Frend, "Hitler and His Foreign Ministry, 1937-1939," *History*, XLII (1957), 118-29.

[3] See Sir Lewis Namier's review of *The Diplomats*, "Diplomacy in the Interwar Period," *World Politics*, VII (1954), 102-18.

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conditions which had never existed. They hoped to escape punishment at Nuremberg and condemnation from posterity by winning acceptance for their arguments, which diminished their responsibility for the events of the nineteen-thirties.[4] The general rule which held that foreign offices were in decline distorts their historic functions, and simplifies or ignores many basic changes in the nature and conduct of twentieth-century diplomacy.

I

Foreign offices have been greatly affected by the increasing complexity of international relations in the twentieth century. Highly technical economic, military, and legal problems are primary concerns of diplomacy in this century,[5] but were not the forte of the nineteenth-century diplomat. Because of the revolution in communications, moreover, ambassadors in this century have not been able to pursue independent policies made in their own establishments. The old style diplomat and the narrow agencies of the old foreign offices have not, in most instances, been equipped to deal with these affairs.[6] Other governmental departments and agencies, sometimes part of the Foreign Office, but always with their own experts and expertise, have been established or given competency over them. In both cases foreign offices and foreign services have had much more business and many more prerogatives, but they have not remained masters of all sides of interstate relations.[7]

The New Diplomacy which originated in the pronouncements of Wilson and Lenin during the First World War has resulted in a diplomacy of ideology, a diplomacy calculated to appeal to peoples of all countries.[8] Diplomacy has thus been more responsive to pub-

[4] Namier hints at this in *ibid.*, 105.

[5] Jules Cambon, *The Diplomatist* (London, 1931), 78-79, also noted the growing pressures of parliaments, the press, and the business world. The legal problems were especially important for Germany, given the attempts to undermine Versailles. See Hajo Holborn, in Craig and Gilbert, 154; Seabury, *The Wilhelmstrasse*, 151-61.

[6] Seabury, *The Wilhelmstrasse*, 154; William W. Kaufmann, in Craig and Gilbert, 680-81; and Namier concluded that there was insufficiency at all levels.

[7] Holborn, in Craig and Gilbert, 150.

[8] Arno J. Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918* (New Haven, 1959), 8, 53-58; Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (New York, 1954), 73-84, contrasts the "Old" and "New" diplomacy; R. Al-

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lic opinion than ever before, and propaganda agencies have been created to manipulate or sway public opinion. Propaganda has played a large part in conference diplomacy, which has been more frequent since 1918. Not only were there numerous conferences, mainly concerning a variety of problems rooted in the postwar treaties, but the League of Nations was in effect a permanent conference. Heads of state attended the conferences of the early nineteen-twenties, and conferences since then have required the attention and often the attendance of responsible politicians, thereby becoming the focus of time, effort, and anxiety often born of excessive publicity.[9] Professional diplomats from the foreign offices of their respective countries have accordingly played a lesser part; quiet negotiations over the essential issues have given way to an avid search for quick successes on what is often superficially important.[10] Perhaps professional diplomats have also had less weight in the highest councils of their states, in the planning and formulation of foreign policy, because they are not usually as sensitive as their heads of state to currents of public opinion and to pressure groups.[11] Whatever the reasons, when diplomats have disagreed with their chiefs their advice has often been rejected. But the complexities of foreign policy have been a source of power for the permanent officials in foreign offices and foreign services.

The burdens of the work have necessitated large increases in staff; the paperwork has become overwhelming, for the official first, and even more for the historian later. As a consequence of increases in staff and paper, no head of state or his high subordinates can readily control the minutiae of foreign policy. Of course, broad formulations of foreign policy, expressions of the temper or tone of a government, are still developed by heads of state in consulta-

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brecht-Carrié, *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna* (New York, 1958), 342-49.

[9] W. M. Jordan, *Great Britain, France and the German Problem, 1918-1939* (London, 1943), 85-102; H. Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925* (New York, 1934), 183-87, 188-91, where he counts twenty-three separate international conferences between January 1920 and December 1922; Sir Charles Webster, "The Council of Europe in the Nineteenth Century," in *The Art and Practice of Diplomacy* (London, 1961), 55-68. Also see Nicolson, *Evolution of Diplomatic Method*, 61, 89-90.

[10] Jordan, 102; Nicolson, *Curzon*, 186-87.

[11] See Namier, 110.

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tion with their foreign ministers and senior advisers. Heads of state and foreign ministers may even draft statements and conduct negotiations, which is to say that they may control many of the details of contacts between states. But senior foreign office officials and ambassadors do more than rote work in executing these formulations of foreign policy, whether they are broad or specific. They very often provide the background papers on which the formulation of foreign policy is based, and they often make the initial drafts of major statements. They are usually responsible for the form and much of the detailed substance of treaties, hence for the results of negotiations. But out of the broad formulations must emerge workable and even more precise statements, which must in turn be executed. Thus the responsibility for much extremely important activity at the lower levels must be entirely in the control of career officials. This activity at the lower levels has added to rather than diminished the prerogatives of a foreign office. The word "policy" is very imprecise, and foreign "policy" is made at a number of different levels. The argument that foreign offices have lost control of "policy" is at best ambiguous, and at worst meaningless, a point which is confirmed by the numerous historical works on the foreign policies of various countries.

Thus there have been changes in the nature and conduct of diplomacy, changes in the concerns and sizes of foreign offices, but many of the powers of these institutions have endured, even increased. And it is almost certainly true that a nation can apply much more pressure through a greater diversity of institutions and a wider range of means toward any given objective in foreign policy than was possible in the nineteenth century. It is no longer possible to channel and control all of these pressures in a single institution such as a foreign office. The position of foreign offices has only diminished relative to other arms of the state, which also influence foreign policy. But there has been no decline in the absolute power of the foreign offices. All of these points can be illustrated in the history of the German Foreign Office, especially during the Nazi era.

II

The officials of the German Foreign Office who insisted after World War II that their office lost power during the nineteen-

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thirties did not note these basic factors. We must if we are to see the "decline" of the German Foreign Office in perspective. If one posits a decline in power and influence of the German Foreign Office, however, he must ask, decline from what? The answer is that historical fancies rather than fact also account for their misconceived sense of decline after 1933. The Foreign Office had never made or completely controlled foreign policy, and yet had usually had an immensely important place. Foreign Office officials and diplomats had advised on the broad formulations of policy, had worked out the intricacies of various specific policies, had decided how to apply them, and had then implemented them.[12]

Bismarck had dominated the Foreign Office and he had made his own foreign policy. Prior to the First World War Kaiser Wilhelm II often relied less on the Foreign Office than on his own close advisers, but Baron Friedrich von Holstein and Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter played important parts. During the war the Foreign Office itself was ruled by the annexationists, and after 1916 by the arch militarists Erich Ludendorff and Paul von Beneckendorf und Hindenburg, the virtual dictators of Germany.[13] Throughout the war conventional diplomacy was combined with and supported by massive propaganda, large subsidies, and considerable subversion. Various combinations of these means made up totalitarian diplomacy and were later used even more effectively by Hitler.

In the first years of the Weimar Republic the Foreign Office was under non-professional, political control,[14] and after 1923 Gustav

[12] Note the curious contrast of title and aims in *The Diplomats*, which purports to describe foreign offices *and* diplomats in the interwar period. The main strand running throughout the volume is the loss of influence on foreign policy suffered by the foreign offices, by the bureaucracy. But the principal functions of diplomats are to represent, report, and negotiate. G. Craig, *From Bismarck to Adenauer* (Baltimore, 1958), 11. The roles of the diplomats and their foreign offices are never clearly distinguished.

[13] For a summary, see Holborn, in Craig and Gilbert, 123-29. On German diplomacy in the First World War, see Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18*, (Düsseldorf, 1961); Ernst W. Graf Lynar (ed.), *Deutsche Kriegsziele, 1914-1918. Eine Diskussion* (Frankfurt a/M., 1964); Fritz Fischer, *Weltmacht oder Niedergang. Deutschland im ersten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt a/M., 1965); and the essays by Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Imanuel Geiss, in *The Journal of Contemporary History*, I (1966), 44-72, 75-91.

[14] Holborn, 148. By the time of Rapallo the diplomats had regained much

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Stresemann, who was not a professional diplomat, had followed the policy of "fulfillment," the main strain of which was revision of Versailles within the limits of Allied overseership.[15] In the Weimar period many ambassadorial posts went to politicians who had not risen through the usual diplomatic hierarchy. They proved unusually competent, despite the undoubtedly hostile attitude of the resurgent old guard in the office.[16] By 1932 the old guard controlled the Foreign Office.

Certainly the Foreign Office, taken as a bureaucratic elite and traditionally conservative aristocratic service, had always been extremely useful and often potent, but was usually kept in a subordinate position.[17] That their glowing hopes for a larger role in pursuit of a more active foreign policy were disappointed until Heinrich Brüning's misconceived customs union attempt in 1931 may account in part for the complaints of the Foreign Office after World War II.[18] But it is certainly not true that the Foreign Office had complete control to lose. Since 1870 the office had been more con-

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of their influence. See Gerald Freund, *Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin* (London, 1957).

[15] The policy of fulfillment had, however, been laid down by Rathenau; Craig, *From Bismark to Adenauer*, 69. For recent studies, see Hans Gatzke, "Gustav Stresemann: A Bibliographical Article," *Journal of Modern History*, XXXVI (1964), 1-13.

[16] Holborn, in Craig and Gilbert, 154. Craig does not offer convincing evidence for his statement that in the Weimar era "questions of policy" fell under the control of the state secretary. *Bismarck to Adenauer*, 109. The vexed question is what he means by policy, a word with various meanings. See Carl J. Friedrich, "Policy — A Science?" *Public Policy*, IV (1953), 271-74.

[17] Stresemann had resisted the considerable pressures of Brockdorff-Rantzau and Seeckt for closer ties with Russia. Craig, *Bismarck to Adenauer*, 80-82.

[18] Hostility to Stresemann in the Foreign Office appears in Weizsäcker's *Memoirs*, 68. Many diplomats undoubtedly hoped for more successes sooner, an end to party influence on policy formulation, and greater power for themselves. Craig, *Bismarck to Adenauer*, 69, condemns Brüning's policy as "maladroit" throughout. For a different view, see Wolfgang S. Helbich, "Between Stresemann and Hitler: The Foreign Policy of the Bruening Government," *World Politics*, XII (1959), 24-44. Two recent works support Craig: F. G. Stambrook, "The German-Austrian Customs Union Project of 1931: A Study of German Methods and Motives," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XXI (1961), 15-44; Edward W. Bennett, *Germany and the Diplomacy of the Financial Crisis, 1931* (Cambridge, 1962). Jürgen Gehl, *Austria, Germany and the Anschluss, 1931-1938* (London, 1963), emphasizes French hostility to the Customs Union more than inept German diplomacy.

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cerned with implementation of foreign policy than with its broad formulation, and this was equally true in the Nazi era.

III

Foreign Office officials have insisted that in the Third Reich their position deteriorated primarily because of interference and usurpation of their prerogatives in diplomacy by individual Nazis or their agencies,[19] such as Joseph Goebbels and the Propaganda Ministry, Alfred Rosenberg's *Aussenpolitisches Amt*, Ernst-Wilhelm Bohle's *Auslandsorganisation*, the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*, Joachim von Ribbentrop's *Büro* or *Dienststelle*, and the powerful Hermann Göring. There are two main reasons why they would have us believe that these agencies had a debilitating effect on the Foreign Office. In the first place these agencies were less knowledgeable and more radical than the Foreign Office. Their ill-calculated, independent, ostentatious pronouncements and actions alienated the Powers and generally exacerbated Germany's foreign relations.[20] In the second instance, because of their intrusions the Foreign Office lost control of policy, had less chance to influence Hitler, and could not slow or divert the series of moves which carried Germany into war.[21] Neither of these arguments will bear careful investigation.

Hitler believed force and propaganda were far more efficacious than diplomacy. The Propaganda Ministry would manipulate opinion both at home and abroad. In 1933 Paul Joseph Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry gained control of both domestic and foreign propaganda.[22] The Foreign Ministry continued its limited, tradi-

[19] Craig, in Craig and Gilbert, 406-36. See, also, Rohan Butler, "Paradiplomacy," in A. O. Sarkissian (ed.), *Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography in honour of G. P. Gooch* (London, 1961), 12-25.

[20] They feared the isolation of Germany. See D. C. Watt, "German Diplomats and Nazi Leaders," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XV (1955), 152-53, for this point and other criticisms of Craig's article in *The Diplomats*. William E. Scott, *Alliance Against Hitler. The Origins of the Franco-Soviet Pact* (Durham, N.C., 1962), and Charles Bloch, *Hitler und die europäische Mächte 1933-34. Kontinuität oder Bruch* (Frankfurt a/M., 1966), describe Hitler's early moves and reactions to them.

[21] This claim is most evident in Weizsäcker's *Memoirs* and in Erich Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten* (Stuttgart, 1950). Hitler increasingly dominated foreign policy by deciding when and how peaceful means would give way to war; the diplomats worked under a deadline.

[22] Z. A. B. Zeman, *Nazi Propaganda* (London, 1964), is useful with Ernest

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tional activities through its Press Department, while Goebbels initiated an enormous program, such as the old bureaucracy would never have imagined or undertaken. The diplomats wanted control of this area because they felt threatened by Goebbels' activities, because they had similar visions. Defeat by Goebbels did not so much diminish the Foreign Office's powers as halt its incipient attempts at administrative aggrandizement. Goebbels was a masterful administrator and successful propagandist, at least in Central Europe. When necessary the Foreign Ministry could disclaim the pronouncements of the Propaganda Ministry, thereby making the two agencies appear entirely separate and thus confusing foreign powers which sought to discern Germany's true course. But the lack of coordination sometimes was disastrous, as during the Austrian *Putsch* of 1934. Afterwards the diplomats regained control of the Austrian situation, and propaganda was the servant of diplomacy.[23] Propaganda also served foreign policy in Poland; from the Pact of 1934 until 1939 the German press was muted.[24] However, Goebbels very successfully stimulated an annexationist mood over the Saar, Austria, and the Sudetenland. Propaganda aroused enthusiasm in Germany and was a strong subversive force in Eastern Europe, but was coordinated with foreign policy in these campaigns. After Joachim von Ribbentrop replaced Constantin von Neurath the Foreign Ministry regained many of the prerogatives which it had temporarily lost.[25]

Diplomatic officials have also insisted that the *Aussenpolitisches Amt* of the Nazi party, headed by Alfred Rosenberg, made inroads on their position.[26] Hitler had apparently considered appointing Rosenberg as foreign minister, but instead gave him the party office. For a short time Rosenberg's agency did seem to threaten the

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K. Bramsted, *Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda, 1925-1945* (East Lansing, Mich., 1965).

[23] Zeman, 133-35.

[24] *Ibid.*, 105; M. Broszat, *200 Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik* (Munich, 1963), 191.

[25] Zeman, 59, Seabury, *passim*, Rudolf Rahn, *Ruheloses Leben* (Düsseldorf, 1949), 136, for a description of how Ribbentrop expanded his propaganda section in 1939.

[26] Seabury describes Rosenberg's efforts and the reaction to them. On Rosenberg's career, see Gunter Schubert, *Die Anfänge der nationalsozialistischen Aussenpolitik, 1919-1923* (Berlin, 1961).

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Foreign Office, but he lost almost all of his influence after his farcical visit to England in May 1933. His ineffectiveness is evident in the complaints which he jotted in his diary. He was impressed by and deplored the power of the Wilhelmstrasse, not vice versa.[27] The Foreign Office, however, had further difficulties with the Nazi party.

The Nazi party caused additional problems by its support and control of German minorities abroad. Although after 1934 Hitler was careful not to alienate Jozef Pilsudski and Benito Mussolini by playing upon the problems of ethnic Germans in Poland, Austria, and the South Tyrol, some party officials and organizations were very active. In 1933 Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess created a *Volksdeutscher Rat* which challenged the Foreign Office's control of relations with these minorities. The Foreign Office successfully resisted Hess' incursion,[28] but Hess continued his efforts by another avenue. In 1930 the Nazi party had created an office to maintain contact with Nazis abroad; in 1934 Hess changed its name to the *Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP* or *AO*, and appointed Ernst-Wilhelm Bohle as director. The diplomats considered Bohle's agency a nuisance, particularly in missions abroad. Only in the important decision for intervention in Spain is there evidence that the *AO* had any weight in the counsels of Hitler. On that occasion *AO* advice probably made less difference than Hitler's own proclivities and appreciation of the possibilities in the circumstances. The diplomats were unenergetic, and joined with the military in opposition to intervention.[29]

[27] The diary also illustrates Hitler's hostility to the diplomats and Rosenberg's hatred for Ribbentrop. A. Rosenberg, *Das politische Tagebuch aus den Jahren 1939-40* (Göttingen, 1956). John L. Heinemann, *Constantin Freiherr von Neurath as Foreign Minister 1932-1935* (University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1965), 266-72, gives Neurath much of the credit for Rosenberg's fall.

[28] Zeman has touched upon these matters, but the best account is by MacAlister Brown, "The Third Reich's Mobilization of the German Fifth Column in Eastern Europe," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIX (1959), 128-48. See, also, Louis de Jong, *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War* (Chicago, 1956), and Robert L. Koehl, *RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939-1945* (Cambridge, 1957). A useful critique of de Jong is Restytut W. Staniewicz, "A Polish Comment on a Book Dealing with the German Fifth Column," *Polish Western Affairs*, I (1960), 110-30.

[29] Craig, in Craig and Gilbert; Manfred Merkes, *Die deutsche Politik gegenüber dem spanischen Bürgerkrieg, 1936-1939* (Bonn, 1961), 19-27.

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The influential and sometimes useful mythology of the "Fifth Column" flourished around the *AO;* this myth had propaganda value in Central Europe, but was a drawback in the United States and South America. Bohle's agency may have been a useful vehicle for Nazi party activities, to which the Foreign Ministry was in general hostile. However, in February 1937 the diplomats gained some control over Bohle and his organization by making him a secretary of state in the Foreign Ministry. Although Bohle remained jointly responsible to Hess and the Wilhelmstrasse, he no longer posed a large threat to the latter.[30]

Other Nazi party agencies competed with the *AO* and the Foreign Office for control of Germans abroad. This competition was so disruptive that in 1936 Hess established a new Party Office for Minority Germans (*Volkssdeutsche Mittelstelle,* or *VM,* or *VOMI*).[31] Initially this office could not coordinate the hostile ministries and party organs. Consequently, in an unusual step the Foreign Ministry recommended that the *VM* be strengthened. Hess had already appointed *SS* officer Werner Lorenz as director on January 1, 1937. The *VM* did subsequently gain control of some of the other party groups, and the *VM* benefited from Bohle's incorporation into the Foreign Office. The *VM* was not, however, treated to unlimited successes in the next few years. In September 1938 it sought control over the *Sudetendeutsche Freikorps,* and in May 1939 wanted the leading role in the transfer of Germans from the South Tyrol. The *SS* triumphed in both of these matters, and their success presaged the ultimate fate of the *VM.* When the war began the *SS* annexed the *VM* through a new agency, the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom (*Reichskommissariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums,* or *RKFDV*).

The Foreign Office alternately struggled and cooperated with the *VM.* For instance, in July 1937 the Wilhelmstrasse would not accept the *VM* decision that only one political party should be accepted for leadership of ethnic Germans in each country. Nor did they approve the *VM*'s recommendation for unification of German political parties in Poland in May 1938. The Foreign Office carefully retained its control of a Polish-German conference on minorities in

[30] Contrary to the conclusion of de Jong, 280, Bohle's style was definitely cramped by the appointment, as is clear in Heinemann, 281-83.

[31] For much of the following, see Brown and Koehl.

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February 1939. Yet the two agencies did cooperate on some issues, as when the diplomats disbursed subsidies directly and through the *VM* to Konrad Henlein's party. In Czechoslovakia the *VM* was only a little more radical than the Foreign Ministry; the agencies had conferred and agreed that Germany or Henlein must frustrate compromise attempts by the Czechs or England, especially the Runciman mission. Neither agency liked Henlein's independent stance.[32] The two organizations encouraged calm when ethnic German restlessness or violence undermined German foreign policy. They united in their protests over East Prussian Gauleiter Erich Koch's activities in Memel. As foreign minister, Ribbentrop authorized *VM* subversion in the Carpatho-Ukraine; he used Wilhelm Keppler and Edmund Veesenmeyer in Slovakia and Danzig.[33] Yet neither the Foreign Ministry nor the *VM* controlled the activities of Reinhard Heydrich's *SD* in Memel or Danzig, and much of the frenetic and aggressive activity among the *Volksdeutsch* was stimulated by the *Anschluss*, or by various forms of Nazi propaganda.[34] Thus, the *VM* certainly did not supplant the Foreign Office; more often than not the two agencies cooperated.

The most important of the para-diplomatic organizations was undoubtedly Ribbentrop's *Büro* or *Dienststelle*, established in 1933 and financed from Hitler's personal treasury.[35] In the early years of the Third Reich the Foreign Office scorned Ribbentrop and did not think him of much consequence. The diplomats were more worried by the hostility of other states and Germany's increasing isolation. However, they placed one of their own men, Erich Kordt, in Ribbentrop's organization.[36] In 1934 Ribbentrop was prominent but ineffectual as special commissioner for disarmament. He did achieve a coup when he negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935, but the agreement was more than a personal triumph. Hit-

[32] See unpublished Nuremberg Trial Documents NG-2130, July 15, 1938, Weizsäcker memorandum; NG-2129, July 29, 1938, Weizsäcker memorandum; NG-2784, Aug. 14, 1938, Woermann to Ribbentrop, in University of Washington Library, Seattle. Also Brown, 143.

[33] Brown, 138, 140, 143-44.

[34] Zeman, *passim*.

[35] Craig, in Craig and Gilbert, 419-27, 431-33; Seabury, *The Wilhelmstrasse* does not entirely supersede his earlier article, "Ribbentrop and the German Foreign Office," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXVI (1951), 532-55.

[36] See Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten*.

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ler had dominated, while the Foreign Office and the military had participated in and approved the decisions and negotiations which led to the agreement. During the final exchanges in London several of the most important members of Ribbentrop's delegation, including Ernst Woermann and Friedrich Gaus, were from the Foreign Office.[37] After this achievement, a boon to German foreign relations, Ribbentrop's appointment as ambassador in London can be given conflicting interpretations. In one view Ribbentrop the anglophile had been commissioned to achieve Hitler's chief ambition, an alliance with England. In another view, not entirely incompatible with the first, he had been relegated to the sidelines and his appointment was a victory for Neurath. Ribbentrop did not want the post, and his efforts on behalf of an Anglo-German alliance failed.[38] Even while he was becoming an anglophobe in London, his projects for Italy and Japan helped carry Germany away from Great Britain.

Nevertheless, from Hitler's assumption of power to the Czech crisis of 1938 Hermann Göring was more important in diplomacy than Ribbentrop. His visits to Yugoslavia in 1934, to a number of Balkan states in 1935, and to Poland in 1935, 1936, and 1937 were complemented by a number of meetings with Mussolini from 1933 to 1937. Hitler consulted Göring but not Ribbentrop before entering the Spanish Civil War in 1936.[39] Italy's partnership in the Spanish war combined with Abyssinia to draw her away from the Danube basin, where the Austro-German Gentleman's Agreement of July 1936 dulled Italian hostility to *Anschluss*. This increasing cooperation resulted in the Axis proclaimed by Mussolini in November 1936.[40] But Hitler had long admired fascism, and his enthusiasm

[37] For these negotiations, see D. C. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment," *Journal of Modern History*, XXVI (1956), 155-75.

[38] Seabury, *The Wilhelmstrasse*, 54-58; E. M. Robertson, *Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Military Plans, 1933-1939* (London, 1963), 95, 103-13; Ernst L. Presseisen, *Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy, 1933-1941* (The Hague, 1958), 189; Heinemann, *Neurath*, 278-81, credits Neurath with a victory.

[39] For Göring's visits, see Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, *Hermann Göring* (London, 1962), 128-39, and for Hitler's consultations, see Merkes, 19-22.

[40] Elizabeth Wiskemann, *The Rome-Berlin Axis* (London, 1949), is largely superseded by Ferdinand Siebert, *Italiens Weg in den Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Frank-

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was shared by Göring and Ribbentrop, as well as many other true believers in the Nazi party.[41] Despite the objections of Ambassador Ulrich von Hassel in Italy the Foreign Office helped promote and then endorsed this tie,[42] which ended Germany's isolation but was not incompatible with good Anglo-German relations.

From the beginning of Ribbentrop's mission to London, Mussolini had tried to frustrate an Anglo-German agreement and the Axis apparently completed his efforts. Yet he held the door open for the January 1937 Italian agreement with Great Britain over the Mediterranean. In the same month Hitler sent Göring to Rome with the message that Italy should be prepared for a clash with England in three years, and meanwhile should maintain her distance from Austria.[43] Most of the German moves of 1936 and 1937 had not, however, envisioned war with England.

Both Mussolini and Hitler believed the campaign in Spain against the "Reds" might facilitate their relations with Great Britain and increase British hostility to Russia. A similar belief lay behind the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan of November 25, 1936, arranged by Ribbentrop's *Dienststelle*, which was opposed but considered unimportant by most of the diplomats, with the exception of Herbert von Dirksen.[44] This pact was also supposed to help hold down Russia, and to be welcomed by England because of its anti-Russian import, without doing grievous damage to Germany's relations with China. When the army purges in 1937 occasioned a lower estimate of Russian military capacity, the pact with Japan seemed less useful. And the Sino-Japanese War revived the vigor-

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furt a/M., 1962). The analysis of Robertson, 93-98, is helpful. The Axis was most heartily promoted by the Nazi party. See Malcolm Muggeridge (ed.), *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers* (London, 1948), for Hans Frank's mission to Rome in September 1936.

[41] W. Pene, "Hitler und Italien, 1920-1926," *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, III (1955), 113-26; Wiskemann, *passim*.

[42] Alan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (New York, rev. ed., 1962), 350-52.

[43] Manvell and Fraenkel, 137-39.

[44] Presseisen, 119, is helpful, but for more detail and a broader perspective, see Theo Sommer, *Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Mächten, 1935-1940* (Tübingen, 1962). The Anti-Comintern Pact was considered so unimportant that afterward the Foreign Office assured China that the German relationship to her had not changed.

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ous argument over German policy in the Far East,[45] even while the shift in Germany's position toward England was being accomplished.

Despite the humiliation of his visit to London in 1937 Göring conducted Lord Londonderry to army maneuvers in Mecklenburg during the summer, hosted the Duke and Duchess of Windsor in October, and hunted with Lord Halifax in November. During this last visit Ribbentrop was not even consulted.[46] Germany's efforts were successful to the extent that Great Britain disavowed interest in Austria,[47] but no Anglo-German pact was possible. Thus Ribbentrop's mission had failed and his career was in doubt at the end of 1937, although his ideas about the future paralleled Hitler's, and circumstances were to promote his appointment as foreign minister in February 1938. At the end of 1937, however, Göring loomed larger than Ribbentrop and the position of the diplomats had certainly not been irrevocably damaged at their hands.

Foreign Office fears of isolation had been laid to rest by the end of 1937, and they had maintained their position despite the incursions of a variety of para-diplomatic agencies. In most instances the Wilhelmstrasse had been consulted about major diplomatic moves and had played a part in negotiations and formulation of agreements. Their advice had been rejected, but only over the gamble in Spain and the unimportant anti-Comintern agreements. The coordination of all of the Nazi agencies and activities was now carried out more skillfully despite the conflicts and personal animosities of their satraps. Although the day-to-day conduct of German foreign policy was in their hands, the diplomats had been disgruntled by the activities of these agencies and especially wanted control over Ribbentrop and his *Büro*. Neurath had not been a strong defender of Foreign Office prerogatives. Thus Ribbentrop's appointment as foreign minister brought into the fold the man who had been most dangerous outside it. But the activities of the para-diplomatic agencies do not entirely explain the complaints of the

[45] Robertson, 98-102.

[46] Manvell and Fraenkel, 140-41, 146-47; Presseisen, 189.

[47] Ulrich Eichstädt, *Von Dollfuss zu Hitler, Geschichte des Anschlusses Österreichs 1933-1938* (Wiesbaden, 1955); Gordon Craig, "High Tide of Appeasement: The Road to Munich, 1937-38," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXV (1950), 20-37.

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diplomats about their position before 1938. Their attitudes toward Nazi aims do help explain this phenomenon.

IV

The diplomats and bureaucrats of the Foreign Office had been for the most part monarchists, had not given strong support to the Weimar Republic, and by 1932 thought its demise inevitable. They were better disposed to a dictator[48] and had hopes for action by Hitler even though they did not approve of him personally or of the rowdiness of his party. They characterized the League of Nations as an arena for exercise of Allied power against Germany,[49] and they were convinced that Versailles had been a *Diktat*, an ignominious peace which was the cause of their troubles and might justifiably be scrapped. They wanted to reverse the results of defeat, raise Germany to the first rank of the powers, and obtain the territories held before 1914, such as the Polish borderlands. But they also promoted *Anschluss* and annexation of the heavily German Sudetenland even when they had reservations about the effects or about the means employed by Hitler. These were radical aims of expansion in the nineteen-thirties, but were short of the aims of outspoken annexationists during World War I.[50] The moderates in the Foreign Office, such as Ernst von Weizsäcker, Erich and Theo Kordt, Ulrich von Hassell,[51] and Adam von Trott zu Solz shared these aims and wanted a far larger role for Germany. The Kordts even toyed with the idea of a German empire on the continent which would be the equivalent of the British empire overseas.[52] These aspirations,

[48] See the illuminating section of Karl Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik* (Stuttgart, 1957), 174-98.

[49] Weizsäcker, *Memoirs*, 70. For his early optimism about the League, see Ernst Jäckh, *Der Goldene Pflug* (Stuttgart, 1953), 352.

[50] Hatred of and arrogance toward Poles and Czechs was an old strain among this type of expansionist, and one which merged rather easily with Hitler's talk about *Lebensraum* and race. For signs of this hatred, see E. Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten*, 39-42. For World War I, see Fritz Fischer; Imanuel Geiss, *Der polnische Grenzstreifen 1914-1918* (Lübeck and Hamburg, 1960).

[51] Hassell became a moderate in the sense that he opposed Hitler, but he had always been extremely nationalistic and would not have been satisfied with anything less than Germany's pre-1914 territories.

[52] See the conversation of Theo Kordt and Gladwyn Jebb on August 19, 1939, in which Kordt spoke of the "Grosswirtschaftsraum" which Germany would build on the continent, and the "Weltgeschichtliche Prozess" in which she was

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then, provided the basis for temporarily harmonious relations with Hitler and the Nazi party.[53]

Despite their sometimes reluctant accommodation with Hitler there were important points on which they differed with him. They had been irritated by the institutional threat posed by the para-diplomatic agencies, but had welcomed some of the results of their work. They had feared isolation, but their fears had been allayed by the Naval Agreement with England, by the success of collusion with Italy in Spain, and by conclusion of the pacts with Japan and Italy. By the time Ribbentrop was appointed foreign minister in 1938 neither irritant—the para-diplomatic agencies or isolation—annoyed the diplomats. But other worries undoubtedly continued to afflict them.

These officials were not opposed to sudden and arbitrary actions in diplomacy, or to the threat and even possible waging of war, if success or victory were reasonably certain. Moral compunctions, humanitarianism, or cosmopolitan moderation did not enter their arguments, although they no doubt entered their minds.[54] But during each of the major crises which arose over the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland they thought a war would ensue which Germany could only lose. From 1936 on they accepted the judgment of the military that the Great Powers would intervene, perhaps out of unpredictable impulse, on the occasion of German coups.[55] Their memories of 1914 and 1918 made them cautious. They deserve slight praise for their kind of realism, which opposed

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caught up. *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939* (hereafter cited as *BD*, and all subsequent citations are in the Third Series) Third Series, VII, Appendix I, No. viii, 555-57. A full account is in Wolfe W. Schmokel, *Dream of Empire: German Colonialism 1919-1945* (New Haven, 1964).

[53] By harmonious I mean that these agencies could and did collaborate, not that they enjoyed the collaboration.

[54] Moral objections to Hitler's methods nevertheless permitted support for his aims. Beck and Weizsäcker agreed that no moral arguments would stop Hitler; Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten*, 233. Having objected so strongly to the lofty moral tone favored by Woodrow Wilson and exploited by the Allies in the nineteen-twenties, these men were loath to allow such arguments a large place in their own reasoning about politics under Hitler. Furthermore, they shared General Werner von Fritsch's fatalistic belief that Germany must endure Hitler even if it disapproved of some of his actions.

[55] For the positions of the military, see John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power* (London, 1954).

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a losing war but promoted a grandiose and implicitly belligerent foreign policy, adamantly insisting on clear gain and pointing toward the test of war.

Hitler did not fear war; ultimately he sought it.[56] From the start he remarked the unwillingness of the Great Powers to take rapid and forceful diplomatic action which they would consistently sustain. He judged the powers even more unwilling to make a military move. After the Rhineland crisis and during the Spanish Civil War he became convinced that he had little to fear from them.[57] Some high officials of the Foreign Office had supported him in all these ventures,[58] and Hitler learned to despise the rest when his own intuitions were borne out. Hitler probably read many of the reports of Germany's ambassadors and high Foreign Office officials,[59] but he rejected their advice and success seemingly confirmed his judgments and intuitions. In any event, whereas in Washington policy appeared to have been "the product of cables received from abroad rather than of a dynamic conception of American interests,"[60] in Germany Hitler and his foreign ministers, Neurath and Ribbentrop, often ignored the reports or scorned them, and had a dynamic conception of Germany's interests which they successfully realized.

[56] A useful analysis of Hitler's outlook, which examines the flawed works of A. J. P. Taylor and the absurd volume of David Hoggen, is in the revised edition of Walther Hofer, *Die Entfesselung des zweiten Weltkrieges* (Frankfurt, a/M., 1964).

[57] Robertson has contributed new information on the role of Hassell in the Rhineland crisis. There is an earlier analysis by Max Braubach, *Der Einmarsch deutscher Truppen in die entmilitarisierte Zone am Rhein in März 1936* (Cologne, 1956), and C. Waldron Bolen, "Hitler Remilitarizes the Rhineland," in L. P. Wallace and W. C. Askew (eds.), *Power, Public Opinion, and Diplomacy. Essays in Honor of Eber Malcolm Carroll* (Durham, N.C., 1959), 244-66. See, also, Donald C. Watt, "German Plans for the Reoccupation of the Rhineland: A Note," *Journal of Contemporary History*, I (1966), 193-99.

[58] For instance, Hassell and Neurath in the Rhineland venture. For the similar position of the generals, see Gordon A. Craig, "Army and National Socialism 1933-1945: The Responsibility of the Generals," *World Politics*, II (1950), 426-38.

[59] He despised the diplomats. For shrewd remarks and pertinent evidence on this score, see Joachim Lauschner, *Volk und Raum zum Stil der nationalsozialistischen Aussenpolitik* (Gottingen, 1958), 39-40. Craig's analysis in Craig and Gilbert and his *From Bismarck to Adenauer* are excellent.

[60] Kaufmann, in Craig and Gilbert, 654.

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The foreign ministers, then, had little respect for the views of their own officials.

Neurath, the foreign minister since 1933, himself a career diplomat, had supported Hitler's moves or was supine and did not object. He did not press the occasionally discordant views of his own career officials.[61] Because of the deficiencies of one of their own, these officials had less influence in the top councils when sharp shifts of policy were determined than they might have had with a more receptive and assertive foreign minister. This accounts for the bright prospects envisioned by the Foreign Office for Ribbentrop's appointment, which they had anticipated for a considerable length of time. They did not view this as a disaster.[62] Not only would his own organization be brought within the control of the old bureaucracy, but the Wilhelmstrasse would also be able to put over its views to Hitler.

The Foreign Office shared a number of Hitler's likes, dislikes, and ambitions in foreign policy, was more cautious about the means Germany might employ, and disagreed about the existing practical possibilities. They had abhorred isolation, held back on the verge of every success, and felt that their views were not presented to Hitler with sufficient force. Would the appointment of Ribbentrop enhance their position?

V

Early in 1938, after the Fritsch Crisis and shortly before *Anschluss* with Austria, Ribbentrop was elevated to the post of foreign minister. At the same time, however, moderates—Weizsäcker and E.

[61] When the career officials laid out their views on their own, they were not well taken. For Nadolny's sharp encounter with Hitler, see Rudolf Rahn, *Ruheloses Leben*, 83-84; an admiring account of this by Craig in *Bismarck to Adenauer*, 112; a sharply critical account by D. C. Watt, in "German Diplomats and Nazi Leaders," 152: "It is impossible to imagine any Government servant in a state where the bureaucracy were not educated to ignore and despise the political leadership using language towards the political leader of the State, such as that Nadolny is reported to have used to Hitler." In the light of that opinion memoranda such as those later advanced by Weizsäcker appear more respectable. On Neurath, see Craig, in Craig and Gilbert, 418, and the excellent thesis by Heinemann, who believes that Neurath was not informed about many moves in foreign policy.

[62] Weizsäcker, *Memoirs*, 120-21; *BD*, IV, No. 119, p. 122, Henderson to Halifax, Feb. 18, 1939; Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten*, 200.

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Kordt—were put in positions closer to the center of affairs.[63] Hassell, Albrecht Haushofer, and General Ludwig Beck outside the Foreign Office,[64] as well as Weizsäcker, Kordt, and Dirksen in it hoped that they would control Ribbentrop.[65] Once Ribbentrop was foreign minister his *Büro* would be incorporated in the Foreign Ministry. And he would fight for them in their competency conflicts with other ministries. Thus it appeared that the Foreign Office might emerge from the internal struggles of Nazi Germany in a stronger position, one from which it might manipulate the para-diplomatic organizations and thereby maintain the great pressures which had proved effective in German foreign policy. The Foreign Office recognized the advantages of totalitarian diplomacy, a combination of conventional diplomacy, propaganda, and subversion.[66]

In the period after February 1938 the Foreign Office was extremely busy with major affairs of state, accomplished many of Germany's most important objectives, and was curiously effective in a way that Hitler may not have recognized. During the nineteenth century European diplomats formed a cosmopolitan school with many ideals, and even more often, with class status in common. Their range of skills and their non-ideological notions about the aims of diplomacy and the relations of states held them together, set them off from most other circles in their own countries, and facilitated diplomatic negotiation. Perhaps the results were more

[63] Weizsäcker became state secretary and Kordt remained at Ribbentrop's side.

[64] Weizsäcker saw Hassell regularly, and Hassell valued his information; see *The Von Hassell Diaries, 1938-1944* (New York, 1947). The ties of Weizsäcker and Haushofer are reflected in Rainer Hildebrandt, *Wir sind die Letzten. Aus dem Leben des Widerstandskämpfers Albrecht Haushofer und seiner Freunde* (Berlin, n.d.). Haushofer expressed his pleasure over Weizsäcker's appointment in a letter to him. Beck had advised Weizsäcker to stay on in the Foreign Office.

[65] The diplomats did not have much respect for Ribbentrop's intelligence, but recognized that he was clever. They thought he would respond to sound advice; Weizsäcker argued with Ribbentrop on a number of occasions during the summer of 1938. The accuracy of Weizsäcker's *Memoirs* on these disputes is completely borne out by his unpublished papers, which contain material for a strong rebuttal to Sir Lewis Namier's essay in his *In the Nazi Era* (London, 1951).

[66] For further characteristics of totalitarian diplomacy, see Gordon Craig, "Totalitarian Approaches to Diplomatic Negotiation," in Sarkissian, 107-25, and Craig's "On the Diplomatic Revolution of our Times," The Haynes Foundation Lectures, University of California, April 1961.

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enduring for this reason.[67] Although this common base did not usually exist in the twentieth century, in the nineteen-thirties we find an almost atavistic reminder of the largely aristocratic cosmopolitanism of nineteenth-century diplomats. Sir Nevile Henderson, André François-Poncet, Weizsäcker, Carl Burckhardt, and Bernardo Attolico trusted and sympathized with one another more than they should have; the trust and sympathy were based on similar backgrounds and attitudes.[68] If one could write a sociology of the Right in the nineteen-thirties these relationships would emerge clearly.[69] The European Right employing its policies of appeasement worked the converse of German expansionism. Conservative politicians and diplomats from the Western European nations turned upon Kurt von Schuschnigg and Emil Hacha, Edward Beneš and T. G. Masaryk, and Josef Beck with almost as much cynicism and glee as the Germans themselves. Henderson and François-Poncet on the Allied side are the most important indexes of this attitude, but their own governments spoke similarly.[70] Careful attention to their statements may well have helped confirm the Nazi judgment that they could carry off their intentions without opposition. German and Italian diplomats scorned the Eastern European politicians and states and capitalized on the receptivity of the Western diplomats to their

[67] Nicolson, *Evolution of Diplomatic Method*, 74-75.

[68] Though this trust usually went only one way. Weizsäcker was ordinarily very discrete, except when the Kordts spoke with his blessing, or when he allowed leaks in anonymity, as through Burckhardt.

[69] One of the principal points of which would be their common hatred of Bolshevism and Marxism. See, for instance, Carl Burckhardt's letter to Weizsäcker on January 22, 1939, in which he castigates the "Marxists" in Geneva, who he says were trying to prevent his return to Danzig. In the same letter he shows his dislike of the Poles. *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Series D (hereafter cited as *GD*), V, No. 124. In his memoirs, largely composed of lengthy extracts from documents already printed elsewhere, Burckhardt has not printed this particular document. Carl J. Burckhardt, *Meine Danziger Mission 1937-1939* (Munich, 1960). Halifax "described Germany as the bulwark of the West against Bolshevism." *GD*, I, 69-70; cited in G. Craig, "High Tide of Appeasement," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXV (1950), 23. See the elaborate argument on the anti-Communist element in British foreign policy in Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, *München 1938. England zwischen Hitler und Preussen* (Frankfurt a/M., 1965).

[70] Craig, "High Tide of Appeasement," 29-37; also Franklin Ford on François-Poncet, in Craig and Gilbert. For Henderson, See Gilbert, in Craig and Gilbert, 537-54, and Rudi Strauch, *Sir Nevile Henderson, Britisher Botschafter in Berlin von 1937 bis 1939* (Bonn, 1959).

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notions.[71] At the same time the German diplomats were of an old school, distinguished from the Nazis by attributes of manner, speech, and social congeniality. Most of the Western diplomats underestimated the rationality of the Nazis, the seriousness of their claims, and the extent to which the more urbane officials of the Foreign Office represented more than a façade. These officials were themselves sometimes deceived by Hitler, but they in turn deceived the Western diplomats. They have nevertheless all given one another, but not Hitler, high praise since.[72] That this was so certainly made attainment of her aims easier for Nazi Germany.

The first major achievement was *Anschluss*, which Hitler and Göring dominated. Foreign Office expectations of control over Ribbentrop were afterwards disappointed. They could not win Ribbentrop to their arguments, and the perceptions of Hitler, Göring, and Ribbentrop about their opponents were more acute than their own. While Göring occasionally manipulated Poland and Hungary during the Czech crisis, Hitler held the reins and Ribbentrop was his echo.[73] Some Foreign Office officials warned, argued, and strove for a negotiated settlement.[74] Before the success at Munich, however, an

[71] Sir Orme Sargent occasionally reproved Henderson for his uncritical acceptance of German lies but as late as the summer of 1939 Weizsäcker drew admissions from Henderson of his hostility to British policy toward Warsaw and Moscow. For these admissions: June 13, 1939: *GD*, VI, No. 521, *BD*, VI, No. 45; June 27, 1939: *GD*, VI, No. 672, *BD*, VI, Nos. 322, 328; also Namier, *Diplomatic Prelude 1938-1939* (London, 1948), 220-21, 236, 239-40.

[72] After all his experience with the Germans, Henderson recalled Weizsäcker as "an honourable man" in his *Failure of a Mission;* François-Poncet and Carl Burckhardt provided supporting affidavits for Weizsäcker while he was on trial at Nuremberg; some of these affidavits and favorable testimonials are cited in Mother Mary Alice Gallin, *Ethical and Religious Factors in the German Resistance to Hitler* (Washington, 1955). They are available in ten mimeographed volumes in the Harvard Law School Library and in the National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[73] Boris Celovsky, *Das Münchener Abkommen 1938* (Stuttgart, 1958), should be read in conjunction with Hans Roos, *Polen und Europa. Studien zur polnischen Aussenpolitik 1931-1939* (Tübingen, 1957).

[74] Weizsäcker's *Memoirs* gave an accurate account of his efforts; the point is proven by his papers which I will edit for publication in the near future. See, also, Erich Kordt's *Nicht aus den Akten.* For the purely diplomatic efforts of the moderate German ambassador in Prague, Ernst Eisenlohr, see J. W. Bruegel, "German Diplomacy and the Sudeten Question before 1938," *International Affairs*, XXXVII (1961), 323-31.

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ineffectual *fronde* formed.[75] Hitler's determination to unleash his armies by October 1938 if the powers and Czechoslovakia did not give way, and the belief of the Foreign Office that the powers would not, stimulated several officials to give information on Hitler's aims to Hungary and Britain on the eve of Munich.[76] These warnings by the Kordts, Weizsäcker, and Trott were high treason. That men in many other ways so deeply attached to the regime went so far was a profound indication of the depth of their dissatisfaction.

However, with a few exceptions these officials were delighted by the Munich agreement, the terms of which were largely composed in the Foreign Office.[77] During the remainder of 1938 they worked for the conversion of Czechoslovakia to a thoroughgoing satellite by treaty rather than for its occupation, and they welcomed the diversion toward Poland.[78] Poland was unreceptive and Hitler wanted all of Czechoslovakia.[79] Well before the Ides of March 1939 high German officials knew that Hitler intended an occupation and they feared the consequences.[80] But because there was no possibility of war over this move they gave no warning to England and France, although they foresaw the hostile coalition which formed.

Nevertheless they were utterly hostile to Poland and expected

[75] For a favorable view, see Hans Rothfels, *Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler* (Frankfurt a/M., 1958); for a very critical account, see Namier, *In the Nazi Era* and Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power*.

[76] The histories of the resistance must be supplemented by C. A. Macartney, *October Fifteenth: A History of Hungary 1929-1945* (New York, 1956), Part I, 238-46; Carl Burckhardt; and now Bernd-Jürgen Wendt.

[77] Erich Kordt believed that Munich was the "second best solution," and that the overthrow of Hitler would have been far better. Weizsäcker's account of how the Munich Agreement was written is true, Celovsky, 462, to the contrary notwithstanding.

[78] Especially important is Heinrich Bodensieck, "Der Plan eines 'Freundschaftsvertrages' zwischen dem Reich und der Tschecho-Slowakei im Jahre 1938," *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, X (1961), 462-76. For the gestures toward Poland, see Roos.

[79] Milan Stanislao Durica, *La Slovacchia e le sue relazioni politiche con la Germania 1938-1945* (Padua, 1964), must now be read in conjunction with Jorg K. Hoensch, *Die Slowakei und Hitlers Ostpolitik. Hlinkas Slowakische Volkspartei zwischen Autonomie und Separation 1938/1939* (Köln, 1965).

[80] *Ibid.*; the memoirs of Kordt, Keitel, Wilhelm Hoettl (W. Hagen), Schellenberg; Ulrich von Hassell, *The von Hassell Diaries, 1938-1944* (New York, 1947), 38. In an unpublished note dated February 13, 1939, Weizsäcker remarked that very few could know from the way Hitler was behaving that he intended to seize the rest of Czechoslovakia in approximately a month.

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major concessions over Danzig and the Corridor. At the same time Germany's position appeared enhanced by the "Pact of Steel" with Italy, which was formulated by the Foreign Office.[81] The diplomats had always opposed Ribbentrop's promotion of a military alliance with Japan as part of a tripartite pact also involving Italy, so they favored combination with Russia in order to make Poland yield.[82] The Foreign Office conducted these negotiations and then to a degree subverted them. In July 1939 Weizsäcker and the Kordts feared that a Russian alliance might allow Hitler his war. Hence they warned Great Britain of Germany's bid for Russia's hand, and encouraged Italy to exercise a moderating influence on Hitler.[83] These tactics appeared to be threatened by Ribbentrop, whose baleful influence on Hitler hastened the sudden actions they deplored.[84] As a consequence they emphasized Hitler's reasonableness and suggested that an English general or prominent politician who spoke fluent German would sway Hitler.[85] In the last days of August 1939 they prepared terms which they hoped would be accepted in another "Munich" agreement, and tried to prevent the war through Göring, who was again actively involved in diplomacy, or by the personal intervention of other diplomats.[86] But war began over Poland, the area they most tenaciously hoped to obtain; they closed ranks and stayed in office.

During the early war years they occasionally advised different

[81] Siebert, *passim;* D. C. Watt, "An Earlier Model for the Pact of Steel: The Draft Treaties exchanged between Germany and Italy during Hitler's Visit in May 1938," *International Affairs,* XXXIII (1957), 185-97.

[82] They also hoped to prevent a pact between England and Russia. See G. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union 1939-1941* (Leiden, 1954), 28-29, 30.

[83] Weizsäcker, *Memoirs,* 190; Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten,* 311-19; Siebert, *passim.* Göring's similar warning may have been intended to frighten Britain into abdicating from her continental responsibilities. Namier, *Diplomatic Prelude,* 189.

[84] This emerges especially clearly in an account of these months which Weizsäcker wrote in October 1939 and kept among his papers.

[85] *BD,* VII, No. 35, is a report by Henderson on a talk with Weizsäcker on August 15, 1939, in which Weizsäcker had suggested it would be very worthwhile if someone who spoke perfect German and was in the inner councils of the cabinet could have a talk with Hitler.

[86] For the terms, see *GD,* VII, Nos. 422, 548, which bear out Namier's statement in his *Diplomatic Prelude,* 359. Göring's activities are related in Birger Dahlerus, *The Last Attempt* (London, n.d.). The other diplomats appear in Hassell, *Diaries,* 68-72; Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten,* 234-35.

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policies;[87] they were ignored then as much as they had been ignored in the past on matters in which they were less perceptive. Relations with Russia, Spain, and the Balkan countries were the main concern until further conquests in 1941 greatly narrowed the range of their opportunities. The Foreign Office did not control relations with the occupied territories or maintain contacts with hostile states.[88] In the later stages of the war defeats by Russia and the demands for unconditional surrender tended to neutralize one another, but at least a very few of the diplomats,[89] working with other disappointed and disenchanted figures inside and out of the government and military, turned against Hitler. The result was July 20, 1944, a grand gesture despite the dispute over its antecedents. Afterward Germany maintained a rigid posture in diplomacy, except for a few faltering attempts to split the Allies and achieve a compromise peace.[90]

VI

The German diplomats' insistence that in the Nazi era the Wilhelmstrasse became nothing more than a "technical apparatus" cannot be credited. Any perspective on changes in twentieth-century diplomacy and on the role of the Foreign Office in modern German history weakens their claim. A careful examination of German diplomacy after 1932 demonstrates that Hitler did not shove aside the diplomats; their labors were essential to his successes. The para-dip-

[87] Weizsäcker's memorandum, *GD*, VIII, No. 56 of September 12, 1939, argued Germany's interest in keeping the United States out of the war and a neutral power. Ribbentrop cut off all talk about peace proposals (*GD*, VIII, No. 373). For Weizsäcker's memorandum advising against war with the Soviet Union, April 28, 1941, see R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie (eds.), *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941* (Washington, 1948), 333-34. Consistent with this document is Weizsäcker's remark to Lanza on June 18, 1941, that he considered the bomb lost that did not strike England. Leonardo Simoni (pseud.), *Berlin, ambassade d'Italie, 1939-1943* (Paris, 1947), 281.

[88] Ribbentrop had taken to the road in September 1939 as part of Hitler's entourage. This complicated the work of the Foreign Office considerably. Seabury, *The Wilhelmstrasse*, 104-05. On the decay of the Foreign Office in wartime, *ibid.*, 111-48.

[89] The most important of whom were Hassell and Trott.

[90] See, for instance, Herbert Feis, *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference* (Princeton, 1960), 3-10. The history of German diplomacy from the German side and on the basis of Foreign Office documents has not yet been written for the last year of the war.

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lomatic agencies did not rob the Foreign Office of its principal prerogatives; very often they all cooperated in achieving Germany's objectives. The agreements with Poland and Great Britain in 1934 and 1935, with Italy, Japan, and Austria in 1936, over Czechoslovakia in 1938, and with Italy and Russia in 1939, the successful seizure of the Rhineland, of Austria, of Czechoslovakia, and almost of Poland could not have been accomplished without diligent, intelligent preparations and justifications to which the volumes of German documents bear witness. Thus the Foreign Office gave shape to German foreign policy and even created it insofar as precise commitments and statements narrowed the range of opportunities and possibilities and implied certain future actions rather than others. Foreign policy is composed of discrete actions and commitments as much as it is made up of broad statements and grandiose aims. The Foreign Office had continued to make the former kind of policy in the Third Reich just as it had before, and its action gives little support to a general rule about weakened foreign offices in the twentieth century.

The German diplomats were radicals in foreign policy, but not megalomaniacs dominated by Hitler's visions of *Lebensraum*. Only a few of them were in the midst of resistance movements to Hitler; emphasis should be placed on their diplomatic work for him as well as on their verbal objections and hesitant opposition to his decisions. Most of them opposed rather than resisted, although several conspired against him. More important than anything else they carried on with their historic functions. They lived to distort many of these points at Nuremberg and in their memoirs.

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An Augustan Reply to Locke: Bolingbroke on Natural Law and the Origin of Government

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By the end of the eighteenth century, when Burke asked, "Who now reads Bolingbroke, whoever read him through?"[1] the image of Bolingbroke as a religious and political theorist had been eclipsed by that of Bolingbroke the political actor, the architect of Utrecht, the Jacobite traitor, the leader of the great country opposition to Sir Robert Walpole and his "Robinarchy." It is this historical Bolingbroke who has traditionally been dealt with by nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship.[2] One school of interpretation has, however, emphasized Bolingbroke's ideas, and from Disraeli to Rab Butler has seen in them the fount of Tory wisdom.[3] More recently, interest in Bolingbroke's political ideas has

[1] Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the French Revolution* (New York, 1958), 101.

[2] The most recent and certainly best historical account of Bolingbroke is found in J. H. Plumb, *Sir Robert Walpole* (Boston, 1956). See, also, the discussion in Archibald Foord, *His Majesty's Opposition* (Oxford, 1964). The biographies of Bolingbroke are many and woefully inadequate. See, for example, the ostensibly definitive, Walter Sichel, *Bolingbroke and His Times* (London, 1902). Their concern is Bolingbroke the statesman and not the thinker.

[3] Benjamin Disraeli, *Vindication of the British Constitution* (London, 1839); Sichel; Maurice Woods, *A History of the Tory Party* (London, 1924); Geoffrey Butler, *The Tory Tradition: Bolingbroke, Burke, Disraeli and Salisbury* (London, 1914); Richard Faber, *Beaconsfield and Bolingbroke* (London, 1961). See, also, Mr. R. A. Butler's invocation of Bolingbroke at the Conservative Party Conference in 1963. (*The Observer*, Oct. 13, 1963.)

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been revived by a set of scholars who see in them the source of non-party government, an articulate theory of opposition, or significant inspiration for Burke's political notions.[4] Others have described his political writings as the paramount influence on Montesquieu's conceptualization of the separation of powers, as the earliest articulation of "constitutionalist" theory, and finally as the Augustan humanist's response to the immorality of Machiavelli's politics.[5] What has generally been overlooked in this revived concern with Bolingbroke's political thought is the significant position he took in the recurring debate over natural law and the origins of political society. Parallel to Bolingbroke's assault on Walpole's political regime and the new social and economic order, which he dated from the sixteen-nineties and the Whig alliance with commerce and finance, is Bolingbroke's attack on what he considered the equally pernicious impact of the liberal and individualist ideas of John Locke. His critique of Locke emerges from deep within Bolingbroke's discussion of natural law and the origins of government, in which he contends that he is merely offering a reading of natural law that mediates between the metaphysical whimsies of the Platonists, Cudworth and Clark, and the gross absurdities of Hobbes.[6] The Cambridge school had erred because it saw morality as an eternal essence antecedent even to the willful determination of God, while Hobbes erred in assuming, to the contrary, that no moral duty existed until man willfully made such distinctions in his positive laws. Both these extremes should be avoided; one should neither "soar so high as Plato and Cudworth," nor "sink so low . . . as Hobbes."[7] According to Bolingbroke, natural law, properly understood, does not predate God, but does antecede civil society. Ostensibly, then, he is setting himself the task of answering

[4] H. N. Fieldhouse, "Bolingbroke and the Idea of Non-Party Government," *History*, XXIII (1938), 41-56; Kurt Kluxen, *Das Problem der Politischen Opposition* (Freiburg, 1956); Harvey Mansfield Jr., *Statesmanship and Party Government* (Chicago, 1965).

[5] Robert Shackleton, "Montesquieu, Bolingbroke and the Separation of Powers," *French Studies*, III (1949), 24-39, and *Montesquieu: a Critical Biography* (Oxford, 1961); J. H. Burns, "Bolingbroke and the Concept of Constitutional Government," *Political Studies*, X (1962), 47-63; J. H. Hart, *Viscount Bolingbroke, Tory Humanist* (London, 1966).

[6] Bolingbroke, *Collected Works* (Philadelphia, 1841), IV, 119 ff., 406.

[7] *Ibid.*, IV, 119.

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both the Platonists and Hobbes with the tradition of Stoic and Christian natural law. In the course of this endeavor, however, he turns this very tradition against Locke, its most recent and illustrious exponent.

Natural Law, Platonists, and Hobbes

Plato and his modern Cambridge disciples were particularly disliked by Bolingbroke. He saw them as despised metaphysicians, presumptuous and arrogant, who wove labyrinthine systems out of their wild imaginations. At best they were but "pneumatic philosophers" dealing with spirits; at worst they were poets whose minds had fled observable phenomena to embrace dreams and fancies.[8] To destroy their arguments, Bolingbroke called upon the great enemy of all such metaphysicians, Locke, author of the *Essay on Human Understanding*, described by Bolingbroke as "the most complete work of this kind that any language can boast."[9] Locke, the empiricist, humbled the pride of the metaphysicians by teaching that their talk of eternal essences and necessary fitness of things was not based on the observable phenomena of nature. All knowledge came from outside the mind in the form of received sensations, repeated Bolingbroke.[10] The sensationalist psychology of the master taught that men could have no idea of real essences, no innate perceptions of eternal moral principles. To base natural law on an assumed power of man's mind to perceive eternal and abstract essences of morality to which man then adapts his actions is to "entertain a high opinion, and to make extravagant encomiums of our intellect."[11] Moreover, it is demeaning to God to suggest that morality is not a product of His will, but is antecedent to Him.

While discussing the question of natural law and will, Bolingbroke turns to Hobbes. In his insistence that will is the source of moral law, Hobbes was useful to Bolingbroke in countering the Platonist rejection of will. To the extent that natural law was positive and promulgated by the will of God, Hobbes' argument was acceptable. But more than the divine role of will Bolingbroke would not

[8] *Ibid.*, III, 50, 66, 121, 124, 135, 290, 446, 434, 530; IV, 120.
[9] *Ibid.*, III, 129.
[10] *Ibid.*, III, 72.
[11] *Ibid.*, III, 103.

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accept. He rejects Hobbes' contention that the particular will which gives moral distinctions their effect is that of the Leviathan created in the transition from the state of nature to civil society. To refute Hobbes, Bolingbroke calls upon the traditional view of natural law which had developed in Rome and the Christian world. Distinctions between moral good and evil, between just and unjust, were not established by civil authority. Moral obligations were derived from an anterior law of nature, not from the laws of society. Civil societies, Bolingbroke claims, could not have been formed had there not been the prior laws of nature which Hobbes denied. The mere will of a human legislator was not a firm enough foundation on which to base morality. Will may constrain and force and even create an outward or physical base to obligation, Bolingbroke insists, but it imposes no inward moral necessity. Such necessity can be derived only from the law of the Divine Legislator whose promulgation of this law coincided with His creation of moral agents. The law of their nature was the product of His will. Natural law is the origin of all positive laws. Civil law is merely a gloss on God's law made by men and altered at their will, whereas natural law is God's basic law which determines the morality of men's actions.[12]

Natural law, however, is not only God's law, but reason's law, which makes it available to all rational creatures. The principles of reason are plain and simple, and have universal application. So simple are the principles of rational natural law, writes Bolingbroke, that if they appear intricate and complex it is only because such great writers on the subject as Grotius and Pufendorf "puzzle and perplex the plainest thing in the world."[13]

The obligations imposed by natural law are few. One of its most basic principles is universal benevolence, for "God has made benevolence to all rational beings the fundamental law of our nature."[14] Other natural moral obligations which derive from reason include the duty to administer justice and to keep compacts. The final obligation imposed by natural law is that men live in political society. When God created man, He made not only a rational creature but also a social creature "by nature fit for society."[15] Bol-

[12] *Ibid.*, IV, 168, 145, 147, 150, 179.
[13] *Ibid.*, IV, 156, 171-72.
[14] *Ibid.*, IV, 176; III, 396; IV, 147.
[15] *Ibid.*, IV, 145, 167.

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ingbroke's discussion of natural law leads logically, then, to an analysis of the origins of political society. He attacks the asocial individualism of Hobbes' state of nature and its image of man's ceaseless pursuit of self-interest. Men, wrote Bolingbroke, were never in a state of absolute individuality before the institution of civil society; they are instinctively social and, like animals, herd with those of their own species. But they are also human and thus an inexplicable intellectual sympathy also prompts them to unite with their fellows. In holding this view Bolingbroke borrowed arguments from pre-Lockean theorists of natural law, Cicero, Grotius, and Pufendorf, who stressed the inherent sociability of men, as well as from the Aristotelian tradition, with its depiction of man as a social animal by nature. More than likely he also called upon the writings of the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, who, in his *Characteristics*, had criticized the individualism of the contractualist argument. There never had been a state of nature where men were unassociated, Shaftesbury had contended. "That it was their natural state to live thus separate can never without absurdity be allowed."[16] Shaftesbury, like Bolingbroke, had also criticized Hobbes for seeing morality as a product merely of civil legislation. There are innate in men at all times, Shaftesbury asserts, moral obligations of faith, justice, honesty, and virtue, which must operate even in a postulated state of nature. Civil union does not make right or wrong; it would be just as wrong to break a promise in natural society as in civil government.[17]

Bolingbroke is at one with Shaftesbury in seeing men's sociability behind the natural origins of society. Where he differs is in his denial of Shaftesbury's belief that men were sociable from some innate benevolence prompting them to seek communal well-being.[18] According to Bolingbroke, men "have a natural sociability; that is we are determined by self-love to seek our pleasure and our utility in society." Where he departs from Shaftesbury's position is in

[16] Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3d Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc.*, ed. J. M. Robertson (London, 1900), II, 79.

[17] *Ibid.*, I, 72-73.

[18] For the complexities of Bolingbroke's intellectual debt to Shaftesbury, see its passing mention in J. M. Robertson's editorial comments in *Characteristics*, II, 260-62. See, also, A. O. Aldridge, "Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke," *Philological Quarterly*, XXXI (1952), 1-17. This deals primarily with a comparison of their respective deistic positions

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basing sociability on the instinct of self-love and not on moral sense. "Self-love, the original spring of human actions, directs us necessarily to sociability." Satisfaction of mutual wants demands sociability. But even were the motives of utility lacking, men would fly from absolute solitude and seek simple human conversation. The most powerful determinant of man's sociability, however, is God, who, desiring that men live in communities, has insured this sociability by the very psychological composition with which he has endowed his creatures. Instinct leads men to seek pleasure of the self which, Bolingbroke suggests, leads inexorably to the sociability of man and woman. The rudimentary instinctual basis of sociability which leads men and women to sexual pleasure is part of the law of nature which utilizes its energy so that men live in community, and there is further pleasure of the self involved in the bringing forth of offspring through family life. It is true that as the circle of ego-involvement widens to family, community, country, and mankind, reason displaces instinct and considerations of long-term happiness replace fleeting pleasures. Men are moved from the instinctive to the rational law of nature with its moral virtues of justice, benevolence, and concern for the public good because their reason informs them that private good depends upon the happiness of society; but man never effectively transcends self-love. Thus, men love themselves in their love for their families, friends, and neighbors, love themselves in the political body to which they belong, and finally love themselves when extending benevolence to the whole race of mankind.[19]

In his *Characteristics*, Shaftesbury had specifically criticized just such a doctrinal merger of selfishness and benevolence. He singled out those who see "the love of kindred, children, and posterity" as "purely love of self." Also criticized were those who suggested that "the love of one's country and love of mankind must also be self-love."[20] Bolingbroke, in turn, was no less critical of those, like Shaftesbury, who talked of the irrelevance of self-love and of the instinctually benevolent nature of man derived from his innate moral sense. Bolingbroke must certainly have had Shaftesbury in

[19] Bolingbroke, IV, 187, 164-65, 369.
[20] Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, I, 79-80.

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mind when he turned on those who believed in a "moral sense; for to assume any such natural instinct is as absurd as to assume innate ideas, or any other of the Platonic whimsies."[21] As he tried to walk the middle path between the Cambridge Platonists and Hobbes, so here, too, Bolingbroke sought the middle ground between the benevolence of Shaftesbury and the egoism of Hobbes. But on the question of the sociability of man and the natural basis of society and civil government, Bolingbroke stood solidly beside Shaftesbury in the critique of Hobbes and Locke.

The Origins of Political Society

The contrast of natural society with political society was a false one, wrote Bolingbroke, if it implied that a non-political existence preceded man's willful creation of civil authority. A form of government had existed ever since man's and woman's instinctual pursuit of pleasure led them to cohabitate and then to love themselves in their children. In such acts of generation paternal government was established. Government and political authority were not creations of voluntary will; their foundations lay in nature. Man was led to political society by the hand of God, not by his own conscious or deliberate choice. Bolingbroke calls this earliest form of political existence "natural political society" or "natural government" in contrast to the later stage of political society created by the art of man which he calls "political societies of human invention" or "civil government." Natural society was not anarchic since it had no isolated individuals, man's natural sociability having led him at least to establish families. Individuality in the state of nature pertained only to individual families. By this logic, Bolingbroke is led to a criticism of Hobbes' image of the ruthless war of all against all in individualistic natural society, when each individual "supposes him [self] to have a right to everything, and to be a rival and enemy on that account to every other man." Such individual anarchy and ruthless competition, Bolingbroke replies, never did, in fact, exist. Men, whose basic reflexes were cooperative, never stood so utterly alone. "We are born to assist, and to be assisted by one another." Bolingbroke has no attachment

[21] Bolingbroke, III, 399.

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to the social outlook that would underlie the Liberal ideology. Natural society was, in fact, a political society, he suggests, with no unbridled freedom to be lost in some later establishment of government. Dispersed in families, men formed numerous distinct political societies under paternal government in which fathers were the chief magistrates. Their natural authority kept peace and order in the relatively small and homogeneous society. Bolingbroke went so far as to explain the incest taboo by the recognition that in "natural political society" whatever tended to diminish the reverence for parents diminished their authority and thus threatened to "dissolve the order of those little commonwealths." Inherent in natural society is the "authority, subordination, order and union necessary to well being." Rejected completely is the liberal notion that consent was the only legitimate basis for political obligation.[22]

But Bolingbroke is no Filmer. He writes of a paternal authority destined to give way to the political society of human invention, "not the royal fatherhood of that ridiculous writer Filmer." Divine right and absolute power of kings as advanced by Filmer comprised "a silly and slavish notion," "one of the greatest absurdities that was ever committed to paper." Bolingbroke has made his peace with 1688; he has no desire to perpetuate royal fatherhood. But his account of the rise of artificial government is still at times strikingly different from the liberal views which had emerged in the sixteen-eighties. The act of association which established civil society was, he contends, a product of reason as natural society had been of instincts. Bolingbroke insists, however, that "civil governments were formed not by the concurrence of individuals, but by the association of families." He suggests two motives which might have moved families to enter into such compacts—utility and fear. Quarrelsome families might break apart, leading in the next generation to separate societies no longer regarding a common political authority, "whose eye was over the whole community" and who could intervene when mutual injuries occurred.[23] Or the case might arise of two different families living in close neighborhood with resulting conflict and tension. Here, too, paternal authority

[22] *Ibid.*, IV, 103, 181, 185, 194, 150, 228, 146.
[23] *Ibid.*, IV, 129, 194, 187.

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would be inadequate. The motive behind union in these cases would be the convenience and utility of a common judge; but, unlike Locke, Bolingbroke sees this leading families, not individuals, to "coalite amicably by covenants."[24] Families, however, may not always be so rational and cooperative. Strong families often threaten weak ones who, in response, unite into larger artificial bodies. Fear is also a principal inducement to the erection of civil authority, as Hobbes had contended, but, once again, it is families that Bolingbroke describes, not Hobbesian individuals. This search into the motivation behind the creation of civil government may be unnecessary, however, for compact and covenant need not be the only foundations of political society. In a significant anticipation of Hume's later critique of contractual thinking, Bolingbroke throws out the suggestion that more often than not families were brought together by war and conquest.[25]

The communities produced by the union of different families contained heterogeneous populations drawn together by accidental ties. Paternal magistrates were unable to exercise authority in these altered circumstances, yet the covenant demanded a supreme power to enforce its observance. The establishment of artificial political authority would fill the gap, replacing natural political authority with a power superior to that of fathers of families. This new civil authority established "rather by art or by force, than by nature," was, more often than not, Bolingbroke suggested, monarchical. Writers who think that men were originally in a state of natural freedom and equality and that when they established government they chose democracy are wrong, Bolingbroke contends. Let such writers simply consult ancient wisdom. Lycurgus, for one, understood the easy transition from paternal to monarchical government. When advised to establish a popular government in Sparta, had he not told his adviser to "try in the first place to establish democracy in his own family"? Even more important than the authority of Lycurgus was that of Aristotle, whose influence was so

[24] *Ibid.*, IV., 189. Though his emphasis is very different it is not clear that Locke meant anything drastically different than the heads of families. He might consider sons, if they were of age, to be part of the contract, but certainly not women or servants.

[25] *Ibid.*, IV, 189.

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strong in Bolingbroke's discussion of the origin of political society, as indeed it would be in so many of his social and political views. Had not the wise Aristotle begun his *Politics* with just such an account of the transition from paternal to regal government?[26]

It is classical political wisdom that Bolingbroke has in mind once again when he describes the character of these first kings. They were great and wise legislators who assembled families and clans into larger and more civilized communities. The first kings were "philosophical legislators, who succeeded to the authority of fathers of families."[27] These men, more wise and just than the rest, invented useful arts of life and established order and good government. They taught men to promote the happiness of individuals by promoting the happiness of the public. They also taught the lesson "of preserving liberty by subjection to law." The plain and simple rules which had been the appropriate basis of natural law under paternal government needed extension in the more complex society formed by the union of families. Philosophers and legislators arose capable of collecting the precepts of the law of nature from God's work and the invariable course of events. Their superior reason enabled them to make the proper and necessary deductions from these precepts and to apply them in all those cases which concerned man's duty to God or his fellow man. They instructed their fellow men and gave them laws. Legislators like Moses and Solon used law to reform the manners of the people they civilized and to improve their social life. These laws, written and unwritten, occasional and permanent, were given by virtue of no royal prerogative. No constituted legislative power stood behind their deeds; on the contrary, they "were chosen kings, because they were chosen legislators." It was the goodness, wisdom, and justice of their laws which recommended these great men to civil authority and which kept them there. The sovereignty of the first kings and legislators was earned simply by their great and good deeds. They received power from the people and ultimately were accountable to them for its exercise. This first form of civil

[26] *Ibid.*, IV, 189, 190.

[27] *Ibid.*, III, 223. Bolingbroke's discussion never returns to his suggestion that war and conquest were the original source of political authority. Thus, he here suggests that the first kings were philosophical legislators as if he had never made the earlier point.

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government "is of human institution, established by the people and for the people"[28]—made by men and submitted to by their consent. Filmer is proved wrong in his claims for Adam as absolute monarch, by right of creation, whose prerogative descends to all kings, leaving all others slaves by birth with no right to choose forms of government or governors.

Emphasis on the need for consent and on government's pursuing the good of the governed, coupled with his general assault on Filmer, might seem to place Bolingbroke in the set of those whose ideas grew out of 1688. But in his opposition to Filmer and divine right, Bolingbroke has in mind an older image of consent and political obligation rather than the new ideology of rights. The good of the governed is not achieved by civil authority's meeting the demands and terms of contract set by those who consent to it; it is found in the paternalism of older views in which authority comes from above and knowing what is best for the governed earns public consent. In Bolingbroke's opinion the function of artificial government is still paternal. In natural society sovereignty had been in the hands of fathers who exercised it not for their own sake, "but for the sake of their offspring." So it is in civil government. Nature instituted natural government and directed human reason to artificial government. "She meant the same in both cases, the good of the governed." In describing the "good of the governed" in civil government, Bolingbroke is not concerned with rights or liberty. He merely repeats the formula for paternal authority: "She [nature] intended no doubt, that they who had been treated like children, under the influence of instinct, should be treated so likewise, under the influence of reason."[29]

Bolingbroke and Locke

Something is missing from Bolingbroke's discussion of the origin and nature of political society; he has ignored Locke. This is an omission all the more striking since Bolingbroke was, as we have seen, a convinced disciple of the empiricist Locke. Bolingbroke accepts 1688, but he rejects the ideology of Lockean liberalism found in the *Second Treatise*. He is, to be sure, in agreement with Locke in emphasizing consent, the artificial origins of civil government,

[28] *Ibid.*, III, 231; IV, 214; III, 228; IV, 191, 194.
[29] *Ibid.*, IV, 193, 194.

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and the significance of covenants. But Bolingbroke still disagrees with the fundamentals of Lockeanism. Nowhere in Bolingbroke's discussion is it suggested that men enter society to protect rights and property. Totally lacking in his analysis is the individualist bias that Locke's natural rights assumptions give to his more traditional natural law notions. Nor does it signify much that they shared some concepts. Consent and compact are notions with long-established usage in medieval political thought in general and in pre-Lockean natural law writings in particular. Their agreement on the artificial origins of civil authority is vitiated by Bolingbroke's contention that natural society was little different from civil society since both were characterized by subordination and government. Bolingbroke's theory of natural law and political society is a pre-Lockean mixture of Aristotelian and Stoic ideas combined with medieval and sixteenth-century natural law views.[30] It sees the origin of political society in families and paternal authority, and the function of government in civil society not as protection of individual rights, but what it had been in natural society—the maintenance of peace and order, the rendering of justice according to natural law, and paternal concern for the good of the people. Bolingbroke does more, however, than simply ignore Lockean liberal positions. His discussion of the origin of political society culminates in a direct attack on Locke. Fragment XIII of *The Philosophical Essays* is devoted entirely to criticism of the eminent Whig's philosophy and of the world view which Bolingbroke sensed lay behind it.

Bolingbroke suggests that Locke reasoned inconsistently and "on a false foundation." It is inconsistent to acknowledge that paternal government preceded civil, as Locke sometimes did, and then to describe the rise of civil government as if men were there first brought into subordination. How, Bolingbroke inquires, could Locke's "solitary vagabonds," his "strolling savages," suddenly accept the laws of civil government if they had previously "known no subordination"? He had reasoned falsely because "mankind was never in such a state of nature." It is impossible, Bolingbroke contends, to discover the origins of civil government by digging

[30] Of course Locke shared some of these views. In their discussions of natural law, per se, Bolingbroke and Locke held quite similar views.

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into a country's history or tradition. All one can do is "guess with great probability" by making analogies from what one knows. Locke's theory, however, is a "speculative whimsy" contradictory to such analogous thinking and the clearly perceivable makeup of human nature. These tell us that civil government probably grew out of natural government. Men never were solitary individuals "out of all society in their natural state." Locke's doctrine is false because non-speculative reasoning confirms what Bolingbroke had been saying: "Civil governments were formed not by the concurrence of individuals, but by the associations of families."[31]

Bolingbroke was very much aware of the revolutionary potential of Lockean ideology. Locke's stress on the natural independence of solitary individuals is, Bolingbroke claims, related logically to Locke's view of men "as equal one amongst another." Arguments of the natural equality and freedom of mankind seem "to carry his notions on the subject a little further than nature, and the reason of things will allow." Much more damning, however, is Bolingbroke's conviction that such notions are subversive of the established order. The fundamental principle of the hierarchical ordering of society by ranks and degrees is threatened when the principle of natural equality is adhered to with complete logic. All distinctions would vanish, the social order would be overturned, and havoc would ensue. "He who sits on a throne would inhabit a cottage, and he who holds a plough would wield a sceptre."[32] A state of perfect freedom such as Locke described would result in total chaos and anarchy. This conviction prompted Bolingbroke to go so far as to suggest, as Shaftesbury had done earlier, that Locke was little different from Hobbes.[33] With Bolingbroke it is Locke's

[31] Bolingbroke, IV, 195-98, 194.

[32] *Ibid.*, IV, 196.

[33] Shaftesbury had claimed that Locke's state of nature was distasteful for its very acceptance of Hobbes' political theory. Locke, to be sure, had seen morality operative in the state of nature; yet he denied innate moral ideas so basic to Shaftesbury's Platonic defense of an innate moral sense. What is more, he based the origin of civil society on the ethical value of self-interest. (Benjamin Rand [ed.], *The Life, Unpublished Letters and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury* [London, 1900], 404). At heart, then, Locke must really agree with Hobbes, reasoned Shaftesbury. They must share the acceptance of self-interest and, he adds mistakenly, the belief in the origin of morality in civil authority. Shaftesbury's argument sounds much like the argument of the contemporary Strausian school. For recognition of this, see Jason Aronson,

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notion of natural freedom that prompted the comparison. Mankind possessed of such freedom would have come into "a state of war and violence, of mutual and alternate oppression, as really [*sic*] as that which Hobbes imagined to have been the state of nature." This is made no less anarchic by each man's right to execute the law of nature. To talk of each individual's executing justice for himself is not only "language unworthy of Mr. Locke," but implies the same absurdities as did the ideas of Hobbes. Each man's pretending to be judge and executioner of the law of nature would lead to a tyranny and oppression as brutish as ever conceived of by the philosopher of Malmesbury. Thus it is "that the state of mankind under the law of nature, according to Locke, would have been very little, if at all, better than the state of nature before there was any such thing as law, according to Hobbes."[34] The part of Locke's thought that looked backward, the traditional natural law doctrine, Bolingbroke could accept; but the bourgeois individualism imparted by the new reading of natural right he rejected.[35] Bolingbroke turns his back on the liberal ideology of Locke as he asks "to what purpose it was to make any abstract system of rights, that never did nor could exist . . . a method of establishing civil government that never could be taken"? Locke, he concludes, presents "a notion of natural liberty very different from the real constitution of nature." Our real nature demands that there always be authority, for if ever it were lacking men would live in the nightmare world of the Hobbesian state of war.[36]

Lest his readers by taken aback by this attack on the great Locke, Bolingbroke tempers his critique by suggesting that it was only Locke's excessive zeal to destroy Filmer's false notions of government which set him off on the other extreme of assuming a state of nature that never could have existed and a freedom and equality

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"Shaftesbury on Locke," *American Political Science Review*, LIII (1959), 1101-05. Bolingbroke could very well be the penultimate Strausian hero, if one agrees with him and shares his values. To defend his social and political attitudes has not been our concern. For such an effort from the Strausian perspective, see Hart.

[34] Bolingbroke, IV, 195-96.

[35] See A. P. D'Entreves, *Natural Law* (London, 1951), 48-64, and Leo Straus, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953), *passim*.

[36] Bolingbroke, IV, 197. See Mansfield, 244-45, for the contrary suggestion that Bolingbroke shared the belief in natural rights; *ibid.*, IV, 199.

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with such subversive implications. Locke's failure, he suggests, is "a common one for men of genius who grow overfond of an hypothesis," who pursue their abstract thought beyond common sense and thus "maintain positions so little conformable to the real constitution of things." Nothing, however, can soften the fundamental challenge to Locke that Bolingbroke has posed. As Locke's ideas on the origin of political society had direct contemporary relevance for the emergence of bourgeois, liberal, and individualist notions of politics, so their rejection by Bolingbroke was part of his rejection of the liberal world these very ideas were coming increasingly to support. Bolingbroke's political ideals were aristocratic and paternal. Men were not naturally free and equal, nor was government instituted to protect natural rights. His opposition to Locke was inevitable; the social forces he represented were very different from those whose champion Locke became. Locke's political thought became the ideology of a middle-class individualism that stressed individual freedom, self-interest, and competition as positive social values. Bolingbroke's political thought was, in the context of his age, the ideology of a family-centered aristocracy and gentry. Fathers, paternal authority, subordination, rank, cooperation, and public service were the dimensions of this ideology's superstructure. When seen in this light, Bolingbroke's attacks on Locke's individualism, natural freedom, natural equality, and natural right take on added significance. So, too, does Bolingbroke's equation of Locke with Hobbes. Bolingbroke had criticized Hobbes earlier in the *Philosophical Fragments* for claiming that men were mere individuals and not members of commonwealths, that men had the right to all things and were rivals and enemies to one another. In his polemical writings, Bolingbroke also decried the individualism, self-interest, freedom, and equality depicted by these theorists in the state of nature as the great evil of his age. These very ideals were those he found in the new economic and social order which was destroying the traditional structure of society. It is more than coincidental that in his last work, *The Reflections on the State of the Nation*, which was also his most scathing attack on the corruption and degeneracy of his age, Bolingbroke compared the English to those very men in the Hobbesian state of nature to which even Locke's writings were now seen to lead:

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> What expectation can be entertained of raising a disinterested public spirit among men who have no other principle than that of private interest, who are individuals rather than fellow citizens, who prey on one another, and are in a state of civil society, much like to Hobbes' men in his supposed state of nature.[37]

Scattered through Bolingbroke's writings, it must be granted, are repeated references to original contracts which might lead one to classify him as a Lockean. In his *Dissertation on Parties*, for example, Bolingbroke wrote of the king governing since 1688 in terms of an original contract which made his office conditional and subject to forfeiture by his subjects. *The Patriot King* also describes the relationship between the people and the government formed when the people consent to the appointment of civil authority above them by an act of contract. It bears repeating, however, that Bolingbroke's idea of a covenant as the basis for artificial civil government is not a product of universal participation nor is it designed to protect rights. There is no initial coming together of all to form a political community, for political community already exists as a natural and God-given phenomenon. The covenant is solely between the people (a small number of them at that, those who are family heads) and a prince. There is no mention of natural rights or of protection as the foundation of civil governments. All that is intended is "to maintain the same degree of peace and good order in communities more numerous." Men establish civil government through a contract, writes Bolingbroke, "because popular liberty without government will degenerate into license." The ultimate end of government is to achieve the good of the people and through contract "governors are therefore appointed for this end." Bolingbroke's contract does not mention personal or property rights; it merely describes a "bargain" struck between the prince and the people.[38] His is no Lockean theory of contract. Its terms do not belong exclusively to post-Restoration liberalism; they go back much further to the description of contract between prince and people and the notion of consent which are found in the late medieval and early modern political thought of such as Marsilio, William of Occam, the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuits, and the

[37] *Ibid.*, IV, 197-98; II, 456.
[38] *Ibid.*, II, 85, 390-92; IV, 189; II, 85, 116-17, 390-92.

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Vindicae Contra Tyrannos. In Bolingbroke's notion of contract is also found the late medieval flavor of Hooker, propagandist for that prince who most nobly embodied the values of peace, good order, and great and good actions. The more traditional notion of contract upon which Bolingbroke calls is less overtly revolutionary than Locke's. Hooker's and the late medieval notions of contract were vehicles to articulate the limitations that should operate on a prince in a good Christian state. Such a contract seemed implicit in the feudal oaths of allegiance which detailed the reciprocal duties of king and vassal. Monarchy was limited by the public good, and to this extent accountability to the people was implied.

In a passage from his *Remarks on the History of England* Bolingbroke's older and pre-Lockean notion of contract and consent is seen most clearly:

> The union we speak of between prince and people, neither can nor ought to subsist on any other terms, than those of good government on one part, and of gratitude and expectation on the other. This union may be, and hath been maintained by absolute princes with their people; because it is not impossible that an absolute prince should be a wise and good man.[39]

The English, however, are fortunate that their Constitution limits the king while it demands that he give "good government." This union had been violated most dramatically in the seventeenth century by James I, Charles I, the usurping Cromwell, and then again by James II. Only in the reign of Elizabeth were great deeds accomplished by a monarch in contract with a grateful and expectant people. Bolingbroke could easily assimilate 1688 into these late medieval views. The Revolution merely deposed a prince who had broken the fundamental covenant with his people. The people were the great men in the community, the natural political leadership of gentry and nobility who, as bearers of ancient paternal authority, still exercised authority and justice in the countryside over retainers and dependents. In return for his maintenance of the *salus populi*, they pledged their obedience to the king. When he broke the contract by threatening the church, by ceasing to maintain peace

[39] *Ibid.*, I, 396-97.

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and good order, and by abdicating the throne in his flight, they replaced him.[40]

Bolingbroke's World-View

Intrinsically related to Bolingbroke's rejection of the liberal and Lockean voluntarist world-view is his endorsement of the notion of the Great Chain of Being. An old concept with roots in neo-Platonic and Christian cosmology, the doctrine received its great statements in English thought with Renaissance humanists like Elyot, Shakespeare, and Raleigh.[41] After its almost total disappearance in seventeenth-century English thought, it reappeared in an extraordinary revival among Bolingbroke's circle of Augustan humanists. The concept poses a juxtaposition between order, duty, function, and hierarchy, on the one hand, and anarchy, rights, mobility, and individualism, on the other. In Bolingbroke's hands the concept was used to defend an ideal socio-political order that he alleged was passing and to brand the agent of that change as sinful.

His description of the Chain of Being emerges in those philosophical essays in which he outlines his notion of theodicy. God's justice, as Bolingbroke sees it, is vindicated despite man's suffering because man is neither the center of God's universe nor does the universe, in turn, exist solely for man's happiness. God's universe contains an infinite number of creatures who form a ladder above man to God, and below him to the smallest of vegetable and inanimate life. To imagine oneself the object of God's special concern is prideful, since it places one above his place in the Great Chain, all the members of which must be God's equal concern. This hierarchical world-view, found in Bolingbroke's religious writings, is the source of his "Tory Cosmology" as it was for the Renaissance humanists and for Swift and Pope. God's Great Chain of Be-

[40] Not only had the *Vindicae Contra Tyrannus*, for example, emphasized the legitimacy of resisting princely threats to the true church, but it also stressed that only the aristocracy should resist the un-Christian acts of princes. See J. W. Allen, *Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1960), 314-30. Bolingbroke, so familiar with "nobilaire" writings and sentiment in his French period, was very likely familiar with the *Vindicae*, which, first published in England in 1581, was revived in a second printing in 1689.

[41] Arthur Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (New York, 1960); E. M. W. Tillyard, *The Elizabethan World Picture* (New York, 1956).

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ing has its secular analogy in men's social and political ranks, equally fixed and determined. In the social world each man has an assigned station with attendant duties and functions, the social order being characterized throughout by authority and subordination. The appropriate response of the individual is resignation to the will of God in placing him in his particular rank:

> The wisdom and the goodness of God are therefore manifest. I thank thee, O my Creator! that I am placed in a rank . . . to which I belong: a rank wherein I am made capable of knowing thee, and of discovering thy will, the perfection of my own nature and the means of my happiness.

The immense design of God's order is contrived so that "the whole order and system . . . would be disordered and spoiled if any alteration was made in either." Each man must accept his station, "the place he is to inhabit . . . the part he is to act."[42] Bolingbroke's words are directed at the prideful men of Walpole's age who were destroying this noble structure in their disregard for rank, duty, and authority.

As a conclusion to his description of the Chain of Being and its violators in the *Fragments*, Bolingbroke illustrates the fundamental unity of the Augustan critics by invoking his dear Dean Swift. If men, Bolingbroke writes, seek to be inferior or superior to what they are intended to be, and do not keep to the rank God intended for them, they will appear as preposterous creatures in God's system. "Gulliver's horses made a very absurd figure in the place of men, and men would make one as absurd in the place of horses."[43] Locke's ideas encouraged such acts of pride with their absurd and sometimes monstrous results. Belief in natural freedom and equality would destroy a static and hierarchical order with fixed social and political distinctions. Locke's system failed to take into consideration the fixed distinctions between the ploughman, the cottager, and the magistrate. A world with social relations determined by contract had no place for assigned rank; nor did a world-view of individualism and social mobility via acquisition accord with

[42] Bolingbroke, IV, 320-45, 339, 363.
[43] *Ibid.*, IV, 363.

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Bolingbroke's emphasis on the static and functional ordering of men and offices.

One specific application of Bolingbroke's social and political reading of the Chain of Being argument was his insistence that there were those whose specific station was that of governor and others whose station was that of governed. In this notion of an inevitable division between those destined to lead and those to be led can be found yet another dimension of Bolingbroke's repudiation of the liberal world-view. His defense of the special merits and claims of great men and great families in contrast to what he considered the liberals' disregard for such distinctions in their indiscriminate description of "the people" is an important aspect of Bolingbroke's aristocratic response to Locke's liberal challenge.[44] Bolingbroke suggests that a basic and recurring division runs through the history of mankind, "the multitudes designed to obey, and . . . the few designed to govern." In paternal government this is quite obvious, but even at the critical stage of political evolution when natural governments pass into artificial governments the few emerge, the philosophical legislators, "men of more genius than the common herd." As it was at the birth of political society that a few men were better able to understand the laws of nature, so it is always, Bolingbroke contends—a few are set apart to govern. All men are directed to submit to government but "some men are designed to take care of that government."[45] That this is so is a result of man's basic nature, which is so constituted that constant battle is waged within each individual between his reason and his passions. The passions, writes Bolingbroke, lead men to immediate and less important pleasures, whereas reason, slower and more de-

[44] Bolingbroke throughout this discussion attributes to Locke equalitarian views which, if pressed, Locke would not defend. His writings on education, for example, suggest that he, too, expected the upper classes (even perhaps the landed classes) to do the governing.

[45] Bolingbroke, II, 90, 355; III, 222. The Renaissance humanist's utilization of the Chain of Being also led to similar political conclusions. See, for example, Thomas Elyot, *The Book Named the Governor*, ed. S. E. Lehmberg (London, 1962), 4-5. The roots of Tory ruling-class notions go at least as far back as the Platonism of Renaissance humanists like Elyot and of Augustan humanists like Bolingbroke.

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liberate, leads men to more lasting but more remote pleasures. There is a striking similarity to Hume's contrast between calm and violent passions in Bolingbroke's judgment that "the influence of reason is slow and calm, that of the passions sudden and violent."[46] From this psychological distinction, Bolingbroke drew the same aristocratic conclusions that Hume would. People in whom slow and calm reason predominates should constitute the political leadership, as these more rational people are born to be guides in formulating laws to the many, in whom sudden and violent passions rule. The vulgar masses "know little and believe much"; they are ill-informed and "incapable of judging for themselves," while the rational few are the educated and well-born. Education helps reason control the passions, and the leisure and affluence provided by high social standing allow one to continue the cultivation of reason.[47]

That Bolingbroke envisioned the nobility and the greater gentry as the source of natural leadership by rational men was made clear in his essay *On the Spirit of Patriotism.* Written in 1736 as a letter to Lord Cornbury, it is a plea to the younger generation of the landed and noble classes to recapture the leadership of English political society from the new men around Walpole. Men of good breeding, like Cornbury, are set apart by the Author of nature. "These are they who engross almost the whole reason of the species; who are born to instruct, to guide, and to preserve; who are designed to be the tutors and the guardians of human kind." Such men are superior spirits, men who even from infancy "were born for something more, and better." Their rank and situation in society denote for them one vocation—government—"which it is not lawful for them to resist, nor even to neglect." Such men are set out in the social chain of being as governors whose function is to preserve the strength and splendor of the commonwealth. Lord Cornbury and other sons of great landed families were those few

[46] *Ibid.*, III, 224. See David Hume, *Theory of Politics*, ed. Frederick Watkins (Edinburgh, 1951), xviii. Bolingbroke's philosophical essays were not published until after his death in 1754, but they were written originally as letters to Pope, which would date them at least before 1744, the date of Pope's death.

[47] *Ibid.*, IV, 151; III, 374-75; II, 190, 299.

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men of reason "designed to take care of that government on which the common happiness depends."[48] With aristocratic views such as these, no wonder that Bolingbroke's essays and *The Craftsman* returned time and again to the theme of an England where a new social and political order had arisen, where monied men of no social rank and men who generally lacked quality were moving to the center of the political stage and making of politics something far different from what it had been when it was the preserve of noble and landed gentlemen. The ability to govern was a product of long experience, not a skill acquired overnight, and such experience came only with the generations of leadership that rightfully accompanied rank.

A final area in which Bolingbroke is critical of Locke concerns the relationship of the religious realm to the political. This disagreement points to their fundamental differences over the nature and purposes of the state. Bolingbroke, a great critic of organized religion from a religious and philosophical point of view, was at the same time, like Machiavelli, convinced of its social and political utility. Doctrinally, he could not tolerate the notion of eternal punishment in another life, yet he recognized that this sanction was a powerful force upholding the laws of men and strengthening government. Like Machiavelli with his Numa, the classicist Bolingbroke could not find enough praise for the antique lawgiver's manipulation of religion as an expedient to encourage obedience and public spirit. There are some, however, Bolingbroke writes, who would question this secular application of religion. He does not mention Locke, but it could easily be Locke's *Letters on Toleration* that he has in mind. These men argue that religious and civil societies are widely distinguished by the ends of their institutions which in turn implies their mutual independence. Since religious society deals with the salvation of souls and civil society with the security of temporal interests, this position, Bolingbroke writes, asserts that the state can only punish overt acts and must take no notice of whatever passes in the mind and does not assert itself in criminal action. Bolingbroke rejects this attitude not only from an intrenched Erastianism but from a position which also rejects

[48] *Ibid.*, II, 353-55.

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Locke's liberal limitation of the magistrate's concerns to only negative protection of temporal natural rights:

> Now in answer to all this we may deny, with Truth and reason on our side, that the avowed ends of religious and the real ends of civil societies, are so distinct as to require distinct powers, and a mutual independence. The salvation of souls is not the immediate end of civil government. . . . But if to abstain from evil, and to do good works, be means of salvation, the means of salvation are objects of civil government. It is the duty of princes and magistrates to promote a strict observation of the law of nature, of private and public morality, and to make those who live in subjection to them good men, in order to make them good citizens.[49]

It was not only Locke whom Bolingbroke was attacking, but also Walpole, who accepted the novel liberal image of a limited magistrate. The *Daily Gazetteer*, one of Walpole's papers, had articulated this position in an attack on the Opposition in 1735. It rejected the Opposition demand for governmental action to end luxury and corruption by asserting that such action was outside the legitimate sphere of the magistrate's power. "There is no remedy for this but what is in ourselves," it wrote. People may do what they please with their property and persons so long as they do not injure others: ". . . 'tis out of the power of all the laws to hinder Them." Government cannot interfere with their freedom and fortunes "under a pretence of preventing luxury." Walpole's *Gazetteer* concluded its Lockean attack on the Opposition with the declaration that "the end and design of government is not to keep us from hurting ourselves, but to keep others from hurting us; if governments would do that, 'tis enough; 'tis all that men desire of them."[50] But government, for Bolingbroke, one of whose models was the classical world, could never be relegated to the position of mere policeman protecting rights. Part of the function of government was positive education in virtue and the shaping of better and more moral men. Here was the culmination of Bolingbroke's charges against the England that had developed since 1688. In this new order, as he saw it depicted by its great theorist Locke and practiced by Walpole, government acted only as an umpire over the ceaseless

[49] Bolingbroke, III, 487, 223-24, 487.
[50] *Daily Gazetteer*, No. 120, Nov. 15, 1735.

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acquisition of wealth which endangered the traditional social structure. Limiting itself to "the security of temporal interests," it overlooked its more traditional role of leading men to the good life.[51]

[51] See footnote 33. I have not been directly concerned here with the intellectual sources for Bolingbroke's ideas on the origin of government. There is the obvious debt to Pufendorf; see, for example, Leonard Krieger, *The Politics of Discretion* (Chicago, 1965), 92, 113, 142, 221. There is also at work the influence of Bodin, Shaftesbury, and Filmer (however much Bolingbroke may deny the latter). Another more recent influence on Bolingbroke's views were the writings of the Jacobite critic of Locke, Charles Leslie; see, for example, his *The Finishing Stroke, Being A Vindication of the Patriarchal Scheme of Government* (London, 1711), 87, 114-15; *The Rehearsal, A View of the Times, Their Principles and Practice* (London, 1708-09); *A Short Account of the Origin of Government* (London, 1703), 4, 14. Bolingbroke was familiar with Leslie and his writings (*Works*, II, 27). In my opinion, however, by far the greatest influence on Bolingbroke's notions described in this paper is the essay of Sir William Temple, *The Origin and Nature of Government*, written in the sixteen-seventies. For the close link between the two, see Temple's *Works* (London, 1814), I, 9-24. Bolingbroke clearly indicates his familiarity with Temple's writings in *Works*, I, 512; II, 64.

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The King's "Wicked Advisers" and Medieval Baronial Rebellions

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> These then roughly speaking are the starting points and sources of factions, which give rise to party strife, and revolutions due to this take place in two ways: sometimes they are in regard to the constitution, and aim at changing from the one established to another . . . but *sometimes the revolution is not in regard to the established constitution, but its promoters desire the same form of government, for instance oligarchy or monarchy, but wish it to be in their own control.*[1]

Medieval barons often justified their rebellions on the grounds that the king was ill counseled and that the evils of the day could be rectified by the removal of his wicked advisers. To us this allegation seems to be either a transparent bit of propaganda, fooling no one and therefore convincing no one, or else a tortuous legal fiction, devised to expiate the rebels' guilt and to placate hostile public opinion.[2] These interpretations are accurate

[1] Aristotle, *Politics*, V, *i*, 4-5 (Loeb Library editions). (Italics added.)

[2] Public opinion was an incalculable but hardly negligible factor by the later middle ages, and political controversies were often aired before this court. Fritz Kern, *Kingship and Law* (Oxford, 1939), trans. S. B. Chrimes, 110: "The genuine authoritarian feeling of the people usually suspected that rebellions by the magnates against an anointed and crowned king were simply odious party intrigues." May McKisack, *The Fourteenth Century* (Oxford, 1959), 172,

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but inadequate as explanations of the phenomena to which they apply. Though legal fictions and political myths were embraced by the medieval mind with alacrity, the historian must explain their popularity and use, rather than simply expose and then dismiss them. This is particularly true in the case of baronial rebellions, for no matter how clumsily the rebels rationalized their motives, beneath the rhetoric were real grievances and a genuine *casus belli*. Rebellions were not meant to be exercises in collective intellectual activity; if the rebels chose a specific legal fiction as being well suited to their needs, it is our task to correlate this fiction with the political, social, and economic motives which drove them to arms, as well as to determine why this particular fiction was adopted time after time.[3] There is a correlation between the ends the rebels sought and the way in which they expressed themselves.

The complaint against evil counselors was a tactic which temporarily knitted together disparate lines of opposition. It was sufficiently broad so as to embrace different ideas and theories, and it was malleable and practical enough so that it could be used again and again, regardless of the exact nature of the situation causing offense. It was complemented by other tactics, some of greater ingenuity and future promise, but the value of this particular mode of attack is witnessed by the frequency of its adoption.

That rebellious barons turned against advisers, rather than against the king himself, is hardly surprising:

> It would be generally true of many societies that kings are expected to epitomize the qualities that their subjects admire, justice in particular.

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about the crisis of 1340-41: "The enormous importance attached by both sides to public opinion, 'that ultimate political force,' is among the most impressive aspects of the whole controversy."

[3] How articulate and perceptive were public figures of the later middle ages? Marc Bloch believes that they were learning to fit form to matter: "There was no longer a divorce between the means of expression and the thought to be expressed . . . towards the end of the 12th century men of action had at their disposal a more efficient instrument of mental analysis than that which had been available to their predecessors." *Feudal Society* (Chicago, 1961), 108. I think that Bloch's view rather overestimates the perceptiveness of the medieval nobility, and I incline more to the older opinion of A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Medieval Political Theory* (Edinburgh, 1962), III, 147: "In the Middle Ages the conditions of civilisation were actually changing probably as rapidly as they are today [1915], but men were hardly conscious of change, and the appeal to precedent, to tradition, was almost wholly sincere."

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> If hereditary rule is to be part of a divinely appointed order of things, people must be able on occasion to reconcile this principle with their discontent at particular actions of particular kings. One way of doing so is to argue that the king, who "can do no wrong," has been badly advised by a counsellor to whom none of the divine aura of royalty is attached.[4]

The allegation, however, was much more than a simple bit of political fraud or propaganda. Its adoption by the barons was a tactic of considerable shrewdness and value. It enabled them to do things which they otherwise could not have done respectably, and it allowed them to fuse various lines of attack, none sufficiently strong by itself to bear the weight of a frontal attack upon the monarch. By accusing the "wicked advisers," the barons opposed the king and yet avoided a decisive clash with the theoretical basis of medieval kingship. Furthermore, by attacking wicked advisers the barons not only took cognizance of the political and administrative developments of the medieval state, but they sought as a class to control these innovations and to govern the state which had created them. Lastly, the attack upon the wicked advisers was a ritualized form of rebellion and, therefore, a conservative one. This was important, because the aims of the barons always had to be quite limited—to destroy the king was to destroy the basis of their own authority.

I

Though charges against wicked royal advisers can be found wherever monarchy has existed, and are particularly frequent in medieval Europe,[5] the baronial uprisings of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century England offer some points of special interest. English feudalism and feudal monarchy were unusually centralized.[6] The whole pattern of post-conquest English politics had been centripetal, and no baron worked with much success to form an independent petty state from his honorial holdings.[7] The development

[4] Lucy Mair, *Primitive Government* (Baltimore, 1962), 143.

[5] Again the Investiture Struggle offers an example: Henry IV was told to eschew "the low born persons by whose advice he had been governing." Carlyle, III, 155, and see Kern, 93-94. For a similar example in France, see F. Lot and R. Fawtier, *Histoire des Institutions Françaises* (Paris, 1958), II, 47.

[6] F. M. Stenton, *The First Century of English Feudalism* (Oxford, 1932), 9.

[7] J. E. A. Jolliffe, *The Constitutional History of Medieval England* (London,

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of bureaucratic government, as an arm of the king, proceeded more rapidly in England than anywhere else in Europe except for the Papal curia. English politics generally lacked the provincial themes which marked France, the splintered qualities of the empire, the hypnotic influence of an external stimulus, as in Spain, and the intellectual dilemmas as to the proper nature and role of secular authority, as with the Papacy. The English barons were monotonously political, and yet they were singularly indifferent to theoretical considerations.[8] English baronial rebellions were not dynastic, and the throne was not usually their object, while at the same time the opposition was frequently led by a close relative of the king; this meant that there was usually the dilemma of reconciling family loyalties with purely selfish aggrandizement. Therefore, an inquiry into the conduct of the rebellions and their justification is a study of how ideas were shaped and determined by non-intellectual realities.

The charges against the wicked advisers were levied by barons and recorded in sympathetic chronicles as well as in the official records and documents of the kingdom. If the repetition of the charges lulls us into dismissing them as mere rhetoric, the reminder that they masked hatred which not only resulted in bloodshed but in the deposition and death of two kings should check our complacency. The accusations themselves varied but little over the centuries. The wicked counsellors had led the king astray and through their advice many evils had been suffered by the realm. "Through bad and deceitful counsel our lord the king and all his men have everywhere been dishonoured and his crown in many ways has

1954), 157: "No English magnate of the feudal age ever formed the ambition of breaking loose from the community of English law and turning his fee into an independent state." Also, Bloch, 431: "After the recovery which marked the reign of Henry II, the aim of the magnates in their rebellions was henceforth much less to tear the kingdom asunder than to dominate it . . . . The powerful kingship of the conquerors had not destroyed all other powers; but it had forced them to act, even when in opposition to it, only within the framework of the State."

[8] Jolliffe, 158: "The maxim that the power of a king who acts as a tyrant is illegitimate . . . almost exhausts contemporary theorizing about monarchy." Also, G. O. Sayles, *The Medieval Foundations of England* (London, 1950), 387. The fascination which Simon de Montfort has exercised upon modern historians is due, in part, to his friendship with and possible borrowings from men of ideas and ideologies.

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been debased and ruined,"[9] so that the king is 'held in great slander in all lands."[10] The advisers sought to disinherit the people of the realm in order to enrich themselves, and they cruelly afflicted the king's people who were left without redress. They corrupted the king so that he actually chose them, and kept them in office, against the wishes, rights, and interests of his good and natural advisers. These wicked men turned the king against his true friends through all manner of lies and slanders.[11] They caused him to despise those who sought to save him and his realm, and they made access to his person difficult. They took advantage of his youth, and they perverted him so that he actually preferred their company—foreigners, aliens, low types, unworthy fellows, women, youths, and the like—rather than that of those whom God had sent to counsel him in a true and natural fashion.[12] The king, his barons, the realm itself, and English prestige all sank when these men wormed their way into the core of government.[13]

II

The grievances of the barons were numerous, and they varied from reign to reign, but that they were compressible, at least in part, in-

[9] *Statutes of the Realm*, I, 57: The Ordinances of 1311, Preface and items 13, 14, and 20.

[10] *Chronicles, Edward I & Edward II* (Rolls Series), I, 167-68.

[11] *Ibid.*, II, 63-64; Mathew Paris, *Chronica Majora* (Rolls Series), III, 31-32, 47-48, 395-96; *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, III, 230.

[12] Roger of Howden, *Chronica* (Rolls Series), III, 72; *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, III, 230 (#3 and #21); *Chronicle, Edward I and Edward II*, II, 68-69, 70-71; *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, III, 230 (#1); Paris, III, 244-45, 362; V, 329, 695-96; *Chronicles, Edward I and Edward II*, II, 91; *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, III, 415; *Vita Regis Ricardi*, ed. T. Hearne (London, 1729), 169; *Chronicles, Edward I and Edward II*, II, 173-74.

[13] Of course there were limits to the applicability of any legal fiction, and so the time came occasionally when the barons said bluntly that the king himself was the root of the evil. This was asserted with vigorous frankness in the "Articles of Accusation" against Edward II, where the conclusion drawn from the charge of evil counsel was that "the king is incompetent to govern in person." Quoted by B. Wilkinson, *Constitutional History of Medieval England* (London, 1952), II, 170. There must have been considerable public cynicism working against the official legal fiction of ill counsel when kings were so frequently and readily led astray, particularly by such inferior creatures as Frenchmen.

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to a common formulation is an indication that they shared certain common themes.

Medieval government was impregnated with many political myths, and the constant allegations against the king's wicked advisers can be seen as one of these. By using a theme which did not attack the king or the basic social structure of the state, the barons effectually ritualized their rebellion and thereby minimized the scope of their attack upon order and authority.[14] Like most cliques working for their own interest, the barons were anxious to proclaim their innate conservativism, to assure both king and populace that only slight demands were sufficient to satisfy them, regardless of how deep their alienation really went.[15]

Medieval thought as to the role of the king and the rights of his subjects ran in two contrary directions, and no reconciliation was ever effected. One line of thought exalted the king and set him apart from ordinary men, providing the rationale for theocratic monarchy. Another line emphasized the limitations upon the king, the exalted status of law, and the privileges, rights, and contributions of the people, particularly the nobles. A direct clash of ideologies was welcomed by neither party. The king preferred to use theocratic theories when he could do so with impunity, but he was generally reluctant to insist upon these special attributes when a deadlock in practical affairs was imminent. The barons on their part were willing to use the ideas which were to their advantage, but a confrontation between baronial constitutionalism and theocratic kingship was an unwelcome prospect to them also, as it was apt to lead to violence and to shake the foundations of both houses. The barons could win the argument by force, perhaps, but this was an ultimate resort rather than a rational method of statecraft.

To the barons there was and could be only one form of govern-

[14] Max Gluckman, *Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa* (New York, 1963), Introduction and Chap. III; Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict in Africa* (New York, 1956), *passim*.

[15] It is of interest to note that the legal fiction of blaming the king's wicked advisers, formulated to serve the purpose of rebellious nobles, was adopted by rebellious and perhaps revolutionary peasants in 1381 and 1450. For Wat Tylor's complaints, see Charles Oman, *The Great Revolt of 1381* (Oxford, 1906), 191, 196, 198; for Jack Cade's views, see G. Kriehn, *The English Rising of 1450* (Strasbourg, 1892), 56-57; Also see J. H. Flemming, *England under the Lancastrians* (London, 1921), 114-15.

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ment—monarchy. The situation which prevailed into recent times among the "primitive governments" of Africa was true for the nobles of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries:

> In these states there is only one theory of government. In the event of rebellion, the aim and result is only to change the personnel of office and never to abolish it or to substitute for it some new form of government. When subordinate chiefs, who are often kinsmen of the king, rebel against him they do so in defence of the values violated by his malpractices. They have an interest greater than any other section of the people in maintaining the kingship. The ideal constitutional pattern remains the valid norm, in spite of breaches of its rules.[16]

To question the institution of monarchy was inevitably to raise basic questions about the institution of hereditary nobility.

Their general political conservatism made the barons satisfied with practical rather than theoretical gains. Consequently they were eager to cover the weaknesses and logical inconsistencies in their position, and to unify various strains of "constitutional" thought, provided these did serve to check the king where he was vulnerable. And he was, in a *de facto* sense, vulnerable through his advisers.

III

Monarchy was endorsed and accepted by medieval political theory.[17] The divine nature of secular political authority was generally recognized by both ecclesiastical and legal thinkers, with even the canonists and theologians agreeing so long as the question was confined to secular affairs.[18] As an agent of God the king existed to promote justice, and his quasi-sacred duties gave him (or possibly derived from) a quasi-sacred nature. The occupant of the throne came to be recognized as a *mixta persona:*

> a twin person, one descending from nature, the other from grace. . . . One through which, by the condition of nature, he conformed with oth-

[16] E. E. Evans-Pritchard and M. Fortes (eds.), *African Political Systems* (Oxford, 1940), 12.

[17] Otto von Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age* (Boston, 1958), trans. F. W. Maitland, 30-31.

[18] Carlyle, III, 92-105. John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* (New York, 1927), trans. J. Dickinson, IV, 1 (p. 4): "The power which the prince has is therefore from God." Thomas Aquinas, *De Regimine Principium*, Chap. 9.

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> er men: another through which, by the eminence of his deification and by the power of the sacrament of consecration, he excelled all others. Concerning one personality, he was, by nature, an individual man; concerning his other personality, he was, by grace, a *Christus*, that is a God-man. . . .
>
> The power of the king is the power of God. This power, namely, is God's by nature and the king's by grace. Hence, the king, too, is God and Christ, but by grace; and whatsoever he does, he does not simply as a man, but as one who has become God and Christ by grace.[19]

Though these views are admittedly at an extreme end of the spectrum, they do give some indication of how far a medieval monarch might be exalted. And from this position of majesty and dignity the king moved to bolster his position with ceremonies, proclamations, and rituals.

The anointing at the coronation marked the king's assumption of the special grace of Christian kingship. Though the coronation ceremony also contained many elements of a "constitutional" nature, for example, the oath and public acclamation and election, these were eclipsed by theocratic rituals which left an indelible stamp upon the memories of spectators and participants alike.[20] The anointing was like an Episcopal consecration, and "the unbiased spectator of a 14th century coronation could no more regard the King of England as a mere layman than could the people who had long believed in miracles."[21] The church itself was willing, into the thirteenth century at least, to consider the royal unction as a sacrament, though it finally reacted strongly against this belief.[22]

[19] The Anonymous of York, quoted in Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies* (Princeton, 1957), 46, 48. The "moral function of political authority" was accepted without exception or serious qualification, being but an extension of the king's divine nature. Carlyle, III, 106-13.

[20] Walter Ullmann, *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages* (London, 1961), 144: "No coronation promise contained any reference to, or indication of the king's duty to make laws only after consultation with the barons or other personages. In this respect the coronation service kept entirely within the framework of theocratic monarchy."

[21] P. E. Schramm, *A History of the English Coronation* (Oxford, 1937), trans. L. E. Wickham-Legg, 136. Kantorowicz, 55-56, states that the author of the Anonymous of York sees the king as superior to the bishop, for the latter is the antitype of Christ's humanity, the former of his divinity.

[22] In the imperial coronation of 1191, the Pope, in crowning Henry VI: "facit eum clericum." R. W. Woolley, *Coronation Rites* (Cambridge, 1915), 50. For the church's reaction, see Carlyle, II, 149.

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After being anointed, the king, by virtue of powers which flowed from his sacred office, rather than by virtue of heredity, occupied a unique role whose qualities included the ability to cure with his touch.[23]

The total effect of these supports of monarchy was most impressive. The king was both exalted above and differentiated from the nobles. As he was raised toward the heavens, so he was removed from the level where his quondam peers could criticize or instruct him: "By relying upon divine grace, he established a close connection with divinity itself and conversely detached himself more and more from the people. He removed himself so much from the people—originally his creator—that, as we shall see, the people became entrusted to him."[24] He assumed a paternalistic protection over his people to which no baron, no matter how mightily or how highly born, could aspire. His public role—he alone stood over all the people, and in his coronation oath has sworn to protect all of them—was something which no one else could share.[25] No nobleman's claim to power could be based on more than birth and natural position; no nobleman had gone through a *rite de passage* comparable to a crowning in Westminster Abbey.[26]

[23] Marc Bloch, *Les Rois Thaumaturges* (Strasbourg, 1924), especially 41-49, 120-45. Bloch (102-03) points out that Edward II, during his most unpopular and impotent periods, continued to touch large numbers of the common people.

[24] Ullmann, 119, and see 117-37 for a general discussion of theocratic monarchy. Kern, 27-31, gives a concise exposition of this, and on page 52: "The *Dei gratia* formula was from the start an avowal of the relative independence of monarchical power from the will of the subjects." See Kantorowicz, 47, 58, and Carlyle, III, 34-35, for Bracton's position on this point.

[25] Fiefs were held on contract, but the crown was held by virtue of a compact between the king and God, and, therefore, as far as other laymen were concerned it was the inalienable property of the king. See Kantorowicz, 347-58. Richard II held at the time of his deposition that he could not renounce his spiritual honors, as they were not his to grant away. S. B. Chrimes, *English Constitutional Ideals in the 15th Century* (Cambridge, 1936), 7. Eventually, as with so many other concepts, that of inalienability was used against the king by his rebellious barons; that is, the king who did alienate either real property or simply his majesty and grace was, *ipso facto*, not a true king. E. H. Kantorowicz, "Inalienability," *Speculum*, XXIX (1954), 488-502, holds that a promise not to alienate that which was the king's was part of the coronation oath. It was alleged against Richard II that he had "given the goods and possessions of the crown to unworthy persons." B. Wilkinson, II, 311.

[26] Despite the fact that entry into knighthood was accompanied by ecclesiastical ceremonies and blessing, "no great feudatory, however powerful he might

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The sum total of these theocratic powers and sanctions did not make an absolute monarch of the English king. Even had he had such a design, he lacked the genuine political power and the resources. What he did want was for all government to be dependent upon his initiative. He sought to stand in the center of all the processes of government, and he strove to keep control of developments and changes. He sought not to break the power of the nobles, but rather to bring their action within the scope of his prerogative powers. But beyond these limited ambitions the theocratic line of thought carried at least the seeds of a threat of absolutism, and as long as this was the case the barons felt the need of protection. Even if Richard II did not actually seek tyranny, with power to declare and to dissolve law, to ignore the laws by which property was held, and the like, his contemporaries feared that that was what he sought. To be misunderstood can be dangerous, and Richard paid the price for threatening to break the traditional balance of government. But this was the ultimate emergency. Generally the barons stopped short of deposition; they had many weapons to try before they were driven to employ the most radical one of all.

IV

Baronial attacks upon the king were limited, first, by the fact that no baron could or would ever preach anything which had the least flavor of republicanism or which even questioned the concept of monarchy.[27] Furthermore, none of the tactics at his command clearly refuted the theocratic views expounded above.[28] What the baron had at hand was a medley of ideas which were impossible to synthesize. The contractual or feudal view of the state offered but limited means to oppose an autocratic king. So did the pre-feudal notion that the state existed for the sake of law. Thirteenth-century notions about true kings and royal responsibility, derived from these earlier ideas and from classical thought, were also inadequate

be, ever dared to demand the most sacred part of the ceremony, the anointing. Apart from priests, the 'Lord's anointed' were to be found only among kings." Bloch, *Feudal Society*, 380.

[27] Kern, 5: "No controversy arose as to the desirability of the monarchical form of government."

[28] The only really effective challenge to theocratic kingship able to meet its argument head on came from the church. See Ullmann, 138-49.

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in a practical situation. From these diverse elements eventually did emerge a line of constitutional thought which limited the power of the monarch by placing sovereignty in the public domain. But until the maturation of that idea (and such institutions as parliament, which made the idea both meaningful and workable), it was useful to have at hand the powerful if temporary tactic of holding the king's advisers responsible for the satisfactory conduct of government.

The strongest traditional tie between king and baron was that of man and vassal.[29] The strength of the tie lay in its mutuality—the lord was no more free to wrong his man than the vassal was to neglect his sworn obligations. If the king acted unjustly against his vassal, that is, if he refused him the process of the lord's justice, or did him certain types of personal harm, then the baron was free to renounce his homage and to defy his lord.[30] The war which followed diffidation, however, was a private one, just as the wrong which was being righted was supposedly a private one. Defiance "is not the remedy of an oppressed nation, it is the remedy of an oppressed vassal."[31] The baron did not resist his king in order to impose a better administration upon the state, nor to enforce a collective political program, nor to check the growth of royal autocracy and royal power in any way that looked to the future.[32] Therefore, defiance (*diffidatio*), that check upon royal autocracy and irresponsibility which drew its rationale from the contractual nature of the feudal state, was an inadequate check upon the privileged position of the theocratic king.

[29] Interesting instances of the strength of this bond and the awe that surrounded it can be found in Sidney Painter, *The Reign of King John* (Baltimore, 1949), 350-51; Bloch, *Feudal Society*, 228-29, 232.

[30] See Jolliffe, 155-59, for a discussion of diffidation. The legalism that surrounded the process is heavily stressed. The king's recognition of the "right" to rebel helps to explain royal amnesties or light punishments which often followed unsuccessful rebellions. The rebellions were not uprisings against the state, but personal grievances.

[31] F. W. Maitland, *Constitutional History of England* (Cambridge, 1908), 103.

[32] An interesting feature of medieval political controversies is the way both sides played the game. The German nobles rose against Henry IV in the 1070's because of private wrongs and, therefore, "a general verdict by the princes, the assembled representatives of the community, could not, in their opinion, decide between them and the king. For their quarrel with the king rested upon private grievances; therefore they must pursue their cause 'privata virtute.' " Kern, 95.

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A more portentous line of attack was provided by emphasizing law as the purpose,[33] goal, and end of the state:

> Germanic and ecclesiastical opinions were firmly agreed on the principle . . . that the State exists for the realization of the Law; the power of the State is the means, the Law is the end-in-itself; the monarch is dependent upon the Law, which is superior to him, and upon which his own existence is based.[34]

This idea gained weight at the expense of those views which favored passive obedience to rulers, no matter how wicked they were. It sanctified the "right of resistance" by stressing that the highest political loyalty was to an ideal, an abstraction: "the objective legal order which had been disturbed by the ruler and was to be restored."[35] This goal placed a public, collective task upon all members of the body politic, and when the king failed to work toward the proper end, everyone else (but particularly the barons) could and *must* interfere:

> The right of resistance, therefore, was not primarily the right of a party whose contract had been violated, nor was it even exclusively the subjective right of a citizen against an unjust ruler; principally it was the duty of resistance which the citizen owed to the objective legal order.[36]

The right of resistance was a principle which was capable of expansion and amplification. At the hands of John of Salisbury, in the twelfth century, law came to be a "higher law" which the subject had to follow, even against the dictates of the prince if need be.[37] From there John moved to his famous doctrine of tyrannicide against evil rulers who opposed the true law. To John, who "does not seem to have conceived that the community, or *universitas*, could act except through the prince,"[38] the tyrant had to be slain by a private individual. By the thirteenth century the concept of

[33] This was not positive law, but natural law, based on "moral or natural necessity." Gierke, 74.

[34] Kern, 70. See, also, Jolliffe, 57.

[35] Kern, 78.

[36] *Ibid.*, xxi (Chrimes' preface).

[37] This overly concise exposition of John of Salisbury's political thought is drawn from J. Dickinson, "Kingship in the *Policraticus* of John of Salisbury," *Speculum*, I (1926), 308-37.

[38] *Ibid.*, 332.

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the state as an autonomous corporation had emerged, and someone, for instance, the barons, could now act on behalf of the entire community as the proper agent for the murder, or as it was in most actual instances, the restraint of the erring prince.[39] The doctrine took root that it was the *duty* of those within the state to participate in its activities and to steer it toward its proper end.[40]

Thirteenth-century thinkers such as Bracton drew upon classical and canonical thought for arguments emphasizing restraints upon the monarch. While on the one hand Bracton exalts the king and differentiates him from all other mortals, on the other he stresses the subordination of the king to law and the limits which were imposed upon royal power.[41] And Bracton's interpolator—read as part of the text by his contemporaries, if not by modern scholars—declared that the king had to hearken to counsel and that he who had companions had a master.[42] This Whiggish line of thought, also expressed in the "Song of Lewes," may have looked to the future, with its interest in natural law and collective participation in public business.[43] Nevertheless, its existence shows that the theocratic monarchy had articulate as well as dedicated enemies.

Despite the number and weight of these opinions which ran counter to those of theocratic kingship, the king was not checked in a definitive fashion. Diffidation was too largely a private matter. Appeals to law and justice were fine, but who was to decide when the king degenerated into a tyrant? Everyone might confi-

[39] Thomas Aquinas, *De Regimine Principium*, I, vi: "It rather seems that to proceed against the cruelty of tyrants is an action to be undertaken, not through the private presumption of a few, but by public authority."

[40] Kern, 84, 89, 102. See Gaines Post, "Two Notes on Nationalism," *Traditio*, IX (1953), 294: "Since what touches all must be approved of all, and all must take care of all, and since an attack on the kingdom and the rights of the king touches all . . . therefore all must offer aid for the defense." This line of thought leads very neatly, when the danger to the state is an internal one, to an attack upon the wicked advisers for causing the trouble. The action against them, being collective, calls for the formation of a baronial party.

[41] For a brief introduction to the imposing volume of scholarship on Bracton, see Carlyle, III, *passim;* Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, 143-92; for a discussion of the glossator or interpolator, see Charles H. McIlwain, *Constitutionalism, Medieval and Modern* (Ithaca, 1958), 157-58, n. 2, and 70-71, 173-79, for Bracton's views on the need for counsel.

[42] Carlyle, III, 71.

[43] Discussions of the development of the concept of popular sovereignty can be found in Ullmann, 215-305; Kern, 117-33; Jolliffe, 173-74, and Gierke, 37-67.

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dently assert that a tyrant could be resisted, but it was one thing when the tyrant in mind was Sextus Tarquinus or Domitian,[44] quite another when he was John or Henry III or Edward II. And even if the community of the realm asserted itself as the arbiter of these matters, how did one explain away the clearly sacramental nature of kingship? Was the man separate from his office? Were the powers held only as long as they were justly exercised? When grace departed, did the king's exalted nature depart also? Constitutionalism, which would later provide solutions for some of these problems, was not embraced as early as the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

The best, and in a sense the most typically medieval solution was to avoid the necessity of formulating a single, final answer, insofar as possible. If English barons were not overly swayed by intellectual distinctions, English kings were not likely to be convinced to abandon their ambitions simply by a display of logic. Baronial strength, rather than baronial ideas, was the real solace of the alienated nobles, and if they could win the day they were content to impose the minimal amount of theorizing necessary to support their case.[45] Yet they had no desire to resort to force until all other expedients had been exhausted. The ingenious plaint against wicked advisers was one of these expedients. Its use allowed everyone to avoid the question whether any given king was the lord's anointed or whether he could legitimately be resisted. The constitutionalists among the barons were not forced to rely completely upon their vague and inchoate ideas about law, tyrants, counsel, and representation. If the king, regardless of his special nature, could be checked through his counselors, this seemed to suffice. Evil advisers implied a collectivity in royal decision-making which could best be countered by another group, but one dedicated to law and virtue. In all

[44] See Aquinas, 44, for a clear definition of tyranny, and 57-60, for some of the tyrants from biblical and classical history who were either slain or resisted with perfect legitimacy—Tarquin, Domitian, Joas, Aioth, Eglon, and others. Even in these cases it is made clear that those who opposed the tyrant sometimes suffered. Also, see John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, VIII, xviii, xix, xx (350-74), and F. Schulz, "Bracton on Kingship," *English History Review*, LX (1945), 153, 161.

[45] The tendency to neglect the actual political process while treating the development of political theories is something we are often warned against, as, for example, by Gluckman in *Order and Rebellion*, 259, n. 25.

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these ways the tactical and rhetorical charge against evil counselors had both substance and value, and so it was employed over and over again.

V

The barons had a vested interest in preserving the social structure which they knew. The rituals with which they surrounded rebellion were designed to help preserve this structure. At the moment of rebellion or civil war the state was most vulnerable both to the threat of foreign enemies and to disruptive internal forces. Whenever the barons were taking action which might lead to or allow for the fragmentation of the state, they embraced a form of ritual protest in which they affirmed their desire to hold it together.[46] Their charge, that rebellion was against the king's wicked advisers and not against the king himself, served this purpose. The rebellion's tendency to break up the state was counter-balanced by an expressed desire on the part of the rebels to correct the evils occurring in the center of the state, around the king's person: "civil wars thus strengthened the system by canalizing tendencies to segment, and by stating that the main goal of leaders [of the rebellion] was control of the sacred kingship itself."[47] The ills of the day were rectifiable by an improvement in the central government. Thus while reacting against a particular set of advisers, or even against the king who employed them, the barons were also affirming their devotion to the central institution of monarchy provided it was corrected and well counseled.[48]

The attack upon "wicked" advisers also had a cathartic value. Medieval government was run by a small group of men. Politics was their natural task, and from its temptations and responsibilities there was no natural escape or retirement. Many of the men in this small circle were related to each other and to the king. They fought together and lived together, and when animosities did spring up they were not the simple disagreements of modern polit-

[46] The use of the legal fiction of "wicked advisers" not only blunted and made acceptable the baronial attack, but it gave the barons the sense of righteousness they needed. It offered, in this fashion, both an offensive and defensive weapon.

[47] Gluckman, *Order and Rebellion*, 131.

[48] Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict*, 126.

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ical life, from which one is free to walk away and retire. Medieval political quarrels combined the disagreements of politics with the bitterness found within a family once relationships have turned sour.[49] Personal jealousies and frictions might smolder for years, exacerbated by constant and intimate contact. When bitterness between king and barons did reach the point of violence, it was a very deep and long-nurtured hatred which was being vented. At the same time we must remember the baronial reluctance to attack the king himself, for after the catharsis of rebellion and bloodshed some means had to remain available for picking up the pieces and resuming normal life.

The kings themselves implicitly recognized the nature and role of this ritualization, and sometimes they accepted its implications as being to their own advantage. The wicked advisers could be used as a scapegoat for monarch as well as for baron, and even kings with as little sensitivity as Henry III or Edward II would sometimes realize that "in a large organization, the leader acts through his officers, and it may be possible for him to see that these officers take the blame for shortcomings. That is, they get the unpopularity for misfortunes and bad decisions, while the leader gets the praise for good things."[50] No matter how firm his loyalty to his own circle, there usually came a time when the king would jettison his advisers in order to save himself. And sometimes he not only did this, but aggressively cast the blame for his faults upon those whom he could no longer protect and who could not be harmed any further by ungenerous accusations.[51] One of the functional aspects of political ritual is that it is a tool usable by either antagonist; if the barons had to limit their rebellion lest it become a revolution, so the king had to accept the ritualized presentation of grievances at face value, lest he force the barons to go beyond them to more basic truths.

The concept that the king was separate from the kingly office was an ultimate attempt to ritualize the rebellion, short of striking out against the king (which no one wanted to be forced into doing).

[49] Henry III's rages against Simon de Montfort at times far exceeded the normal animosities of politics, particularly when Henry publicly charged Simon with having seduced the king's sister.

[50] Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict*, 39.

[51] Wilkinson, II, 123.

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For the barons to have emphasized the separatist line of thought was hardly surprising; they were looking for myths behind which they could hide. But when all else failed to save him the king was also willing to accept the idea and its consequences. If he could not preserve himself, he did at least try to protect the special nature of his office and to preserve it for his successors, leaving his dynasty's claim to the throne unshaken. If the king had to be deposed, better that his downfall be associated with the machinations of wicked advisers than that he bear full and sole responsibility for the grievances which had led to rebellion and deposition.[52] In this way the office itself could remain untouched, and the heir was not contaminated by his predecessor's faults. The barons were, through their employment of a ritualized myth, able to assert their basic loyalty to the institution of kingship even while engaged in destroying the king.

VI

When the barons of England rebelled against their king it was because they were threatened, as a class, by two different but allied political developments. One threat came from the establishment of a self-sufficient royal bureaucracy and administrative apparatus. The other came from the sporadic creation of a royal party among the nobility, operating to exclude those nobles, no matter how mighty, who were not members. Together these two developments seem likely to disturb the vested interests and privileged position in government and society which the barons had enjoyed as their "natural" right.

As in the realm of political ideas, here also it was a long while before the baronage could match the king in its comprehension or articulation of the dilemma which faced it. Gradually the barons came to understand the nature of these two threats, and even more slowly they learned which counter-measures would prove effective and permanent; the court party was to be checked by means of impeachment and insistence upon ministerial responsibility, the bureaucracy by the concept of political neutrality and baronial partici-

[52] Richard II refused to play the game, and by doing so he so completely identified himself with the least popular activities of the government that Bolingbroke was able to skip the attack upon the king's advisers and go against the king himself.

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pation in administration. These checks, however, post-dated the initial challenge, and they were only devised through trial and error. Before they could stand upon their own as tactics of sufficient strength to carry the weight of the baronial anger, the barons also relied upon the traditional charge against the king's wicked advisers. Once again this legal fiction served baronial needs when more imposing and sagacious responses were as yet undeveloped and uncoordinated. And by means of their traditional attack the barons *did* realize their ends—to secure the removal of those who surrounded the king when this group lost the confidence of the magnates.

Nothing could have made the English baronage so aware of a class interest as the intrusion and challenge of outsiders.[53] Once this challenge was sounded, whether by civil servants or men suddenly elevated to the topmost ranks of the baronage, the old nobility fell back with great righteousness upon its "natural" position at the king's table, counsel, and council.[54] Feudal theory had given the baron the privilege *cum* duty of counseling his king, and the feudal-political machine of medieval government had been formulated on the assumption that the baron was an intrinsic part of the king's governmental apparatus: "a medieval baron in England was part of an administrative machine, and could not, even if he wished, escape from it."[55] He was expected to develop a sense of responsibility for the health of the body politic.[56] When he found himself excluded from his rightful place, as he chose to put it when aggrieved, he banded with his fellows who were in a similar position. The targets of this baronial wrath were those who had usurped an unnatural and improper position, the wicked advisers.

The self-sustaining professionalized bureaucracy was an obvious threat to the barons. Fundamentally the development of such an instrument of government represented a major revolution in the con-

[53] This assumes a naïveté on the part of the barons in thinking that the king's advisers actually advised him. But the issue at stake was not usually who formulated the threatening policies, but who could be held responsible for them.

[54] It must be noted that the king's duty to hear counsel and to meet with a council were not in dispute. No king could or would be so foolish as to deny this or to attempt to govern without some such machinery. What was in question was *whose* counsel would he seek; the issue dealt with here is a political, not a constitutional, one.

[55] F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton* (Oxford, 1928), 123.

[56] Stenton, 93.

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cept of political service and status within the hierarchy of public life. In place of position by birth and wealth, the old standard feudal criteria for political pre-eminence, there came into use the concept of merit, based on special skills and dedication to a common interest or policy.[57] The growth of a complex administrative machinery had begun in England with the transformation of Anglo-Saxon institutions immediately after the Conquest. First there had been the formation of a group of men who rose through their willingness and ability to perform for the king.[58] Then came the molding of the special tools which gave royal government an advantage over the nobles—the writ, the enrolled letter, the diversity of seals, the exchequer tally, and the like. By the thirteenth century the wielders of the new tools were being channeled almost exclusively into the new and specialized branches of royal government—exchequer, chancery, king's bench, common pleas. By the late thirteenth century the most intimate secrets of government were being confined to those who worked in the "privy" or household branches of government—wardrobe, hanaper, chamber. Each development was more esoteric, those who participated in it more highly (or specially) skilled, and the old barons farther and farther removed from the new bases of power.

Royal government was becoming a government of specialists, and it was becoming government with a written and recorded memory.[59] This created a distinction between the counsel offered the king by his social peers and the special services performed by the trained bureaucrats. The baron was apt to resent not only the men, but the system which made the services of a base-born, though highly skilled, bureaucrat as important as his own. And since in many cases the experts were either clerics or from the ranks of the "mid-

[57] R. W. Southern, "The Place of Henry I in English History," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, XLVIII (1962), 143: The king's servants "had risen by influence in courts and in government, and especially by their knowledge of the ways in which central authority could be used to bolster up local power." This is a good example of a form of specialized political knowledge, which, if a baron comprehended, he might hesitate to place at the king's disposal.

[58] S. B. Chrimes, *An Introduction to the Administrative History of Medieval England* (Oxford, 1952), 87: "No Norman or Angevin king had favoured baronial tenure of important administrative office."

[59] For governmental memory, see Chrimes, 77; V. H. Galbraith, *Studies in the Public Records* (London, 1948), 84.

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dle class," the baron focused the frustration caused by his increasing clumsiness in government upon these outsiders, now fulfilling the roles from which he was generally excluded.[60] These upstarts threatened to give the king a functional independence which the barons did not want him to enjoy. This class jealousy and feeling of exclusion must be put into the context of a world that accepted doctrines of limited profits and quantitative controls on manufacture, severe strictures upon usury and gain, and the like. The economic world was one of tight boundaries and short horizons, and the political world must have shared some of its psychological premises, conceiving only finite amounts of power and authority in the state, and fearing that if one had too much another necessarily had too little. This is in contrast to modern concepts of bountifulness, expansion, and opportunism.

VII

The other great threat to the collective interest of the barons lay in the creation of a court party.[61] These men, though nobles themselves, were singled out by the king and raised to an exalted rank by virtue of personal affection and sympathy.[62] They were offensive to the other nobles not because they were outsiders, as were the "civil servants," but rather because the king sought to make them his exclusive counselors and to use them as a façade behind which he could disregard the rest of his "natural" advisers.[63] The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the king not unnaturally preferred men from the minor nobility, whom he then elevated to the highest ranks of the peerage. The root of the problem, of course, lay in an almost insoluble paradox: the advisers chosen by a wicked king

[60] See McKisack, 194, for the contrast between government by experts and by representatives. In contrast to the lawyers of the French monarchy, the English nobles stood as a randomly chosen group.

[61] I am not concerned here with the more technical issues of who made up the council, its jurisdiction, and the like. It was not formal membership but degree of intimacy which might make one a "wicked adviser." Perhaps what the barons most feared was private and personal counsel, which might even be neutralized in part by membership in the council.

[62] Henry III, Edward II, and Richard II were all prominently associated with the creation of a court party; see Wilkinson, *Studies in Constitutional History* (Manchester, 1937), 160, and McKisack, Chaps. I-III and 425-26, 475-76.

[63] Wilkinson, *Constitutional History*, I, 110-11, quoting from Mathew Paris on the charges against Hubert de Burgh.

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were, *ipso facto*, wicked advisers, while the king who listened to wicked advisers obviously was or quickly became a wicked king. The less a monarch was initially in rapport with his great magnates, the more likely he was to choose as favorites men who could neither win nor keep the sympathy which would have adjudged them to be good advisers; this is true for Henry III's Poitevins, the Despengers and Gaveston, and the coterie of young and *nouveau riche* nobles surrounding Richard II—Oxford, de la Pole, and the like.[64] The rebellious nobles were not interested in ravelling the logic of the dilemma. They concentrated upon removing the wicked advisers from the court, whatever the reason for the alleged wickedness.

As there was a basic issue at stake in the baronial reaction to the bureaucratic development—the conflict between men of merit and men of birth—so there was a basic issue at stake here—the king's right to choose whomsoever he pleased as his intimate adviser versus the public right to give counsel.[65] The king asserted that he sought a privilege not denied to the meanest of his baronial subjects. Why should the barons be able to deny it to the monarch? The answer, of course, was that the king's government was public government, and that the entire realm was involved in it and affected by its decisions.[66] This was awkwardly expressed by the barons, however, for their goals were neither altruistic nor well thought out. When the king chose counselors who were able to prove themselves, that is, to counsel the king without inflaming the barons

[64] McKisack, 12: "The personal element in medieval state conflicts is the most transitory of all, the least readily recoverable by posterity. Yet it is impossible to read these chronicles without being made aware of the supreme importance of personalities in these conflicts; and the chronicles of Edward II's reign make it very plain that it was loathing and jealousy of Gaveston which brought the whole business to a head." T. F. Tout, *Chapters in Medieval Administrative History* (Manchester, 1920), IV, 50-51, is at pains to point out that, removed from the jealous verdict of the nobles, many of the wicked advisers were not only capable and dedicated, but were often disinterested.

[65] See Wilkinson, I, 175-77, for a translation of Louis IX's arbitration: "We also decree and ordain that the aforesaid king at his own volition may freely appoint, dismiss and remove . . . officials and ministers of his kingdom and his household. . . . [The king] may safely call to his counsel such aliens and natives as shall seem to him useful and loyal, just as he was able to do before the time aforesaid."

[66] F. M. Powicke, *The Thirteenth Century* (Oxford, 1953), 77: The barons "felt that the affairs of the realm were their concern, and they could never know what the king might do as soon as their backs were turned."

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who were not members of the inner circle, little trouble resulted. But when the king or his advisers proved unsuccessful, the barons claimed a right to see that it would not happen again. They turned against the court party, sometimes not content until blood had been shed.

The baronial rebellions of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, therefore, were in opposition to two types of wicked advisers, the curial and the administrative, and they sought to dispel the threat presented by each. Eventually baronial efforts realized a large measure of success, not so much through the removal of the wicked advisers—for this was merely an *ad hominem* response to particular situations—but rather by erecting machinery within the government to check the bureaucrats and by formulating a set of conventions which governed political responsibility and activity. Many crises, over a two-century span, were to occur before the barons were able to assert their position coherently. They slowly grasped the revolutionary aspects of the challenge to their position, but long before they had learned to articulate their grievance they understood that there was a threat to them, and they recognized a common class interest.

VIII

The great development which would eventually be evolved as an antidote to wicked advisers would be an institutionalized response, governed by rules, shared in by commoners, and largely accepted by the king himself, if only grudgingly. The short-range solution was always to remove the wicked advisers, by force if need be. The long-range solutions were less obvious, and the story of baronial rebellions during our period can largely be seen as the story of the slow formulation or evolution of these solutions. The threat from administrative advisers was largely laid to rest by having the bureaucracy rendered poltically neutral. That from the curial party was overcome by making the king's political advisers responsible to their fellow counselors, to parliament, and, if need be, to impeachment and charges of treason. The barons increasingly came to utilize these devices, not always distinguishing between the two types of advisers whom they opposed, but at least growing more sophisticated in their grasp of the political-economic-administrative complex of royal government.

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The first steps taken against the nobles of the king's party were personal ones, directed at the men, and confined to obtaining their dismissal and replacement by good advisers, that is, men from the baronial ranks. If the king were reluctant to comply with such demands tempers rose and eventually exile or even death might end the ministerial tenure. Animosities in the fourteenth century were probably even sharper than in the thirteenth, reflecting the growing role of government and the great amount of power at stake in the conflict. The rebellions against Edward II and Richard were accompanied by more bloodletting than those against Henry III. The violent reaction against unpopular royal favorites lasted until the Tudors closed the question by effectively determining the personnel of their council themselves, but by the end of the fourteenth century the beginnings of the institutionalization of baronial anger were evident. The doctrine of impeachment, and its concomitant doctrine of responsibility to the public weal and to the collective public interest, was the great advance here.[67]

The threat posed by the bureaucracy was largely answered by political neutralization. The barons only slowly learned how to realize their ends, and they did so in halting steps: the thinking of 1258 showed an advance in this direction over that of 1215; the thinking of 1311 over that of 1258; that of 1386 over that of Edward II's day. They were aided in the realization of their goal by several tendencies operating within the bureaucracy itself. As the organs of administration became permanent they moved away from the household and court and away from the king's personal control. Furthermore, partially because of its success and importance, the administration inevitably developed its own policies and loyalties; the tradition of service and of competence grew to the point where it rivaled the original goals of royal service and obedience. Personal interests within the system can become more compelling for bureaucrats than the external calls upon them, and this tendency operated within the major departments of government, removing them from the political arena and making them as willing to accept baronial control as royal, once the nobles realized that this was a proper goal of rebellion. All of these develop-

[67] For the literature on impeachment, see the bibliographies in McKisack, 390, and Wilkinson, *Studies*, Chap. IV.

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ments served to dispel the threat of absolutism contained within the bureaucratic machine. But until these had come to pass, individuals proved easier to attack than concepts and institutions; wicked advisers were an easier political target than were expertise and specialization.

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Book Reviews

A Study of the Chinese Communist Movement *by Shanti Swarup. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966.—viii, 289 pp. $5.60.*

Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927-1935 *by John E. Rue, with the assistance of S. R. Rue. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966.—xv, 387 pp. $10.00.*

Student Nationalism in China, *1927-1937 by John Israel. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966.—xiii, 253 pp. $7.50.*

The decade 1927-37 is one of the most important in the history of the Chinese Communist party. It is also unquestionably one of the most obscure. The work hitherto published has not succeeded in clearly establishing either the evolution of Mao's own position on the principal issues, or the precise composition of the factions in the party with which he contended. It is, therefore, a cause for rejoicing that in the course of a single year two books should have been published which examine in detail the history of the Chinese Communist party and Mao's role in it during this period.

Both John Rue and Shanti Swarup have made a most useful contribution to our knowledge of Chinese communism. Given the fragmentary and contradictory nature of the primary source materials available, it is not surprising that their interpretations should frequently diverge. Apart from this, the very dissimilar methodological approaches of the authors have led them to present events in a different light even when they are basically in agreement regarding the facts. Mr. Swarup is a political scientist bent on elaborating a general theory regarding the causes of rev-

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olution and stability. He presents not a chronological account of the history of the Chinese Communist movement, but a systematic analysis of the policies defended by Mao and his rivals in various domains: relations with the peasantry, relations with the proletariat, the appeal to nationalist sentiments, and relations with the Comintern. In his view, Mao developed in the course of the years 1927-34 a "triple synthesis" between national revolution, social revolution, and a strategy of gradual advance from a limited territorial base.

This approach has the advantage of raising basic issues in stimulating fashion. Unfortunately Mr. Swarup is sometimes led by his passion for generalization to lump together facts from different periods without taking account of the radical changes in circumstances and policies which often occurred within a very short interval. Thus he telescopes (pp. 87-88) Comintern advocacy of preparing for a revolutionary upsurge in August 1927 and in February 1928, without taking note of the fact that in the autumn of 1927 Moscow actually called for the *formation* of Soviets.

As a historian, Mr. Rue is less interested in model-building and more interested in the facts. His book breaks new ground in many respects. But he also sometimes allows his judgment to be colored, not by a desire for logical consistency, but by his admiration for Mao Tse-tung, "one of the master politicians of our era, a subtle thinker who adapted the Marxism of old Europe to the demands of the Chinese revolution." Though he is not uncritical in his evaluation of the Maoist reconstruction of party history, he is, nevertheless, inclined to argue that at any given moment Mao took the position which he believes he should have taken.

Two or three examples will illustrate the differences between the two books. One of the most obscure and significant issues is that of Mao's agrarian policies. The current official line is that throughout the period 1927-34 these were relatively moderate, though it is admitted that Mao's first land law, adopted in December 1928 on the Chingkangshan, made the "mistake" of confiscating all land, including that of the rich peasants. Mr. Rue, who provides the first full translation of this early land law, explains (pp. 110-15) its radical provisions by pressure from the Central Committee which had forced Mao to alter his earlier policies. He takes this line despite the fact that, as he himself points out, only a few months later Moscow reproved not Mao, but the Li Li-san leadership in Shanghai for its policy of alliance with the rich peasants. Mr. Swarup holds that in 1928 Mao was still expecting relatively rapid victory and, therefore, opposed collaboration with intermediate classes such as the rich peasants. He observes very pertinently (p. 125) that if the radical provisions of the

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1928 land law had been forced on Mao by his rivals in the party, these policies would be explained today in Peking not as a mistake due to inexperience, but as the result of a "deviation."

The difficulty in dealing with events such as these in the years 1927-29 lies in the lack of sources, especially of contemporary texts of Mao's own writings and speeches. The period of the Kiangsi Soviet Republic of 1931-34 is, if possible, even more obscure, but for a different reason. The documentation is much more voluminous, and includes several periodicals in which Mao published a large number of items. But in view of the fact that at this time Mao's power was strictly limited by his superiors in the party hierarchy, it is necessary to determine in each case, in the light of other evidence, whether a given document corresponds to what Mao actually thought, or to what he was forced to say.

In the face of these difficulties, it would be presumptuous of any reviewer to state categorically that the conclusions at which Shanti Swarup and John Rue have arrived after lengthy and painstaking research are wrong on a given point. One does have the impression, however, that both authors allow their reading of the evidence to be affected by their overall view of Mao's line. An example of this is their handling of the so-called Fukien rebellion in the autumn of 1933, when the Nationalist 19th Route Army rose in revolt against Chiang Kai-shek because of his reluctance to fight the Japanese. Since 1936 Mao has denounced the failure of the Communists to unite actively with the Fukien rebels as an extremely grave error which contributed to the catastrophic defeat that ended in the Long March. But the record of his own contemporary statements is an extremely ambiguous one. He was sharply critical of the rebels while the problem of cooperation with them was under active consideration, and violently hostile once they had been suppressed by Chiang Kai-shek. Shanti Swarup altogether ignores this evidence, and treats the matter (pp. 188-89, 195-98) as though it were beyond question that Mao actively favored collaboration throughout. The only explanation one can find for this interpretation is that Mr. Swarup takes it as axiomatic that Mao desired collaboration with the "national bourgeoisie"; hence it is impossible that he should have opposed uniting with the patriotic rebels of Fukien. John Rue's account is more balanced, though he leaves the impression (pp. 260-61) that in his heart Mao was probably favorable to the rebels. But his version of this episode contains an extraordinary example of his selective use of sources. Citing a former Red Army commander, Kung Ch'u, to the effect that Mao was under house arrest in the summer of 1934, he observes that according to Kung, Mao's disgrace "resulted from his activities during the Fukien rebellion" (p. 263). He neglects to tell the reader that the "actions" in question consisted, according to the

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author cited, in categorically opposing all collaboration with the Fukien rebels.

More generally, while Mr. Rue's intelligence and energy frequently compel admiration, his habit of citing information taken from secondary works as though he had himself extracted it from the primary sources often excites misgivings. This is particularly flagrant in the case of the so-called "Bureau of Information Collection," consisting of materials held by the Ministry of Justice in Taiwan. Mr. Rue lists this collection as the very first item in his bibliography, and frequently cites it in the notes, but in most instances it is apparent that his information has come from Hsiao Tso-liang's *Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement 1930-1934* (1961). Another illustration is to be found in Mr. Rue's Appendix C, which is presented as though it had come directly from a confidential inner-party periodical of late 1927, but in fact is a fragment obviously taken from a secondary compilation.

John Israel's monograph is not as broad in scope as the two books already discussed, but it deals with one of the central factors in the political evolution of China during the period 1927-37. With admirable clarity and scrupulous objectivity, Mr. Israel traces the development of the student movement in China in the face of the efforts by both Kuomintang and Communists to court the youth of the country. He shows how the Chinese students, initially reticent toward the Communists because of misgivings aroused by their radical tactics in the years immediately following 1927, were later won over by the slogan of resistance to Japan. Meanwhile the Kuomintang had progressively undermined its own position by its cautious policy toward Japan and by its failure to offer the students an outlet for their desire to serve their country. Thus, although the great anti-Japanese movement which began on December 9, 1935, was not (as the official Peking historiography now claims) planned and organized by the Communists, the latter were soon able to assume the leadership of the forces of student protest. This evolution continued during the war, so that in 1945 Mao faced Chiang Kai-shek with the support of the vast majority of China's radical intelligentsia. It was the combination of this appeal to the elite with the mobilization of the peasant masses for both national and social revolution, described by Messrs. Swarup and Rue, which constituted Mao's original and devastatingly effective formula for the conquest of power.

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Ideology and Organization in Communist China *by Franz Schurmann. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966.—xlvi, 540 pp. $12.50.*

To my mind this pioneering work is the most valuable single study of Communist China that has been published to date. There are important omissions in Professor Schurmann's book, in particular the absence—which he acknowledges in his introduction—of any detailed consideration of the organizational role of the People's Liberation Army. There are, too, conceptual weaknesses such as, when dealing with the problem of centralization versus decentralization, a failure to distinguish adequately the political and economic dimensions of this question. In effect, Schurmann concentrates only on the degree to which economic decision-making powers are in the hands of basic production units. But the cumulative effect on this reader as he ate his way through the pages of the volume was that here at last is a study of Communist Chinese society which transcends mere intelligence gathering and policy-oriented analysis to reach the heights of genuine scholarship. Given the still underdeveloped character of our study of contemporary China, this is a major achievement and it is certain to inspire other social scientists to follow and extend the path which Schurmann has opened.

The central theme of this volume is "contradiction." Contradiction is the key to Marxist ideology, the "handle" by means of which the Chinese Communist leadership has both understood and attempted to transform the society it rules. Ironically, it was the contradiction between what Mao aspired to achieve with rapidity and the real constraints of Chinese society which led the regime into such serious troubles in the "Great Leap Forward" period. In his seven chapters—which deal in turn with ideology, party, government, management, control, cities, and villages—Professor Schurmann skillfully examines in several contexts such contradictions as "red and expert," centralization and decentralization, bureaucracy and management, the traditional rural system of work organization and the Maoist vision of a radical transformation of the technological and social basis of agriculture which permeate Chinese Communist society. For the most part, the book limits itself to the years 1949-60, but both its data and analysis are of immense aid in understanding the most recent developments in China. The work is based on a thorough examination of the extensive Chinese documentation and on interviews in Hong Kong with refugees from the mainland. Further illuminated by a broad knowledge of pre-1949 Chinese history and society, it will, I predict, become a classic in its field.

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Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam *by Douglas Pike. Cambridge, Mass., the M.I.T. Press, 1966.—xx, 490 pp. $8.95.*

Knowing your enemy does not in itself guarantee victory, but failure to know him is no way to win. The French made no serious attempt to study the revolutionary war techniques that eventually defeated them in Vietnam, until it was too late. The Americans, stepping into the power vacuum left by the departing French, did not immediately grasp the nature of the challenge to the regime they supported—that of the late Ngo Dinh Diem. Douglas Pike, in this detailed and immensely painstaking study of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, has made a major attempt to fill what might be called the "understanding gap."

It is, with relatively minor reservations, a very successful attempt. The author was able to draw on his six years' experience in Vietnam as an official of the United States Information Agency; he wrote his book during a year's research leave spent at the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The outcome is a work that is both locally authentic and scholarly in research and analysis.

One misapprehension Mr. Pike effectively removes is the widespread notion that the NLF is a profoundly ideological movement, with its corollary, that the Vietcong guerrillas fight the way they do because they are fanatical believers in their own cause. As the author points out, ideology —though important with the hard core of Communists who control the movement—is not a major ingredient in its successes. The NLF turned itself into a formidable instrument of subversive war because of its complex and highly disciplined organization, using selective terrorism to compel obedience. Mr. Pike is not, of course, the first to make this discovery. As Sir Robert Thompson, the former head of the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam, pointed out in *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, the destruction of the enemy's subversive apparatus is, or ought to be, the Number One priority target of a government threatened by revolutionary war. What Mr. Pike contributes, above all, is a previously unparalleled wealth of information to clarify the birth and growth of the NLF. This reviewer knows of no other single work in which this information can be found.

Not the least interesting part of this book is the initial historical section, in which the author sketches Vietnam's history and traces the origins of the NLF through the maze of clandestine societies that flourished in Vietnam under French rule, and, of course, through its "parent company," the Viet Minh. The analogy with the secret societies is perhaps slightly strained, but it is true enough that the deeply ingrained Vietna-

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mese habit of clandestine political action provided the Communist Lao Dong party of North Vietnam with a fertile soil in which to plant fresh seedlings of subversion when the 1954 Geneva Agreements broke down.

One's minor reservations must now be stated. The author announces his interest in communication and declares that he is addressing "the general reader—the concerned American." He does not, however, achieve this object, for it may be doubted whether the general reader will struggle through Mr. Pike's communicative obstacles to the end. For the specialist and those with a real need to master the subject, this is an invaluable handbook.

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Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World *by Barrington Moore Jr. Boston, Beacon Press, 1966.—xix, 559 pp. $10.00.*

This work represents a major contribution to the field of "comparative studies in society and history," to use the title of a journal prominent for its publication of studies which, like Professor Moore's, lie on the margins of several academic disciplines. Strategies of research and exposition in such studies are complex. They involve choices between a case-by-case presentation or an analytic perspective used to move back and forth between two or more cases; also the number of cases considered for comparison tends to be related to the depth to which any single line of analysis can be pursued. In the face of such dilemmas Professor Moore has chosen a very broad canvas, dealing in successive chapters with England, France, the United States, China, Japan, and India during the last two or three hundred years. The classic comparativists typically chose a relatively narrow focus like the implications of equality or of the secular incentives implicit in religious doctrines, and then revealed the structural interrelations of societies by examining the manifold ramifications of that single starting point. Compared with them Professor Moore is more ambitious. Like Marx, he has chosen a central production relation as the fulcrum of historical change, but in a suggestive reversal of the Marxian canon he emphasizes the relations of lord and peasant in agrarian societies on the threshold of the modern world. If in the mid-nineteenth century Marx chose capitalists and workers as historical dramatis personae, the Russian and Chinese revolutions appear now to prompt a reappraisal of Western history in terms of the agrarian sector. Still, Marx chose to

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analyze England in depth because to him it was the classic country of capitalism, his forays into other societies were correspondingly brief, and he believed he could extrapolate from his analysis because his work was inspired by a belief in the progressive potential of scholarship and of the forces of production. Intellectually, the most noteworthy feature of Professor Moore's effort is that for him scholarship has become animated by a pessimistic commitment to revolutionary coercion made necessary ultimately by the vested interests that oppose change toward a less oppressive world (p. 508). It is not clear to this reader why scholarship or revolution have value for the author, who expects no lightening of human burdens from either, though this void may have an existentialist appeal.

According to Professor Moore peasant revolutions were prevented by various coercive measures in England, France, and the United States, but the stranglehold of vested agrarian interests was broken sufficiently to allow the development of democratic institutions. In China and Russia peasant revolutions resulted in Communist dictatorships and in successful industrialization, if the Russian experience can be extrapolated to China. In Japan (and Germany) internal upheavals were prevented by revolutions from above which entrenched traditional ruling classes and led to industrialization and Fascist regimes. All these developments occurred at a deplorable cost in human suffering. But even the avoidance of revolution in a country like India meant the failure to break the hold of traditional vested interests, the consequent failure of industrialization, and hence widespread human suffering also as the price of peaceful change. The author traces the emergence of democratic and dictatorial institutions to the outcome of the crises through which in each of the countries examined the old world of lord-peasant relations was drastically transformed. Many details of these analyses are fascinating, but some large questions also remain. The English Civil War, the French Revolution, the American Civil War, the Chinese Revolution, and the Meiji Restoration of Japan are considered on a par, irrespective of the time and setting in which they occurred, because Professor Moore considers social change primarily the product of forces internal to the society. Yet the commercialization of sixteenth-century English agriculture is equivalent to similar processes in nineteenth-century Japan only if the international setting of both is neglected, and yet this setting contributed materially to the democratic development in one case and the dictatorial development in the other. In a discussion of the "democratic route to modern society" we learn that the balance of power between crown and landed aristocracy (p. 430) is a basic precondition, yet this is mentioned in the context of Mogul India, while its relevance for England (which would have forced analysis back to the Norman Conquest) is precluded by con-

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centration on the English Civil War. Again, why discuss the social origin of American democracy by reference to the Civil War rather than the American Revolution?

Questions like these as well as more detailed queries can be multiplied. In years to come this impressive work may well be considered a major landmark in the development of Marxist thought in its period of disillusionment. What remains of that legacy is a horror at oppression and a sophisticated version of historical materialism, two orientations which are naturally epitomized in an account that focuses attention on revolutions. What holds the interpretation together is the organization of evidence from the great revolutions "by a system of direct reference to the present," which defines what Herbert Butterfield has termed the Whig interpretation of history.

REINHARD BENDIX
University of California, Berkeley

A Reappraisal of Marxian Economics *by Murray Wolfson. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1966.—xii, 220 pp. $6.75.*

Professor Wolfson sets out to give an appraisal of Marxian economics with a great air of impartiality and high scientific objectivity, but in effect the book comes to nothing very much more than Böhm-Bawerk without the witty cracks.

The discussion of philosophy sets the tone: "Marx substituted Matter for the deity" (p. 19).

For us today the Hegelian metaphysic adds nothing to Ricardo's economic analysis that cannot be better expressed without it. The interesting question, all the same, is whether for Marx it added something or whether it was merely the peculiar way in which he explained Ricardo to himself.

It is absurd to suppose that Marx invented the labor theory of value or the law of falling profits. These were commonplaces of classical economics. Marx believed himself to be explaining them in a new way, which related them to his diagnosis of the operation of the capitalist system, not establishing them as true.

Marx knew very well that the labor theory of value, *as a theory of relative prices,* is imperfect, because "prices of production" (which allow a uniform rate of profit to all capitalists) are not proportional to labor value, but this does not mean that the labor theory *as a theory of distribution* is not cogent. Still less does it mean that the marginal productivity theory is.

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Following Böhm-Bawerk, Wolfson attacks the easy game of the theory of relative prices and thinks that by doing so he has knocked out the theory of exploitation.

However, he provides a new solution for a theory of distribution based on demand. Marx, he maintains, treats "the wages fund as an historically determined portion of the capital fund which society on a class-antagonistic basis decides to spend on labour power." He then puts labor and capital into a box diagram, and shows how the real wage is established where their respective indifference curves in wages and employment are tangential (p. 116).

This at least has the merit of starting from the position that real wages are what they are. But surely we should then go on to consider how accumulation is affected by relative shares and how capital changes through time. Wolfson is still worse than Marx at confusing stocks with flows.

Even when Marx (following Ricardo) is saying something perfectly straightforward—for instance, that, when a constant share of total income is being invested, a change in technique which raises the capital/labor ratio is likely to cause unemployment—Wolfson cannot make it out (p. 105).

The book ends with a paean of praise to present-day capitalism, including the beneficial effects on development of poor countries of American investment. (It is noticeable that Galbraith's rather soothing book, *American Capitalism*, is quoted, but not his acid *Affluent Society.)*

Presumably there will be a ready demand for this book from professors who will be delighted to give it to their students in order to get them into a thorough muddle and leave them with the impression that Marx was a silly old duffer whom they need not bother about.

JOAN ROBINSON
Cambridge University

Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power *by Andrew Shonfield. London, Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965.—xvi, 456 pp. $10.50.*

Shonfield's volume is the first serious and scholarly review of the modern capitalist revolution. Its author, director of studies at the Royal Institute of Economic Affairs, considers it an account of a "thorough metamorphosis of capitalism" since World War II, demonstrating, among

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other things, that private large-scale enterprise subjected to public power and planning has become an enormously fruitful productive and distributive social instrument. In considerable measure, it is superseding nineteenth-century socialism as a means of overcoming poverty and want. In his youth Shonfield had some sympathy with the Socialist conception, namely, that to accomplish planning and social objectives, the state had to own enterprise. Twenty years of postwar experience suggests that publicly-controlled and planned private enterprise can do as well; the "property" element has ceased to be a power factor to be overcome.

This book should have been reviewed earlier in these pages. Now it is relevant to note the recently published book by Professor John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State*, as a companion volume. Galbraith, like Shonfield, considers the new phase of "capitalism" as different in motivation, kind, and result.

Shonfield accepts the corporate revolution and with it big business, science-based and pledged to planners. Hence his emphasis on economic organization whose operations are carried on by private enterprise but whose grand strategy eventually falls to government economic planners. He compares the experience of Britain, France, Germany, and the United States; his chapter on "Planning in General" and the role in it of independent intellectuals is classic. Politics must always enter; "A standing committee of the nation's major interest groups working in collaboration with a team of high-powered economic experts and taking issues right out of politics" (p. 236) would be a danger to democracy. The government-appointed representatives can and must maintain a dialogue with the public itself. Desires, objectives, hopes, and values are continually changing. The economic machine must take account of these changes as they are registered in political affairs. This is the business of politicians rather than of corporate managers.

American doctrine and practice, Shonfield finds, is currently uncertain. It has not quite decided whether, in dealing with economic enterprise, the political state is bargaining or giving orders. He is astonished at American use of federal courts to lay down economic policy, as, for instance, in antitrust matters. Policy should be determined in general aspects by the Congress and in specific aspects by administrative agencies, since policy belongs to expert political representatives rather than to judges. "In the traditional British system there is no place for the use of the courts to further some evolving purpose of public administration. In America there is" (p. 328).

His conclusions are interesting. Property relationships—notably between stockholder and corporation—are no longer as important as "either revolutionary proletarian or conservative bourgeois philosophy alleged."

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He foresees expansion of the supervisory role of public power over the private sector. This may reverse the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. At long last, all three must cooperate, but it is the public official who must be responsible to—and fortified by—public opinion.

Compare this with the recent dictum of Professor John Kenneth Galbraith in *The New Industrial State* that purely economic goals are diminishing in relative importance and are, progressively, a less safe guide for planning, that the industrial system, unlike its economic antecedents, to serve its intellectual and scientific needs brings into existence a community that will reject industrial monopoly of social purpose.

Shonfield's is a ground-breaking book. The literature of the mid-twentieth century capitalist revolution is at length emerging.

ADOLF A. BERLE
Columbia University

The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations *by Robert Ardrey. New York, Atheneum, 1966.—xii, 390 pp. $6.95.*

This book should be subtitled "An Autobiography of Primitive Thought." Ardrey's book proves his main point regarding continuity of behavior in modern man with lower animal forms. What remains a difficult task is to ascertain which ancestors are most responsible for this thought—planarian worms, lemurs, slime-molds, or the brash cock robin. If this appears vindictive, the reader is correct: I would prefer to have my time back. Actually, according to Ardrey's own thesis regarding the instinctual basis of human behavior, the question has a sense of fairness in it. Initially, my reaction was that nobody had really understood Ardrey's aim—here was one of the best satires written—but further reading led unerringly to the conclusion that the author is indeed serious.

Nowhere in this book will one find a closely, tightly knit, reasoned statement or hypothesis which interrelates a number of scattered variables such as territorial behavior, aggressiveness, amity, enmity, stimulation, security, identity, and natural selection, and which could be tested for logical consistency or empirical support. Instead, in dramatic and scattered fashion the author parades a plethora of behavioral instincts (some of his own invention) under the protective wrapper of "the new biology" (which, alas, is denied to our childrens' education), and does little more than assert that anyone in disagreement with his view of man

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and man's instincts is ignorant, a clinger to religion, a throwback to an older generation of non-informed biologists. In short, Ardrey has almost constructed a religion, very much along Freudian lines, where dissent or skepticism is explained by the theory itself. Perhaps this is fine drama; it is hardly science. When Ardrey says that this is a "personal inquiry" he is not exaggerating. Unfortunately, the "personal" aspects enter into the argument. We are constantly reminded of his personal acquaintances, drinking buddies, and the recent budding generation of baboon watchers, all brought to the readers' attention as authoritative. (The possibility that many on this list of heroes very likely might disagree with Ardrey is never mentioned.) We learn of Ardrey's competence and professional background; after all, he once lectured on anthropology in one of the booths at the Chicago World's Fair in 1933.

The methodology needs explanation. Ardrey starts by making a general assertion as if it were heretical, for example, that man's behavior is a product of evolution. He expands this into the non-sequitur that man carries around some particular behavioral pattern from his ancestry. Next, he recounts animal studies (it may be slime-molds, birds, or penguins) to prove that behavior, for instance, territorial defense, has an instinctual, innate basis. One is warned that if he dissents and does not see the instinctual basis of human international behavior, he is guilty of not believing in evolution, and a sort of "see-there-I-told-you-so" mentality takes over; Ardrey feels he has proved his point. Nowhere does one find a single whit of evidence provided for human instincts; that is unnecessary according to Ardrey's methodology. We simply jump to collective farms, national character, or international relationships to prove the innate basis of individual men's behavior. Associated with these tactics is the ever occurring assertion that Ardrey is breaking new ground. The phrase "Social Darwinism" never appears in this book. Too bad, for that is essentially the message of the book. Ardrey is colossally uninformed if he thinks that there have never been attempts to reduce human group behavior to a few animal instincts. He is absurd if he believes that international bodies have never before been seen as organisms. Ardrey accepts group selection theory as proven, even though most biologists know that this is an area of considerable debate. There is misinformation about the ubiquity of primate territoriality, and many of the recent advances in the eufunctions of spacing behavior, particularly in terms of disease resistance and adaptation, are omitted.

There are some good points to this book. It is well written and the reader will appreciate the dramatist's skill. He will learn something about the behaviors of different animals (often fascinating) without having to read the dry, original scientific reports; that is, if he is willing to trust

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the selectiveness of Ardrey's perception and accuracy of reportage. The type is large, his wife's illustrations are succinct and dramatic, and the book reads quickly—a distinct advantage for the reader. People with various prejudices for and against Italians, Jews, Black South Africans, free enterprise, and collective farms will be treated to the end products of Ardrey's thought processes. The Italians are organized like the Lemurs. Black South Africans now prospering under the largesse of apartheid policies will (eighty-five per cent) rise up in indignant wrath and defense of their white benefactors should any liberation attempts be made on the part of their brothers in the rest of Africa. In short, this book is an apology and rationalization for imperialism, Pax Americana, laissez-faire, Social Darwinism, and that greatest of all evolutionary devvelopments, capitalism.

Of course, there is a drawback which Ardrey takes pains to elaborate upon. Those intruded upon gain a certain energy from the fact that the territory is theirs, so intruders must take into account the likely intensity of reaction to their intrusion. This framework will surely interest those who have studied the history of the Third Reich. One thing Ardrey does not explain is why, when a nation (organism?) has ample territory, abundance of food, resources, stimulation, and security, it nevertheless wants more and more. Territorial instincts, energy gains and losses, slime-molds, noyaus, lower birds, identity, stimulation, amity-enmity-hazard are hardly necessary, and one fails to see how they offer any richer understanding than simple *greed* and *stupidity*.

In the final chapter, on the Three Faces of Janus, one has the distinct impression that at last Ardrey has raised the really important issues, that somewhere in all this anthropomorphizing and animalizing of man's behavior there are truths, and that Ardrey is on to something very important. Perhaps his next book will do it. This one fails and in a maddening, glib way.

It is only fitting to close this review with a quote from Ardrey: "Men unlike mockingbirds, have the capacity for systematic self-delusion."

RALPH L. HOLLOWAY JR.
Columbia University

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World Politics and Tension Areas *by Feliks Gross. New York, New York University Press, 1966.—xvii, 377 pp. $10.00.*

This is a large, informative, and unsystematic book about social conflict. "Tension area" may refer to the place where a conflict occurs, or the parties involved, or the issues at stake. The conflicts that interest Professor Gross are international or have international implications, and they exhibit or threaten violence. He attributes such conflicts to two principal causes—ethnic antagonism and ideological disagreement—recognizing that both causes may appear in the same tension area. He characterizes his viewpoint as "problem-oriented" and "normative." In other words, he is interested in ways of preventing the eruption of violence in intergroup relations. He is no utopian, wanting to banish conflict itself from the human scene, but he believes that differences of interest can be resolved by peaceful and legitimate means through a "network of institutions" and he takes an optimistic view of the possibility that mankind may be capable of adopting *pluralism* and *universalism* in the reasonably near future—that is, be willing to agree on non-violent forms of group competition while gradually extinguishing international and internecine war.

The book contains three quite different kinds of material—a set of case histories, a discussion of theoretical concepts, and an inventory of the world's current tension areas. The case histories are of uneven length and style, but highly informative. Two of them, for no apparent reason, are relegated to an appendix, and one of these is by another author. They cover an Indian reservation, a town in Asia Minor, a region in Yugoslavia, Silesia between the wars, Crakow, New York, Venezuela, Central-Eastern Europe, and the Horn of Africa. Despite the range of this material, the composite conflict model, in which multiple, neighboring, hostile ethnic groups maneuver for relative advantage, has a Balkan appearance.

The concepts and theories discussed do not constitute a theoretical system, but offer a wide assortment of perspectives. Among the key terms are *process approach* and *action approach, horizontal* and *vertical goal structures, ethnic distance,* and the *self-segregation of minorities.* The exposition is sometimes clear and sometimes undecipherable. What is one to make of a paragraph that reads, "A latent tendency toward a pluralistic system is paramount. Toleration of different groups is not enough" (p. 311).

The briefest but perhaps most valuable portion of the book is a description and classification of twenty-eight tension areas as of June 1964—an inventory of the active and potential crises that seemed to threaten

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the peace of the world at that moment in time. Eight of them were in Asia, six in the Near East, seven in Africa, four in Latin America, and four in Europe. They were classified as primary if they involved major powers and secondary if only minor powers were concerned, and further classified as critical, near-critical, consequential, distant, and non-critical. The list is not unchallengeable. Zanzibar and New Zealand were included, but not Rhodesia or the Dominican Republic. Malaysia was rated as near-critical but there was no mention of Formosa. Nonetheless, the effort is worthwhile, and such a list might be useful if issued annually or semi-annually so that students of international affairs might follow the shifting pattern of the world's woes more conveniently.

THEODORE CAPLOW
Columbia University

The Things That Are Caesar's *by Milton Katz. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.—227, x pp. $4.95.*

Few academicians have had such diversified and high-level experience in the administration of governmental affairs as Milton Katz has enjoyed. He now for the first time offers us a book containing his reflections on a primary problem of government.

At the outset he roundly states the issue—it takes qualities of one kind to win power, but qualities of another kind to govern, an issue that has been given much consideration since the time of Machiavelli. What can we learn from history concerning the means to develop "an accommodation between the acquisition of power and the constructive conduct of government"? The exploration of this question is the promise of the book.

The treatment of the question is eclectic and rather discontinuous. We have first three synoptic accounts of the seizure of supreme power in times of trouble. The first reviews the break-up of the long-established Roman Republic when Sulla seized control to quell the disturbance created by the agrarian reforms of the Gracchi and restore the authority and privilege of the old aristocracy, a short-lived usurpation followed by Julius Caesar's more masterly but aborted endeavor to create a unified Roman empire. Was Caesar then one of the rare leaders who possessed both the art of winning power and the art of governing? Mommsen gave an emphatic "yes," Ferrero an equally confident "no." And Mr. Katz leaves us to make our choice.

The second exhibit examines the end of the French revolutionary up-

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heavals, with the military triumphs of Napoleon opening the way for him to become first consul and then inexorably emperor. His was a signal instance of the capacity both to seize power and to govern, as became evident with his reorganization of the public finances and his reform of the legal code. Mr. Katz dwells particularly on his possession of one essential qualification for governing well, his recognition that the men who aided him in the attainment of power were not usually the kind of men who could serve him best in the exercise of power; his doctrine for appointments was *la carrière ouverte aux talents*. The further comment may be in order that the men with the capacity to seize power by resort to arms have frequently an insatiate urge to expand that power. This flaw in Napoleon not only destroyed the empire he had established but in the process emasculated France itself for a generation.

We shall pass over the third of this series of exhibits, that of the Congo in the years following the attainment of independence, since this is mainly a case-study of a situation in which for lack of preparatory training, aggravated by the disparate interests of tribal and regional areas, neither the capacity to retain power when seized nor the capacity to govern was manifested.

The second and larger part of the book is addressed to the "accommodation" attained respectively by Prussian Germany, Great Britain, and the United States in the struggle for administrative reform. Germany's major problem was to limit the political prerogative of the military elite in order to assure the expert and relatively independent civil service requisite for an increasingly complex industrial society. Its advancement in this respect was at length wrecked when Hitler converted the civil service into the supine instrument of his will. Mr. Katz goes on to point out the considerable headway the new West German Federal Republic has made in the difficult effort to restore the standards of the civil service.

The account of the British "accommodation" takes up the development of party control over patronage and the process of administrative reform with the opening up of the Indian Civil Service through the establishment of a competitive examination demanding high educational standards, and later by the demarcation of a series of grades in the various branches of home and foreign service. The British system, as evolved in the past century, is acclaimed as a "brilliant accommodation between the factors through which political power is won and the condition required for the effective conduct of government." It is significant, however, that the higher services were recruited almost entirely from the elite universities and the elite "public schools," and that changing conditions and changing attitudes have made a broadening of the base imperative.

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The longest sector of the work is given to the American "accommodation." Though George Washington was plagued by the importunacy of office-seekers, for him and other Founding Fathers the problem of obtaining efficient service was eased by the existence of an educated elite, at a stage when only "gentlemen" were considered eligible. But with the democratic surge under Andrew Jackson and his successors the "spoilers," jobbers, and party heads had their innings. The need for a competent civil service and especially for the selection of qualified career officials became more urgent with the expansion of the role of government and finally with the vastly increased commitments of the United States in world affairs. While some advances have been achieved, the accommodation desiderated by Mr. Katz is still far from being fulfilled. The tasks devolving on government are legion. Unfinished business includes the alleviation of ethnic and racial tensions, the plight of our cities, traffic and housing decay, congestion and stratification, crime and delinquency, welfare provision for young and old, crises that can no longer be met solely under local government. No city, not even—or perhaps least—megalopolis, is an island. Interdependence grows with the advance of technology, which throws new regulatory tasks on special organs of government. There is another major area of governmental service that extends beyond mere regulation into actual management, one hardly alluded to in this book, the operation, in whole or in part, of great enterprises that are not profit-making or that call for initial funding beyond the capacity of private industry or that involve an overall authority that properly belongs only to government.

In the whole section of the work dealing with these accommodations Mr. Katz is thoroughly at home and presents us with an admirable clear-cut selective picture of the processes and problems under consideration. But the initial and major question seems to have fallen by the wayside. We are no longer concerned with Caesar, the ruler with the capacity to win or seize power and who may or may not have the capacity to govern as well, but only with his servants.

R. M. MacIver
Palisades, New York

The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism, 1843-1849 *by Frederick Merk with the collaboration of Lois Bannister Merk. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.—xii, 289, ix pp. $6.95.*

When James Monroe framed his famous pronouncement in 1823, he had reason to apprehend an attempt by the so-called Holy Alliance powers

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to reverse the trend toward independence and republican government in the Americas. He had evidence also of an intention on the part of the Czar's government to expand Russian colonial claims on the Pacific coast. Such measures appeared to endanger not only the material interests but even the security of the United States. Hence the warnings comprising what later became known as the Monroe Doctrine. A quarter-century later American Democratic leaders either convinced themselves or professed conviction that European powers again contemplated interference or colonial acquisitions in North America and the Caribbean area. They—most notably President James K. Polk—reasserted the principles of President Monroe and utilized the alleged dangers as justification for aggressive moves on the part of the United States. Thus the expansionist policies of the Tyler, Polk, Pierce, and Buchanan administrations (for the story is carried a decade beyond the nominal termination date of 1849) were all rationalized in part as measures necessitated by European, mainly British, threats to American security. British "intrusions" into the Oregon country called forth Polk's vigorous assertion of the American claim to "all Oregon"—a claim, however, which he prudently refrained from pushing in full. To the British both Tyler and Polk attributed a scheme to compensate for the economic disaster which the abolition of slavery was alleged to have wrought in their tropical colonies by promoting abolition in competing economies, first in Texas, then in the United States. Their efforts to preserve Texan independence by arranging an agreement with Mexico, and French Premier Guizot's expressed preference for preservation of *l'équilibre des forces* in the Americas, were both deemed to be in violation of the principles of President Monroe and served as partial justification for annexing Texas. Rumors that Mexican debts to British subjects were to be secured by a mortgage on the interior valleys of California induced visions of British occupancy of the priceless harbor of San Francisco Bay, a danger obviously to be warded off through the acquisition of that province by the United States. Even suggestions that European powers might undertake to mediate the quarrel between the United States and Mexico presented the peril of European interference in a new form, and one that might endanger the highly inflated claim of Texas (and the United States) to the Rio Grande as its boundary with Mexico. (A careful contemporary study by State Department Librarian Robert Greenhow demolishing the Texan boundary claim was apparently suppressed.) A race war in Yacatán and an offer by the white minority of sovereignty in exchange for protection, made at the same time to the United States, Britain, and Spain, raised new alarms in minds forever suspicious of British purposes. Coupled with the renewed fear of British designs on Cuba (to be followed presumably by emancipation) it seemed

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to portend a British *mare clausum* in the Gulf and Caribbean as well as a new threat to slavery in the United States. The alarm over Yucatán soon evaporated, but the supposed Cuba menace and the proposed cure through purchase or "detachment" of the island from Spain lingered on to the eve of the Civil War. Professor Merk, though bringing his intensive study to an end with Polk's departure from the White House in 1849, traces the quest for Cuba through the Ostend Manifesto of 1854 and the futile proposals of President Buchanan.

Little of this is new history. Merk's valuable contribution is to highlight the application, or misapplication, of Monroe's principles as pretexts for the overlapping expansionist drives of the period, and especially to show up the fictitious character of the alleged threats from Europe. A painstaking analysis of press opinion in the United States shows that only Democratic journals took the dangers seriously; the Whig press was uniformly skeptical and vied with British papers in denouncing the schemes of Polk and his supporters. How far Tyler, Polk, and company believed their own warnings is not always clear. Altogether there was enough concealment, deceit, and secret maneuver—though the secrets generally leaked—to add up to a decidedly unpleasant story.

JULIUS W. PRATT
University of Notre Dame

Socialism and the Workers in Massachusetts, 1886-1912 *by Henry F. Bedford. Amherst, The University of Massachusetts Press, 1966.—xiii, 315 pp. $6.50.*

The history of American socialism turns on the question of failure. Why did the movement, in contrast to its European counterparts, not develop into a major factor in American politics? The problem has not lacked shrewd interpreters, nor able historical treatment at the national level. But it has not been the focus for intensive investigation of the grass roots of American socialism, where the answer ultimately lies. Now we have a book that does pursue this central issue for the Massachusetts movement during the critical years from 1886 to 1912.

Henry F. Bedford's volume has a great deal to recommend it. The research is thorough. Bedford has made good use of newspapers and journals—always the mainstay for studies of American radicalism—and, despite the disappearance of the records of the state organization, has managed to gather a considerable amount of manuscript material from scattered collections. And the book is constructed with admirable crafts-

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manship, carefully written, and thoughtfully organized. It seems unfortunate that Bedford felt obliged to cover and explain every annual election in his period. The space might better have been devoted to more extended analysis of the sources of Socialist strength and weakness, especially in relation to the major political parties, the trade unions, and its working-class constituency. Still, Bedford's choice does make the book a little more useful as a standard account of the Socialist party in Massachusetts.

At its peak in 1902, the Socialist party (Social Democratic until 1903) polled ten per cent of the vote for state offices. But that success, far from demonstrating the appeal of socialism, reflected the party's ability to play down ideology, to champion moderate, concrete reforms, and to excel at conventional political skills. Unlike De Leon's small band of Socialist Laborites, Massachusetts Socialists paid little heed to doctrine; their bible was Robert Blatchford's *Merrie England*, not Marx's *Capital*. The local pattern of Socialist strength—big in one industrial city, nonexistent in another—revealed the party's utilization of local conditions and dependence on strong local leaders, for instance, James F. Carey of Haverhill and Thomas MacCartney of Rockland. And, like its conservative counterparts, the state party maintained only a casual relationship with the national structure. The strategy of Massachusetts socialism was accommodation to the American political setting.

It did not work for long. The base in the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union evaporated. The major parties appropriated reform planks. And the Roman Catholic Church launched a powerful counterattack. After 1903 the Massachusetts Socialist movement went into a rapid decline. Not only did opportunism fail; it sapped the Socialists of militancy. When the great Lawrence textile strike of 1912 broke out, the state party proved utterly impotent to respond to it.

Bedford's account makes clear the futility of one major option of American socialism; accommodation did not work.

DAVID BRODY
Ohio State University

The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II *by Herbert Feis. Princeton, Princeton University Press, rev. ed., 1966.—vi. 213 pp. $5.00.*

Herbert Feis has revised *Japan Subdued*, his 1961 study of the decision to use the atomic bomb. The brief changes deal in part with the

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scientists' effort to establish international atomic control, but mostly with the now well-known fact that when the bomb's use was decided in 1945, its effect on diplomacy toward Russia was an important consideration. Precisely "how important?" is the remaining issue.

As in 1961 Feis concludes, along with most experts, that in retrospect Japan was thoroughly defeated and would have surrendered, certainly by December 31, 1945, in all likelihood by November 1, 1945 (the scheduled date for a landing on the island of Kyushu). He also believes that had the United States offered a specific warning of the new atomic force, or specific assurances for the Emperor, the war might well have ended, especially if the latter had been fortified by a warning of Russia's forthcoming declaration of war against Japan.

Unfortunately, in his report on the decision itself Feis does not follow up these insights. The United States wished to avoid an invasion—but when Hiroshima was destroyed on August 6, 1945, as noted, the landing on Kyushu (itself a relatively minor operation—initial casualty estimate: 31,000) was still almost three months off. The main invasion of Japan was not scheduled until the spring of 1946. In the weeks before Hiroshima Truman received intercepted messages which showed Japan willing to surrender except for the "formality" of unconditional surrender. The President had previously been advised by Secretaries Grew, Forrestal, and Stimson to change the unconditional surrender formula and offer assurances to the Emperor. He told both Grew and Stimson he had no objection in principle to the changes, but chose not to test before using the bomb whether this available option would end the war. He also chose not to test whether the shock of the expected Soviet declaration of war might produce surrender, as U.S. intelligence and General Marshall advised seemed likely. Nor did he choose to test the effect of assurances for the Emperor *plus* the Soviet war declaration.

Why was the bomb not held off until such options had been tried? Feis leaves this basic question unanswered, but it is not difficult to show that one major reason was that American leaders wished to end the war before Russia was scheduled to enter in early August. Previously, of course, U.S. officials had felt differently, but once they were sure of the new weapon —as Churchill observed at Potsdam—their position changed. Strangely, Feis refuses to credit Churchill's observation, and he relegates to an obscure footnote Forrestal's diary entry which confirms that at Potsdam Secretary of State Byrnes made no bones about the desire to end the war before the Red Army invaded Manchuria. Feis also skips lightly over Byrnes' quite open subsequent confirmations of this powerful motive for ending the war *immediately*—rather than any time in the three months before a landing.

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Though he misses the point in Asia, Feis does realize that political considerations related to Russia in Europe played a role in the bomb decision. The bulk of his revisions describe Secretary of War Stimson's view of the bomb as the "master card" of diplomacy toward Russia and Secretary of State Byrnes' judgment that the threat of the bomb "in his pocket" was needed to force the Soviets to yield in negotiations. Feis also acknowledges that the Potsdam Conference, which centered on European issues, was postponed until the weapon had been tested; he writes that Truman and Stimson calculated the dramatic power of the bomb would help resolve not only the Polish issue, but the ultimate question of Soviet domination of other Eastern European states. These matters were at the center of the President's daily concern as repeated indications Japan was willing to surrender poured in during late July.

Such facts have forced Feis to revise his 1961 judgment that it is "only conjecture" that U.S. officials thought of the bomb as a way to impress Russia. He now writes that "certainly" Secretaries Byrnes and Stimson felt this way, and "probably" the President did, too. Unfortunately, however, Feis stops short of the overriding issue without clarifying just how important he believes such considerations were, and, as in 1961, he ends up with the blanket judgment that the atomic decision "ought not to be censured."

GAR ALPEROVITZ
Harvard University

Kennedy Campaigning: The System and the Style as Practiced by Senator Edward Kennedy *by Murray B. Levin. Boston, Beacon Press, 1966.—xix, 313 pp. $5.95.*

The dust jacket of this book reminds us that "the Kennedys have won three congressional campaigns, five senatorial campaigns, one presidential campaign, and numerous convention and primary fights." The book is a study of "how the Kennedys do it," as demonstrated by Senator Edward Kennedy's campaign for the Democratic nomination in Massachusetts in 1962.

The author subjects the campaign to description and analysis in quite considerable depth. The five principal chapters, which deal respectively with the campaign that preceded the Democratic state convention, the convention itself (June 8, 1962), the primary campaign that followed the

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convention, the television debates between Kennedy and McCormack, and campaign costs, average fifty-seven pages in length. They utilize all likely sources of information and they cover every conceivable aspect of the Kennedy campaign effort. It becomes apparent early that Kennedy conducted a veritable Project Overkill designed to demolish, not merely to defeat, his opponent. But if the candidate waged a "sledgehammer primary fight" against McCormack (p. 236), the author himself has subjected the campaign to sledgehammer treatment. The particularities of "the system and the style" are here, and in detail.

Professor Levin summarizes his findings as early as page ten, where he avers that "Edward Kennedy's candidacy for the United States Senate was essentially based on three facts: He was the attractive, energetic brother of the President of the United States; he was a Kennedy; and he was able to raise the funds necessary to wage a major state-wide campaign." He develops this theme over the next 275 pages, recurrently emphasizing expert staffing, careful planning, attention to detail, variety in techniques employed, lavishness in financing, and, perhaps above all, the attractiveness, the effectiveness, the saleability of the candidate. He abundantly documents the conclusion that the campaign was a thoroughly professional one financed within an inch of its life.

The enduring lessons of the campaign—and of the book—are reserved for Chapter VI, "The Political Campaign as Pseudo Event." The thesis here is that things are not what they seem, that the "intelligently managed and adequately financed" political campaign generates a labyrinth of contrived or "pseudo" events which may have only a strained relation to reality, and that the candidate that emerges is similarly unreal. He is—not he *projects*—an image. Physically he looks like the individual who entered the contest months before, but in many significant respects—in philosophy, in temperament, in personality—he is a "synthetic, fictitious" public person.

The portent of all this for democracy is frightening, yet the optimist may find cause for hope. Can the image-makers *really* sell a sow's ear as a silk purse? Given the state of technical knowledge as at January 1, 1967, one is justified in concluding that a tonic to restore hair or a pill to dissolve tumors is phony on its face, but political candidates are not to be judged so readily. There is always the possibility that the candidate will turn out to be livewithable, that even an actor will serve better as governor than the knowing anticipated from his campaign. So for the hero of this book, who bids fair, by combining native intelligence, energy, and an ear for sound advice, to develop into a useful member of the Senate. Mr. Levin has subjected a system and a style of political campaigning to cold analysis, but has not had harsh words for the cam-

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paigner. There is evidence that he would join the reviewer in wishing the Senator well.

ROSCOE C. MARTIN
University of California, Berkeley

The Historian and the Diplomat: The Role of History and Historians in American Foreign Policy *edited by F. L. Loewenheim. New York, Harper and Row, 1967.—ix, 213 pp. $6.95.*

This interesting but somewhat frustrating volume is made up of lectures given at Rice University in 1964 by A. J. Mayer, Herbert Feis, and Louis Morton, enclosed between an introductory essay by F.L. Loewenheim and appendixes by Woodrow Wilson, Thorstein Veblen, and F. J. Turner. The ostensible theme is the role "history—what people knew and thought about the past—has played in the development of American foreign policy since the era of the First World War" (p. vii). But the book suffers from a lack of rigor in the definition of terms and issues. History, for example, may influence the making of policy as comprehensive theory, or as isolated analogy, or, in Herbert Feis' term, as memory. It may offer short-run predictions about specific political developments or long-run predictions about broad social and intellectual tendencies. It may serve as the cause or as the rationalization of decisions. A systematic approach surely would have noted such distinctions and sought a general formulation of the problem. Instead, *The Historian and the Diplomat* is a collection of essays casting fitful, if sometimes penetrating, light on questions never stated with precision.

Professor Loewenheim shakes the faith of the reader by misquoting Santayana in his opening sentence. For the rest, his long essay is an amiable defense of American foreign policy which he sees as filled through the centuries with moral and intellectual continuity and wisdom. In the course of his argument, he takes on George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and Hans Morgenthau, about which it can only be said that he has struck at kings without killing them. He concludes, "It is not too much to hope that from a renewed study of the U. S. record in world affairs, we may approach the events of our days with greater faith in the American tradition and through such faith reach out to build a better world in our time" (p. 71). His piece will be read with gratification in the Department of State.

Professor Mayer's perceptive essay considers Wilson as a New Historian plunged into foreign affairs. This perspective leads to the point,

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too often overlooked, that the adjustment of internal social conflict remained a basic factor in Wilson's search for peace; in the end, "he became a reluctant but indispensable accomplice of political forces considerably more conservative than himself" (p. 87).

Mr. Feis' "Notes on Historical Record-keeping, the Role of Historians, and the Influence of Historical Memories During the Era of the Second World War" is not only a rewarding discussion of research problems in contemporary history but a brilliant and substantial contribution to the history of the Second World War. With his usual crispness of analysis and pungency of style, Mr. Feis assesses significant personalities and problems of the war years. Professor Morton's essay on "The Cold War War and American Scholarship" will disappoint those looking for a *Studies on the Left* exposé of the corruptions allegedly wrought in the writing of American history by the decision to oppose Communist aggression after 1945. Instead, he has written a sometimes discursive but always intelligent account of the role of history and historians in the era of the cold war.

Some of the best value in the book rests in the appendixes. One can find there the full text of Woodrow Wilson's extraordinary speech at the Congress of Arts and Science in St. Louis in 1904 on "The Variety and Unity of History"—a superb analysis of the nature and purpose of history. And, after a couple of turgid and inconsequential pieces by Veblen, there is a surprising memorandum addressed by Frederick Jackson Turner to the European situation in 1918. Turner argues here for the political party as a means of cohesion across frontiers, enabling the voters to transcend the lines of national division and "to act continentally" (p. 206). His analysis points, I think, to the most neglected road to working European unity today.

Wilson in his St. Louis speech observed apropos the *Cambridge Modern History*, "no amount of uniform type and sound binding can metamorphose a series of individual essays into a book" (p. 181). This, alas, is abundantly true of *The Historian and the Diplomat*. Yet enough remains in the way of random insight and illumination to make this volume of considerable interest to the student of the relationship between public policy and the historical consciousness.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR.
City University of New York

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Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility *by Donald G. Morgan. Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966.—xv, 490 pp. $8.95.*

That sapless branch of our national government, the Congress, which I took to task in my short volume, *Congress: The Sapless Branch* (1964), is under attack again. The critic this time is Professor Donald Morgan of Mount Holyoke College, and his complaint is that Congress is not meeting its responsibilities as an interpreter and applier of the Constitution.

This is an interesting theory, and one which I am not surprised to note meets with the favor of my good and genial friend from North Carolina, Senator Sam Ervin. Unfortunately the efforts of Senator Ervin and other like-minded representatives of the states of the Old Confederacy to remedy this failing have tended to emphasize the negative rather than the positive elements in the Constitution.

There seems to be an unfortunate tendency among scholars and politicians to think of the Constitution as a long laundry list of "Thou Shalt Not"s. Of course there are all sorts of limitations and proscriptions in the Constitution—and in the Bill of Rights as well. Clearly every member of Congress has the grave duty of considering these prohibitions every time he casts a vote; that is implicit in the oath of office.

But we should not fall into the trap of regarding the Constitution as merely a bar to action. The very contrary is the case. From its ringing preamble onward, it strikes a positive tone, authorizing and empowering action to be taken "to establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare" and so on. In short, it calls on the Congress to take an active role in curing the ills and meeting the needs of our society.

Here, I believe, is where the Congress has fallen down so distressingly in failing to meet its constitutional obligations. There are thirty-five million Americans today whose standard of living is so low that we have been forced to admit officially that they live in poverty. Under legislation proposed by President Johnson and approved by the Congress we have been able to create programs which have had some impact on four million of them, roughly one-ninth of the total. How much of an impact is a question now under study by the Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty, which I chair. The war on poverty has had difficult days in the Congress, and there is bound to be more rough sledding ahead. Yet it seems quite clear to me that the Congress has the duty *under the Constitution* to devise and appropriate funds for programs that will reach all of the poor—not just a small fraction of them—in meaningful ways that will help them build better lives for themselves.

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That same positive mandate from the Constitution exists in the field of civil rights. Yet almost a hundred years elapsed after the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments before the adoption, in 1964, of the first Omnibus Civil Rights Bill—and much more remains to be done.

As I have said many times, the reason for this constitutional default has been the unwillingness of the Congress, and particularly the Senate, to change its rules, practices, and procedures so as to make it possible for a majority to act, after reasonable debate, when a majority is ready for action. I agree with Professor Morgan that we must bring our actions into harmony with the spirit and letter of the Constitution, and I suggest that we begin with a thoroughgoing reform of congressional procedures so as to make them accord with the fundamental constitutional principle of majority rule.

JOSEPH S. CLARK
United States Senate

Politics and the Regulatory Agencies *by William L. Cary. New York and London, McGraw-Hill, 1967.—149 pp. $5.95.*

William L. Cary, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1961 to 1964, writes "impressionistically" (p. 123) about the impact of politics on the viability and dynamism of six of the "big seven" regulatory agencies over a period of time. He draws his central conclusions from first-hand knowledge of forces that tended to generate, and sometimes to enervate, the SEC during that agency's most active and consequential years since the early New Deal.

In references to the work of agencies other than the SEC, Mr. Cary is sometimes the ex-chairman who has talked with other commission heads, sometimes the impatient citizen, and sometimes the inquisitive professor of law. But he is nearly always the impressionist whose less than fully buttressed conclusion is that wholesale reform of the regulatory agencies (as advocated by others) is not needed.

In references to the SEC, the author is an informed reporter whose main interest is in the successful drive of that agency to produce the first major amendments of the securities laws in more than a quarter century. He can and does speak meaningfully of the political context within which the SEC sought to define the ideal and reach for the possible.

The political context is described with candor and, in spots, with a hangover of irritation. There are illustrations of the time-consuming responses a commissioner must make to people in the legislative and

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executive branches. There is a pinpointing of the difficulties agencies have in attracting adequate funds as well as capable people. And there is a discussion of the significance in the balance of political alignments among commissioners.

With a back-handed tribute to those in the securities industry who helped the SEC during his tenure ("Some of the responsible representatives appreciate their responsibilities . . . ," p. 73), Mr. Cary says agency vitality is impossible without a favorable political and economic climate, adequate funds, and a program that appeals to Congress, the public, and young recruits. The underlying assumption is that an agency must either advance its techniques and its jurisdiction—its grasp—or wither into institutionalized irrelevancy. It might be argued, and Mr. Cary might agree, that there are times when an agency's greatest challenge and best chance for both congressional and public respect would be in a self-vitalizing program aimed at the efficient administration of statutes as they are already written.

At the close of his discussion (p. 139) Mr. Cary emphasizes that he has not surveyed "the battle from a tower," but has written as "one who has been in the trenches, or more precisely in one of them." The battle and trench image may be disturbing to a congressman, to a denizen of the White House, or to one in the private sector who shares the view that laws must be responsive to needs just as agencies must be responsible as regulators. Such a person might prefer a comment about the fusion of conscience among all who share responsibility for development and administration of patterns of public protection in the areas of agency jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the battle and trench image suggests the essential vibrancy of an interesting book which provides a fresh comment on a vital subject by a thoughtful man of action.

EDWIN D. ETHERINGTON
Wesleyan University

State Legislatures in American Politics *edited by Alexander Heard for the American Assembly. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1966.—vi, 182 pp. $3.95.*

Prepared as the background reading for the 29th American Assembly at Arden House, this is an excellent summary of information concerning the present status of the state legislatures, their need for reform, the form it might take, and the improving prospects for securing it.

Each chapter is provided by an author who has been a major contributor to significant research on the subject. Herbert Jacob begins with the

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"Dimensions of State Politics." Using a systems analysis approach modeled on that of David Easton, he locates the state legislatures in the total political system and suggests the amount of variation from state to state in measurable characteristics. He demonstrates that for most of the more important purposes, the state legislatures rank low as centers of political decision. Hence he concludes (p. 36) that "we should guard against expecting unreasonable results from formal plans to revitalize state legislatures."

In further chapters, William J. Keefe writes on "The Functions and Powers of the State Legislatures," Malcolm E. Jewell on "The Political Setting," Duane Lockard on "The State Legislator," and John C. Wahlke on "Organization and Procedure." All of these chapters are concise, fact-filled, sensible, and much to the point, especially on all the factors that impede the state legislatures as institutions for the performance of work. "Reform: Limits and Opportunities," is the concluding chapter by Alexander Heard. "Two fundamental changes from the outside have given new significance to what can be accomplished," he suggests (p. 155). One is the compulsory reapportionment that is being achieved under *Baker* v. *Carr*. The other is the emergence of competitive two-party politics in many states previously dominated by Democrats or Republicans.

The result may be a great improvement in the extent to which the state legislatures can perform their political functions. This should lead rather quickly to removal of the obstacles that have prevented reform in such mundane areas as legislative staff services, office facilities for the legislators, sessions long enough for deliberation, and salaries permitting extended periods of service by those who are neither rich nor unprincipled. If such reforms can be accomplished, legislatures will be much more able to give effective attention to the heavy workloads they already carry. There may then be some opportunity to move on to "the larger tasks of creating government in the United States adequate to the nation's needs" (Heard, p. 161).

PAUL T. DAVID
University of Virginia

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New Dimensions of Political Economy *by Walter W. Heller. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.—viii, 203 pp. $3.50.*

Here is a delightful, winsome, and significant book. In this expanded form of his Godkin Lectures, delivered at Harvard University in 1966, the author reviews his experiences as a policy-maker and their implications for the discipline of economics and for the political economy of economic policy.

The first chapter is largely concerned with the arena within which economic analysis and political realities must be fused into a workable strategy of policy. Here the author is able to draw upon his four eventful years as chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers from 1961 to 1965. The result is an absorbing, fast-paced narrative of how two presidents served by the author recognized and utilized "modern economics as a source of national strength and presidential power" (p. 1). While there are here no hitherto undisclosed state secrets, the reader does have the feeling of a tour behind the scenes of those interesting years.

The second chapter explores "the objectives, working concepts, and policy content of the 'new economics' . . ." (p. 59). Much of this is concerned with the persisting gap between actual and potential output during the years beginning with 1958, and with the strategy of policies developed to close the gap. Fiscal policy was to play the crucial role. The concept of the full employment surplus (the difference between expenditures and the receipts the tax structure would produce at full employment) became the fiscal gauge and the rationale for a tax reduction in the face of an actual deficit. The 1964 tax reduction, then, came to epitomize the new fiscal policy.

The third chapter examines a subject that is receiving increasing attention, namely, the fiscal problems of our federal system. Here, in some ways, is to be found the part of the book that is most apt to make a difference in policy during the years ahead. It reflects solid and thoughtful philosophical underpinning about the nature of federalism, and those with a growing interest in the subject of revenue-sharing will find much here that is helpful to them.

So much for content. This book also deserves, and will receive, a vote of thanks from readers for its style. Professor Heller writes with a sprightliness and piquancy rare and refreshing in a profession justly famous for arid, formalistic, and turgid prose. Indeed, the reader may find himself swept along by the sheer contagion of the author's own enthusiasm and persuasiveness.

Chapter 2 will be the one most appreciated by many readers, but here a mildly negative note must be sounded. The sheer eloquence and anima-

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tion of the prose tend to mask the fact that the precise substance and content of the new economics does not really come through. Certainly the new in the new economics is not to be found in the four specified objectives—full employment, rapid growth, price stability, and balance of payments equilibrium—which have a long and honored place in postwar declarations of national economic policy.

For many the real meaning of the new economics is to be found in the skillful use of existing policy instruments to produce an impressive economic performance—a vigorous growth rate without a recession and with only a small rise in the price level. The other side of this, however, has been overlooked for too long. The fact is that the pace of the return to full employment from the 1961 recession was actually slow by historical standards. The economy's operating rate showed almost no improvement from the end of 1961 to the end of 1963, and in four and three-quarter years (the first quarter of 1961 to the fourth quarter of 1965) the unemployment rate was reduced by only two and one-half percentage points.

Naturally this slow improvement in the economy's operating rates, in turn, delayed the return to the full employment that would again expose us to price pressures and to another recedence in business activity. And not long after we finally regained reasonably full employment late in 1965 problems reappeared. To interpret the rise in economic activity from 1961 to 1965, with no recession and little inflation, as the power of something potent and new but never quite specified, is a disservice to those who had to assume responsibility for policy in 1965—when the problems became vastly more complex as the economy finally regained full employment.

Even so, this was an interesting era for economic policy, important progress was made in the instruments of policy, and the author of this book deserves the esteem that he enjoys. When we have time to see the era in perspective, we shall probably identify two major avenues along which we moved forward. First, the high employment surplus concept has certainly contributed to a better understanding of fiscal policy. Second, there is more of a philosophical consensus. Businessmen are showing a new sophistication about the problems of finding a *modus vivendi* between the public sector and the private sector. And there is a growing feeling on the part of the intellectual community that the general welfare is, after all, well served by the free market system of organizing economic activity. If so, the new economics will have made a major contribution to our era, and this certainly will be a tribute to the author of this book as the leading apostle.

PAUL W. MCCRACKEN
University of Michigan

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La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty—San Juan and New York *by Oscar Lewis. New York, Random House, 1966.—lix, 669 pp. $10.00.*

One of the main concerns of contemporary anthropological research may well be described as the study of how poor people apply psycho-social and cultural techniques to cope with the scarcities of their rapidly changing environments in the midst of an increasingly prosperous world. Credit belongs to Oscar Lewis for explicitly focusing this anthropological interest into a linear concept of a culture of poverty. Lewis is concerned about the popular use of the term and its imprecision, yet *La Vida* does not do much toward this objecive. *La Vida* is based on a series of studies of Puerto Rican families selected on the basis of their low income, having migrant members in New York, and their willingness to cooperate with the study. The book is a report on one of those families. It is written as a recast of field data in the form of a script and is reminiscent of the style of a *roman fleuve.* The members of the family are travelers; a product of the jet age, they go to Florida, to Pennsylvania and to New Jersey where they engage in agricultural harvests. They go to New York, where they work in marginal industrial occupations, but their home base remains a San Juan slum which the author likes to call *La Esmeralda.* Regardless of where they are, the women of the Rios family intermittently engage in *la vida*—the life of prostitution.

The central character of the family is presumably Fernanda, the mother, who has been a prostitute herself and who reassuringly encourages her daughters to follow in that same direction. Their socialization as prostitutes-mothers is successful. The Rios women like American sailors and merchant mariners and prefer them to Puerto Rican men, they manage to learn some English and they favor statehood for Puerto Rico. *La Esmeralda,* as any San Juan resident would tell, is a center of prostitution, the unofficial red light district of the city. The author indicates that *La Esmeralda* is off-limits for military personnel, but does not report clearly on the fact that *La Esmeralda* is probably a special kind of urban slum. This could be an important factor in understanding the Rios family and other families with a similar life-style. The Rios women talked candidly about their multiple sexual exploits with husbands, lovers, and clients. They all seem aware of the social disapproval of their behavior, even by their own slum neighbors, but justify it in terms of economic need. Thus Fernanda tells her children that she had gone "whoring" so that she might be able to buy them presents for Three Kings Day (p. 65). They pay lip service to cultural norms and social standards of desirable behavior and seek to explain their behavior in culturally approved ways.

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Yet, this reviewer could not help question the relevance of the Rios experience and life-style and the character formation of their members to Puerto Rican society, particularly to the slum subculture. To be questioned also is an implied connection between poverty and prostitution. Other research about Puerto Ricans in their own country and in the United States seems to point to alternative manners of coping than those used by the Rioses. Are the Rioses a deviant family, a product of very specific cultural, social, psychological, and even political processes? Lewis claims that the Rios story "shows in painful and dramatic form the conditions of poverty and social pathology which existed on a mass scale in Puerto Rico prior to the nineteen-forties and which still persist today in the slums" (p. xiv). This rather vague characterization of Puerto Rico prior to the twenties is a platitude. The Rioses seem unlikely to have existed prior to the whirlwind of social and economic changes that has swept Puerto Rico in the past twenty years; they are more likely marginal to an urban modern society, rather than widely distributed in the more rural and conservative society of the depression. One might speculate from some of the data provided by Lewis himself that the Rioses are an ironical example of progress and its corollary effects of human uprootedness and alienation. Yet, Lewis is a gifted writer and *La Vida* is a well-written book; the translation of field data is so faithful that it has retained the colorful vivacity of the Spanish language; and the respondents have been verbal to the point of exhibitionism. *La Vida,* however, is neither a contribution to science nor to humanistic scholarship. Lewis has failed to provide the concept of the culture of poverty with analytical dimension, has failed to use unbiased sampling procedures in the selection of his respondents and has neglected to use historical methods to place the Rioses in their proper historical and social perspective.

ELENA PADILLA
New York City

Economics and Prestige in a Maya Community: The Religious Cargo System in Zinacantan *by Frank Cancian. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965.—xv, 238 pp. $6.50.*

Cancian's book is a welcome change from the usual anthropological monograph in which an author tries to say everything about a single community, society, or culture and succeeds only in producing something that is superficial and impressionistic. Cancian's work is neither. It is a lucid, carefully documented, rigorous analytic account of some as-

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pects of the operation of a single institution in Zinacantan, a community of some 7,650 Mayan Indians in the Mexican state of Chiapas. The institution is what Meso-Americanists call the "cargo system" or "ceremonial ladder," a hierarchy of religious offices (cargos) occupied on a rotating basis by men of the community who spend substantial amounts of money in carrying out their duties as cargo-holders. In the eighteen months that Cancian spent in Zinacantan between August 1960 and August 1962, he was able to concentrate on investigation of the cargo system and to collect extensive samples of individual behavior for tests of his hypotheses because necessary background information was already available from other field workers associated with the Harvard Chiapas Project, which began in 1957.

The first twelve chapters of the book present an essentially synchronic account and analysis, culminating in a number of conclusions about the functions of the cargo system. Among the conclusions are the following: participation in the cargo system defines who belongs to the Zinacantan community; by reducing the amount of wealth that might be spent in the Ladino world, the expenditures entailed by the cargo system limit the extent of "boundary-crossing" into that world; intra-community conflict is kept in check by means of the legitimizing of wealth by cargo service and the actual reduction of wealth differences by cargo expenditures. Similar conclusions have been presented in other studies described, like this one, as functional analyses, but rarely have they been presented with the kind of extensive supporting data which Cancian is able to give on participation in the religious system, on expenditures in it for drink and food for fellow cargo-holders and auxiliary personnel, and on other pertinent variables.

Having specified some functions of the cargo system and having devoted his thirteenth chapter to a careful discussion of the use of the equilibrium model in testing a functional analysis in a single society, Cancian proceeds in his last three chapters to make a diachronic analysis. In this, he uses statistical methods and demographic models to show that population growth is markedly reducing the extent of participation in the cargo system even though its effect has been offset somewhat by two innovations: an increase in the number of cargo offices and the establishment of waiting lists for the offices. Cancian discusses also the disruptive effects of a growing surplus of cash that cannot be absorbed by the cargo system. He concludes by predicting the eventual destruction of the integrative consequences of the cargo system in Zinacantan.

Cancian's monograph is a notable achievement both as detailed and systematic ethnography and as a demonstration of the fruitfulness of empirically grounded functional analysis. The things that the monograph

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does, it does extremely well. Inevitably, however, this is at the expense of doing certain other things. Thus, there is no attempt to explain why it should be the cargo system rather than something else which fulfills the functions discussed by Cancian, but this question would of course require historical or some other kind of analysis rather than functional analysis. The reader interested, for example, in the historical role of the clergy or, at a later time, of the *hacienda*-owners in fostering and maintaining the cargo system as a source of material advantages for themselves will find no discussion of this in Cancian's book, and will have to turn instead to such other works as Marvin Harris' *Patterns of Race in the Americas*.

The functional analysis itself is not exhaustive in the book. For Cancian, as for Ernest Nagel and others, functional analysis means the analysis of systems in which several variables interact so as to maintain some other property of the system. Cancian confines himself for the most part to analyzing the maintenance of only two properties, participation in the cargo system and community integration. There might, however, be other functions of the cargo system—for example, maintaining the availability of a certain amount of subsistence goods to all families in the community. Cancian concedes that the system does produce some degree of "economic leveling," but he is concerned with the effect of this only on community integration and not on material welfare. It would, of course, be unfair to criticize Cancian for having dealt with some problems and not with others, but the hope may be voiced that these other aspects of the cargo system of Zinacantan will eventually be subjected to the same kind of intensive, rigorous, and illuminating analysis as have the aspects reported in this book.

ANDREW P. VAYDA
Columbia University

The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada *by John Porter. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1965.—xxii, 626 pp. $15.00.*

Few researches compare to that of John Porter, either in the United States or in Europe. This is due to the reluctance to present any new proposition in this controversial field that is not either mathematized or highly documented. The book offers a great amount of statistical data on incomes, professions, levels of education, and mobility of population from rural to urban areas. The chapter we found the most important was

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that dealing with migrations and the distribution of ethnic groups on the stratification scale.

The second part of the book describes the power structure in this stratification. A highly subtle analysis deals with the origins, the status, and the role of the elites in the realms of finance, labor, politics, administration, education, and mass media. Porter demonstrates, for example, that the financial elite is composed of 985 Canadian residents who control 170 powerful business corporations. He was able to obtain comparative data for 760 of them. The analysis of this data gives us a clear image of the social origins, social relationships, and religious and political affiliations of this elite, and allows the author to discuss competently in what measure this group is homogeneous. The same method is applied to other elites. When necessary, the data are examined in a historical context and further clarified by other informative documents discovered by the author. It is a monument of precision and sobriety.

It is highly regrettable, however, that the author voluntarily limits himself to what he calls objective data. The title of his book, *The Vertical Mosaic*, is a good illustration of this point.

Canadian society appears to be completely immobile. Porter himself mentions the fact that not one serious study of class consciousness exists in Canada. The dynamism, the movement of a society, however, can be discovered by methods other than interviews or questionnaires. Class interaction is expressed in collective actions, strikes and elections, for example, or the birth of reform movements.

The analysis of the relationship between Canada's two founding nations appears particularly weak from this point of view. To explain the political and economic retardation of French Canada, Porter makes use of the ideology of the French-Canadian clergy and bourgeoisie. But this ideology and the educational system that stems from it are never related to the political and economic domination of English-speaking Canada. The book does not mention that Canada was once an English colony in which French Canadians considered themselves and behaved as second-class citizens. The social class analysis of Canada cannot neglect such historical data, if it wishes to present a dynamic interpretation. Canada can be studied like a gigantic mosaic. On the other hand, the study could equally well start from the hypothesis of two social systems and two mother cultures, whose relationships determine a double system of stratification and of social classes. Porter notes the inferior status of the French Canadians, but because of the inadequacy of his conceptual scheme he can offer only a very partial explanation.

The theoretical part of the book gives us the conceptual scheme of the analysis. It seemed to us that it limited itself nearly exclusively to certain

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classics of American sociology, mainly Warner, Barber, Mills, and Davis. The analysis of Marxist theory is summary and the author accepts too readily Dahrendorf's criticism of the theory. This leads Porter to specify that what he considers classes are not social groups with a cohesion and an existence of their own, but descriptive categories established for the sole purpose of analysis. If this is done as a methodological choice, it is perfectly acceptable. If, on the other hand, the choice is theoretical, and such seems to be the case, it must be admitted that a number of recent researchers in the United States and Europe do not allow classes to be considered as statistical categories only. But there is no doubt that Porter's subsequent works will explain the genesis of the classes' relationships and conflicts, as well as their interrelations with ethnic groups.

JACQUES DOFNY
University of Montreal

Makers of Modern England: The Force of Individual Genius in History *by Giovanni Costigan. New York, Macmillan and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1967.—xiii, 334 pp. $6.95.*

Once upon a time historians solemnly recited Gresham's Law as truth once and for all delivered unto economists. By projection they translated it into a universal formula for all products of the human mind. A moment's reflection should establish that good money drives out bad and, what is more relevant here, that good biography drives out debased. The problem is to get good biography, for no branch of history is so common and none so debased. Mr. Costigan is helping to redress the balance, and, given its limits, each "life" in this volume should drive some trumpery from the market.

His volume, like any good essay, has double value, as method and as substance. Because, so we are told, biography alone of art-forms lacks an intense critical study, every student of it must feel his way; he has no *lehrbuch*. What to include, what to omit, how to group are questions he must constantly face as he attempts to relate what even in the easiest cases is intractable. The questions, as old as Plutarch and as new as this review, are made no easier by the appearance of new facets if not new questions, as the turmoil over a recent presidential biography testifies. In less personal vein it is enough to recall the compulsion to take account of psychoanalysis, the more that this vehicle, sometimes clothed in pretentious jargon and dependent on dubious assumptions, seems less concerned with explaining a man than explaining him away. Even the dis-

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tinction of some ventures does not hide either their failure to increase our understanding or their lack of historical insight and knowledge.

Starting with the assumption that the basic unit of history is the individual, alone yet not alone, Costigan has chosen nine lives which afford clues to whatever patterns may be discerned in history. In so doing he has exemplified the Diltheyan canon that biography enables the historian to give order to complex problems, to see in miniature contemporary tensions, and to achieve an angle of vision. His subjects, Bentham, Mill, Newman, Disraeli, Gladstone, the Webbs, Lloyd George, and Churchill, represent a nice balance of mind and body. Without uncovering any new information, he has deftly woven what is readily available into a coherent account and in the process woven that account into the fabric of the times. Without telling all, his selectivity fixes these personalities in the reader's imagination. He has not yielded to eulogy, edification, or exposure; his characters are there, warts and all. If he applauds some more than others, that is his privilege, and in its exercise he has slighted none. Because his essays are personal he conveys a sense of intimacy—heightened by felicitous exposition—that admits the reader to the experiences, public and private, of his subjects, whether Jeremy "Benefactor," John Henry "Schoolman," the towering Gladstone, or the progenitors of Blue Books. He does not demand concurrence, he provides understanding. An occasional dubiety such as the presumption that the Reform Act of 1867 did not benefit Disraeli, whereas at their first full opportunity the newly enfranchised gave him an overwhelming triumph, in no wise detracts from this delightful and informing restoration of the human personality to its place in history.

CHARLES F. MULLETT
University of Missouri

The Evolution of National Insurance in Great Britain: The Origins of the Welfare State *by Bentley B. Gilbert. London, Michael Joseph, 1966.—497 pp. 84s.*

In this tightly packed, scholarly volume Professor Gilbert offers us by far the best account yet available of the late Victorian and Edwardian origins of what later in the twentieth century was to be called "the welfare state." Most earlier accounts have been written on the basis of secondary sources or have consisted of detailed monographs on individual personalities, many of them slanted, or specific problems, some of them peripheral. With the help of a large number of collections of private papers,

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some of which have significantly little to say about social reform, Professor Gilbert has tackled the central themes, drawing a most important distinction, which will prove definitive, between two epochs in Edwardian social legislation. Of six welfare measures passed in the golden age of Liberal reform politics between 1906 and 1914, three—feeding of school children, school medical services, and old age pensions—had long prehistories, with mixed pedigrees, while three others—labor exchanges, unemployment insurance, and health insurance—were as removed from the first three "as if the measures had been enacted in another country." They involved quite new ventures into social politics. In a detailed study of the passing of each of these measures, Professor Gilbert deals admirably with the interplay of interest and administration, opinion and social change. His conclusion is that "the magnitude of the achievement can be described only as stupendous. Great Britain was diverted from a socialist solution to the problem of poverty and was turned instead to the establishment of the institution of social insurance" (p. 451). Moreover, "even though Liberalism died as a political force, its moderate and essentially British ideal remained alive" (p. 452). Every subsequent writer on the "welfare state" will be deeply indebted to Professor Gilbert both for the richness of his research and the bold range of his generalizations.

At the same time, there must be some doubt about his perspectives. His introduction on the Victorian origins of the story is less satisfactory than his study of the measures themselves. It does not quite explain why poverty, which had for long been taken for granted by most Englishmen, became a major issue of argument in the eighteen-eighties. The fear of social democracy seems to me to be overplayed; English social democracy was a different kind of phenomenon from German socialism, nor were English labor leaders quite as anxious to extend state powers as is sometimes suggested in subsequent writings about them. A more searching study is needed of the "new Liberalism," a term which Professor Gilbert often uses but does not track down to its source. J. A. Hobson does not figure in his index, for example, although he is mentioned once in a footnote. Some aspects of Liberal debate are consequently neglected, and of these, indeed, some, like temperance or land reform, had welfare bearings of great importance. Qualifications would have to be made to Professor Gilbert's generalization that "national insurance was the Liberal response to the threat of socialism" (p. 448), even to his emphasis on the influence of the German model. Another figure he leaves out, the political economist Alfred Marshall, would direct attention to problems of "citizenship," which T. H. Marshall was to treat as fundamental in what is still the best introduction to the post-1945 "welfare state," *Citizenship and Social Class*. Lastly, ending as he does in 1914,

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he inevitably misses war out of his general picture, as he almost always misses out the influence of the market on incomes, expectations, and status. A fuller study of the "welfare state" would have to take account of all these themes, yet to raise them as additional factors is in no sense to under-value Professor Gilbert's narrative or analysis. He stimulates discussion as well as clarifies and defines.

ASA BRIGGS
University of Sussex

Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926-1933: A Study in Diplomatic Instability *by Harvey Leonard Dyck. New York, Columbia University Press, 1966.—279 pp. $6.75.*

This latest addition to the long row of books dealing with Soviet-German relations is distinguished from many of its predecessors in that it firmly links foreign policy to the internal development in both countries. That this approach has much to recommend itself emerges in particular in the later chapters. A distinct cooling-off which almost became a crisis in 1929 was due not only to the growing subversive activities of the German Communists, but above all to the collectivization campaign which caused many thousands of Russian peasants of German origin to congregate in Moscow whence they hoped to emigrate to Canada. German public opinion began to be deeply stirred and the German diplomatic representatives intervened on their behalf, so that the relations between the two countries not unnaturally deteriorated. During the following years the growth of German nationalism and revanchism and Russian skepticism about the stability of German governments during the great crisis again brought about much cooler relations than had existed in the nineteen-twenties. Both sides still referred to the spirit of Rapallo, but this was virtually dead before Hitler became the German chancellor. Papen in particular was strongly pro-Western and anti-Soviet. What was not dead was the military cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army; their "contacts were reaching their high-water mark" in the early nineteen-thirties, as the author correctly emphasizes in contrast with recent German works on the same topic. The policy of the Reichswehr once more diverged from that of the German government. The Russians in their turn were ever-suspicious, at the time of Stresemann as well as that of his successors, fearing that the line of Locarno would predominate over that of Rapallo, that Germany would opt for a pro-Western course. Yet this was hardly possible as long as a revision of the German-Polish

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frontier remained the central aim of German foreign policy. For this reason Germany relied on Russian support and was unable to effect a *rapprochement* with France.

These and many other points of interest are clearly established in this volume; it shows throughout a sound knowledge and understanding of the German diplomatic documents on which it is based. There are, however, occasional slips as far as the German domestic scene is concerned. Thus General Hasse was never "Chief of the German Army Command" (as claimed on page 25), and General von Schleicher did not cease to be the minister of defense when he became chancellor in December 1932 (as stated on page 254). In addition, many of the sources quoted from the originals have already been used and quoted by other authors—a fact that is often not acknowledged; and the translations are not always correct. Yet these are minor blemishes in a work that substantially adds to our understanding of a very complex issue.

F. L. CARSTEN
University of London

Contemporary French Political Thought *by Roy Pierce. London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1966.—x, 276 pp. $5.75; paperbound, $2.50.*

This is a clear, careful, and unpretentious account of the political views of six influential French thinkers. All born between 1903 and 1913, they developed their ideas in the world of Stalin and Hitler, the slump and the Bomb, and were published (in one case posthumously) mainly after the Second World War. They all reacted against the evident inadequacies of the established French political doctrines: the sterile negativism of Alain's version of liberalism, which began and ended with resistance to the state; the venomous violence of Maurras, who reviled all his opponents in the name of national union and traditionalist doctrine; the rival and hostile schools of Marxism. The reactions of the six writers took very different forms. Emmanuel Mounier tried to marry religion and revolution, and Simone Weil became a mystic before her early death. Bertrand de Jouvenel flirted with fascism in the thirties, and Albert Camus with communism; Jean-Paul Sartre, who contrived to be apolitical at that period has fluttered round the party ever since like a moth round a candle. Even Raymond Aron, the cool arch-rationalist, was a militant Gaullist in 1947 when that protean movement was in its most intemperate phase.

In their different ways all six writers are preoccupied with the conception and the reality of revolutionary violence: the hopes it inspires, the cor-

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ruptions it entails, the methods and chances of so organizing society as to avoid either chaos and massacre in the name of liberty, or stagnation and repression in the name of order. Jouvenel, the most conservative of the six, puts stability first and seeks to fit the need for change into a solid structure in which democracy (as distinct from liberty) finds little place. Revolution comes high among the values of Mounier and Sartre; the author finds the former unconvincing when he relies on a change of revolutionary hearts to solve the problem, and the latter when he dismisses it by redefining abstract nouns. As a good American liberal Pierce plainly prefers the other three. Camus emphasizes the perils of intellectual self-assurance which leads men in the name of abstractions to "logical crime," the slaughter of the people they once meant to help. Simone Weil struggles to reconcile her two imperatives, utopian speculation (to provide a standard for judging the direction of progress) and realistic analysis of the existing situation (to prevent the murderous temptations which beset crusaders for the unattainable). Aron wars above all against the utopian search for the best of both worlds, insisting that social systems are wholes from which it is impossible to pick and choose only the features you fancy. "His purpose is to reduce the terrain over which political conflicts take place to an area in which there is some probability of successfully realising the values in the name of which the conflicts take place."

While his own preferences are not concealed, Pierce treats his six thinkers fairly and respectfully, though he subjects each of them to careful, sensible, and often searching criticism; only Sartre occasionally—and understandably—stimulates him to irritable impatience. This is not a flashy book. It is clear and readable but without verbal fireworks. As a brief, honest, and intelligent analysis of a generation of political writers, it helps to show that political theory need not be irrelevant to the contemporary world.

PHILIP M. WILLIAMS
Nuffield College, Oxford

The Searchers: Conflict and Communism in an Italian Town *by Belden Paulson with Athos Ricci. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1966.—xviii, 360 pp. $6.95.*

This is in many ways a moving and revealing book, "written" in large measure by the residents of Castelfuoco, a small town close to Rome where the author (and his assistant) were able to tape record the "life histories" of a number of persons intimately involved in Castelfuoco's social, political, and economic history. The words of the villagers, even

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when they do not ring true (I doubt that very many of Castelfuoco's residents can put together phrases like "every pulse boiled up in a single erotic convulsion . . .") convey a sense of Southern Italian politics that is curiously lacking in Banfield's *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. The "life histories" reveal, as social science rarely does, what the advent of fascism meant for the life of a small town close to Rome, and how that particular regime—blended with a previous history of feudalism, religious superstition and obtuseness, abject poverty and political reaction —could influence the postwar politics of the community.

Belden Paulson (and Athos Ricci, his assistant) deserve our appreciation for having induced several of Castelfuoco's citizens—Communists and declining aristocrats, priests and "idle" youth, Christian Democrats and interest group leaders—to give their interpretations, perceptions, and evaluations of the political institutions, events, and personalities that have been involved in national and local politics during this century. The "March on Rome" thus takes on a vivid reality when seen through the eyes of several of Castelfuoco's residents, some of whom participated in it, others who opposed it with violence. So does the postwar switch of Fascists to the Communist party, symbolized in this book by Castelfuoco's mayor, an authoritarian figure and *apparatchik* who exploits the remarkable and consistent majorities the Communist party continues to garner in the commune. Similarly, the vestiges of feudalism, the politically passive role of Southern Italian women, the seeming economic hopelessness of the Italian South, the role of the clergy in Italian politics—all of these and more are indelibly communicated when we learn of them through the comments that the author was able to record and skillfully edit. Although the struggles between the mayor and one of the local priests is sometimes reminiscent of *Don Camillo*, the slapstick humor of Guareschi's novel is lacking, as well it should be when one stops to enumerate the incredible number of indignities, physical privations, violences, frauds, and disillusionments that the Catholic Church and Italy's "political class" have persistently inflicted on the local citizenry. If Paulson has demonstrated nothing else, he has certainly shown how problematical will be the growth of democratic institutions in a milieu such as this.

Yet this book is curiously marred, largely, I believe, because the author, in his attempt to explain the appeals of Italian communism in Castelfuoco, is hobbled by many of the very stereotypes he proposes to modify. Surely no one in Italy with any understanding of the Communist party would hold that what made a Communist coup unthinkable in 1964 (!) was its "fear of U.S. retaliation" (p. xii).

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The author's ambivalence about Italian communism and Communists keeps surfacing in the book. For example, Paulson tends in part to ascribe the strength of communism to the weaknesses of the opposition—uninvolved youth, obtuse clerics, lazy and non-militant Christian Democrats. Yet he can also say about Communists that "they were able to bring communism to Castelfuoco in 1945 and the early postwar years because they were more militant, more persuasive, and probably more understanding of the new historical realities than any of their competitors" (pp. 89-90). Paulson is able to suggest that communism may give a sense of purpose to Castelfuoco's hapless citizenry, but he then goes on to describe what the Communist leaders say as just so much rhetoric or creation of religious fervor. He notes that the PCI is the only *mass* party in the village and that the DC is run by the clergy and is abjectly dependent on local Catholic Action and Catholic agricultural associations, but he does not go on to analyze what electoral difference organization as such seems to make. At one point (pp. 328-29) he notes the low quality of Communist leadership, confiding that "men of intelligence and integrity rarely make good organizational communists," and adds that the opposition "man for man has better people in terms of education and professional attainment." A few pages later (p. 341) the author tells us that "the Communists of Castelfuoco may be intellectually sterile but they are less so than their opposition."

The reader then will be left to wonder how the author's personal calculus finally comes out. As I read him, the critical factor that explains PCI strength in Castelfuoco is its ability to persuade local voters that the Communists offer the best short-cut to a "just society." But persuasion, as Paulson's respondents attest, involves more than campaign oratory in the piazzas. It includes as well ideological militancy, disciplined organization, hard-working activists, and—yes—even political patronage.

There is one other overpowering inference to underline, namely, that in Castelfuoco, as in much of Italy, the *status quo* has now come to mean not only the undemocratic, feudal institutions of the past but much of what we in America associate with "liberal" or "pluralistic" democracy. Insofar as this configuration fails to resolve Italy's and Castelfuoco's nagging problems, political change will take essentially anti-democratic directions. We are greatly in the author's debt for having illustrated this problem so convincingly.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
Yale University

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Portugal and Africa, 1815-1910: A Study in Uneconomic Imperialism *by R. J. Hammond. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966.—xv, 384 pp. $8.50.*

The conjunction in the title does not connect two similar entities, at least as treated by R. J. Hammond. Portugal is a country inhabited by people who have leaders, policies, crises, and international relations, but Africa is merely an object.

The author achieves more empathy for the Portuguese than most writers whose mother tongue is English. This gives the book one of its more valuable qualities, because while he strives to be fair to each Portuguese point of view (and, of course, there were many), he does evaluate the positions taken in the various events. He will call a Portuguese a knave or a fool when the epithet seems to be deserved, but no Portuguese comes off as battered as Lord Salisbury.

This book is to a large extent an account of Anglo-Portuguese relations concerning Africa, but surprisingly Professor Hammond confines himself to published Portuguese sources while he utilizes Biritsh archives. It happens that the published Portuguese materials are extensive, and while it may be possible to be fair to the Portuguese side vis-à-vis the British by relying on what is published in Portuguese, the neglect of Portuguese archives is undoubtedly one of the reasons why the African participation in this lop-sided history is almost completely lacking.

Gungunhana is the only African to be more than mentioned—and very few are even mentioned—and he appears (p. 136) in a quote of a minute of Salisbury's without any preparation of the reader for his rebellion. Yet the author is aware (p. 177) that there was a Portuguese "resident" at Gungunhana's court and that there had been official correspondence from that source.

Chapter One is devoted to preparing the non-Portuguese reader for the personalities and politics of nineteenth-century Portugal (familiarity with the British is assumed), but nowhere is any effort made to give an African background. The author seems not even to perceive the Africans—unless minuted by someone like Salisbury.

The preface contains the author's excuse for "omissions"—which is nothing less than that the historian should concern himself with what interests him. In this period of increasing general interest in Africa it is our loss that Professor Hammond does not share in this, but we can be very grateful to him for so amply sharing with us his interest in Portugal's involvement in diplomacy during the "scramble for Africa" and to a lesser extent in its policies of African administration.

DANIEL F. MCCALL
Boston University

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The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914 *edited by Charles Issawi. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1966.—xv, 524 pp. $12.50.*

This is a pioneering study in the vast but unexplored field of the economic history of the Middle East by an eminently qualified scholar. Professor Charles Issawi, Ragnar Nurkse Professor of Economics at Columbia University, is familiar with all aspects of the Middle East, as his books and articles, ranging from the philosophy to the politics of the area, testify. His familiarity with the area is clearly proven in the present book, whose title does not express fully its broad scope. Mr. Issawi's work assembles a rich variety of social, economic, and demographic information; it is indispensable reading for any social scientist seeking to place this area in its proper historical and political perspective. To this reviewer, who has tried to see the politics of the Middle East in a broader social and economic context, Professor Issawi's work provides valuable insights into the foundations of the political process. The passages on land tenure, particularly in Iraq and Egypt, and on the transition from subsistence to market economy provide tantalizing and vital information on social and structural changes which accompanied the modernization of the Middle East. Other sections on taxation, financing, banking, population, the introduction of modern systems of transportation, irrigation, and commerce, together with those on industrialization and the occupational habits of ethnic groups, illustrate the broad scope of Professor Issawi's work.

The book consists of a general introduction and sixty-one excerpts, each preceded by a brief introductory passage and accompanied by notes and relevant bibliography. Most of the excerpts are translated from Arabic, Turkish, Russian, Italian, and French, and are made available for the first time to the English reader. Such an approach is far more suitable to begin a systematic study of the social and economic history of the Middle East than the forced assumptions and the scant information on which many existing books are based. In comparison with Professor Issawi's work, even the better books, such as those by Z. Y. Hershlag and Alfred Bonné, seem outclassed and inadequate. The value of Professor Issawi's approach lies in the fact that he supplies, with illuminating commentary, basic information on the specific aspects of the Middle East economy derived from works by native writers and outside authorities intimately familiar with the problems under consideration. Thus, the reader, while not able to learn the entire history, say, of transportation, has in exchange a number of basic points to set him on the proper course of inquiry. This reviewer would, however, question the wisdom of organizing the texts on a country basis. Since the nations of the Middle East did not emerge un-

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til the twentieth century (except for Egypt), the reader may mistakenly think that the Middle Eastern economy evolved nationally. True, the economy of the Ottoman empire, the dominating authority until 1916, was never integrated nationally. It developed on a regional basis subject to forces in its immediate surroundings. But a number of fundamental measures, such as the land code of 1858, the railway system, and taxation, introduced by the central authority, had nationwide effects. Consequently this reviewer feels that the work might have dramatized even better the nature of economic change if its organization were topical. All in all, however, Professor Issawi's book, with its rich content, bibliography, glossary, and appendixes on currency, weights, and measures, is a major contribution to the study of the Middle East. It should be consulted by all social scientists dealing with the Middle East if their studies are to reflect authentically the economic causes of social and political transformation in the area.

KEMAL H. KARPAT
University of Wisconsin

The Managerial Revolution in Higher Education *by Francis E. Rourke and Glenn E. Brooks. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.—viii, 184 pp. $8.00.*

Education is the last of the useful arts to respond to the technological revolution. The building of churches and the growing of crops have become mechanized, but only recently has the teaching of students been regarded as something which would benefit from modern technology. (It is worth reflection that the output of crops per farmer has enormously increased over the last thirty years, but the output of graduates per professor has decreased!) Change has now, however, descended swiftly upon the academic world, and this book records one significant advance on the technological front in universities. This lively essay describes how institutions of higher education, dedicated by tradition to the advancement of knowledge, are at last, somewhat reluctantly, beginning to collect knowledge about their own operations. Most universities now have something which could be described as "institutional research" on their own activities, though (according to the authors' sampling) over a third of those who direct this research think that there would be major controversy if the results were made public; so in many cases the data become classified in the same category as research on missiles and bombs.

The book describes the effect of the computer on the campus, with some alarming examples of what an English reviewer must be forgiven for

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regarding as abuse rather than use. In one institution (p. 25) the computer is used to produce the president's letter of appointment to the academic staff. In another the admissions officer reported that "ninety percent of our applications are untouched by human hands" (p.24). Perhaps the computer's most bizarre duty is (in two institutions) "the compilation of bids and choices for sorority rush." But these examples are, of course, not a valid measure of the usefulness of modern administrative technologies in higher education. The products of technology are always subject to abuse; much more important, though less newsworthy, is the vast amount of accurate information which any university can now collect about the efficacy of its own operations.

Accurate—yes; but is it also reliable? For higher education deals with men and women, not manpower, and many of the essential data are non-metrical and cannot be fed into a computer or punched on an IBM card. The authors recognize this antithesis between what is accurate and what is reliable and they do not underrate the difficulties of using the mass of data now available for decision-making and academic strategy.

This is a sensible and timely book. Universities must optimize their efficiency, because they now perform an essential function for the state and they receive liberal support from the state. To optimize efficiency modern techniques are essential. But over one thing the last word must remain with the professors: they, not politicians or even boards of trustees, must determine what the criteria for efficiency are to be. In a modern university both Karl Marx and Charles Darwin might have received drop-out chits from the computer!

ERIC ASHBY
Clare College, Cambridge

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Book Notes

The expansion of the British Commonwealth of Nations to include Asian and African members has obscured the problems of the "Old Commonwealth," the association of European communities that emerged before World War II. J. D. B. Miller concentrates on them in his *Britain and the Old Dominions* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967; 286 pp., $6.50). He provides the background necessary for understanding these Dominions by a chapter on their common heritage from Britain, and by several chapters in which the distinctive characteristics of each one—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa—are described. Then he deals in more detail with the relations between Britain and the four since 1918 and especially since 1945. The working of the system in its present form is beautifully illustrated by brief case studies on Suez, the departure of South Africa, Britain's first attempt to join the EEC, and Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Miller writes with rare authority and pretty complete objectivity, although I think he accepts too placidly the way in which the case of South Africa was handled in 1961. He is sympathetic to what the Commonwealth is supposed to stand for, but wholly free from the piety that used to characterize so much discussion of Commonwealth matters—and occasionally still does. Even close students of Commonwealth affairs can profit from his many insights into current politics. This is perhaps especially true of the last chapter on possible future developments. This is truly a book that fills a gap. It should take rank as one of the best volumes in the series "Britain in the World Today" in which it appears.—T. P. PEARDON, *Barnard College.*

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One topic of modern Italian history on which Americans have produced a considerable literature is Italian labor. Perhaps familiarity breeds contemplation, for here is still another thoughtful work on this favorite subject—*Ideology, Economic Change, and the Working Classes: The Case of Italy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966; xiii, 196 pp., $5.00) by Samuel J. Surace. This study claims no new evidence, a point Professor Reinhard Bendix makes as a kind of pre-emptive strike in his brief introduction. Indeed, Surace's study by no means exhausts the secondary literature. A sociologist's essay, which treats the period before the First World War, the book is brief and highly conceptual. These virtues exact their penalties; the first section of the book, on the development of an ideology, has to explain too much in too short space. Generally, it is too derivative from works which are themselves imprecise. The last section, on "strategies" (emigration, cooperative movements, uprisings, strikes, suffrage reform), though often stimulating, can provide neither formal elaboration of theory nor detailed analysis of particular events. The conceptual ideas in the book are hardly startling; most of them would be well known, for example, even to historians who cannot say sociology without a snarl. But when Surace sensibly and unpretentiously applies these ideas to particular aspects of his topic, the results are impressive. One may wish to dispute some conclusions or certain applications of his methods (Surace's use of statistics, incidentally, is especially effective), but in each chapter he offers suggestions at least good enough to deserve our gratitude. The two main contentions of the book seem to me admirable—ideology is itself "a dynamic force in generating change" and consensus as well as conflict can lead to change. If those points seem obvious, they are often ignored. The first point, though the easier one to make, is developed less systematically than it deserves to be. The second point is one that has been largely overlooked ever since the nineteenth-century discovery that liberal reformers had private interests. Professor Surace's case for the role of consensus is well done and welcome, particularly with regard to Italy, where interpretative stress on conflict had in itself become a matter of consensus.—RAYMOND GREW, *University of Michigan.*

Another narrow *apologia* for President Ayub Khan's regime in Pakistan —Herbert Feldman's *Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration* (Lahore, Karachi, and Dacca, Oxford University Press, 1967; x, 242 pp., $6.50)—has found its way undeservingly into print. The author's fourth work, following thin introductory descriptions of the country, its constitution, and the Karachi Chamber of Commerce

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and Industry, is a dull but detailed summary of government press notices and newspaper clippings. It would be a useful substitute for a clipping file but for the fact that it is written in the wordy style of the nineteenth-century *Statesman*, and the reader must painfully search for small increments of new information. Mr. Feldman is at his best in presenting minute detail and footnoting precise dates, places, and occasions, but we also owe him thanks for a little new light on Iskander Mirza, the foreign subsidy of certain Pakistani papers, and the politics of evacuee property distribution. He has also helped preserve some of the insights of *Outlook*, a remarkable but short-lived weekly which offered a less opaque window on the society than its more favored competitors. But the problem with the book is not with what it says; it is with what it does not say. There is little insight into President Ayub Khan, his problems, or his colleagues, and the title word "study" is surely inaccurate. Perhaps the spirit of the book is best illustrated by what must be a classic disclaimer on page 123. Having alluded to Henry VIII to illustrate a point, the author immediately finds it necessary to footnote the fact that no one (guess who?) in Pakistan aspires to "follow the example of Henry VIII in any respect." Either the book was written with tongue in cheek, or it should have been. One can only wonder why Oxford University Press chose to publish it.—WAYNE WILCOX, *Columbia University*.

The seven essays collected in *The Revolutionary Internationals, 1864-1943*, edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch (Stanford, Stanford University Press for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966; xv, 256 pp., $6.95), explore the various historical phases of the international force of communism under the impact of Marxism and its contradictions. Jacques Freymond and Miklos Molnar explore the ideological and political diversity of the various sections which became members of the IWA (First International), the heterogeneity of which finally led to a breakdown after Marx exerted his authority in 1871 to enforce a centralist strategy. The authors come to the conclusion that the role of this organization was "evolutionary" rather than revolutionary, in as much as aggressive class consciousness did not yet exist, but slowly emerged during its existence. This interpretation is further supported by Boris I. Nicolaevsky's article on "Secret Societies and the First International" and its relation to the Masonic Lodge, and by Max Nomad's essay on "The Anarchist Tradition," which focuses on the controversy between Marx and Bakunin. The struggle among the various groups of the First International foreshadows the two main trends in the Socialist move-

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ment: socio-political reform within the framework of national existence, and aggressive class struggle in the international scene. The history of the Second International reflected these two irreconcilable ideologies, but unfortunately the two analyses of the Second International are tinged by the political viewpoint of the authors. Gerhart Niemeyer interprets it predominantly as utopianism, prohibiting the integration of labor into the existing society. Carl Landauer's article, on the other hand, is confined to a history of the German Social Democratic party, without giving enough consideration to the relative position of the SPD and its antagonists within the comprehensive framework of the international labor movement. Milorad M. Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch examine the history of the Third International (Comintern), the internal struggle with deviationists and the changing tactics in foreign policy during the turbulent decades 1919-43. The last article, "The Comintern as an Instrument of Soviet Strategy," by Stefan T. Possony, centers around the problem of the policy of the Comintern toward Germany, 1919-35. The volume is a valuable contribution to the history of the Communist movement, the different facets of which the Hoover Institution has undertaken to explore.—KAETHE MENGELBERG, *New York City.*

The first volume of Arnold Brecht's autobiography, *Aus nächster Nähe: Erinnerungen eines beteiligten Beobachters, 1884-1927* (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, *1966*; *532 pp.*, *38* DM), springs from the rare combination of abundant recall of the German political scene, 1914-27, seen from the middle ranks of government service, and fine understanding of the events in historical perspective. His position in the Reich Chancellery, October 1918 to November 1921, afforded Brecht an excellent vantage point from which he observed (and participated in) the fall of Imperial Germany and the establishment of the Weimar Republic. He describes vividly the crisis of the abdication, the confusion of the revolutionary months in Berlin, and the bitter dispute about the Versailles Treaty. Brecht accompanied the government when it fled to Stuttgart to escape the Kapp *Putsch* in the capital. As head of the political section of the Ministry of Interior, 1921 to 1927, Brecht devoted himself particularly to bringing the machinery of government into harmony with democratic ideals, to revising the old federal and electoral systems, and to drafting legislation for the protection of the Republic. The author draws skillful and penetrating portraits of the leaders and civil servants of the Weimar Republic, offering apt and often original critical evaluations of their capabilities and shortcomings. Throughout his memoirs, he en-

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larges upon his experience with acute insights into the nature of Weimar politics and politics in general. The book, especially the appendix, contains a number of hitherto unpublished documents: Brecht's correspondence with Max von Baden, several of his early articles on the political situation, and the "lost" minutes of the cabinet meeting of November 2, 1918.—C. M. KIMMICH, *Columbia University.*

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